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Abstract 
 
This dissertation examines theories of emotion in politically contentious 
discourse in order to better understand the implications for teachers and students in 
composition classrooms where critical pedagogical practices lead to contentious 
political work. I suggest that partly as a result of the social and political turn in 
composition studies, the expectation for disrupting the normative political values and 
beliefs of students has become part of the curriculum in many writing classrooms. Yet 
teachers and students charged with such learning goals may be largely unaware of and 
unprepared for the role emotion might play in this teaching and learning situation. I 
argue that it is both ethically imperative and pragmatically in our best interest to better 
understand the complexities of the intersection between emotion and politically 
contentious discourse.  
Drawing on a variation of grounded theory methodology called “situational 
analysis,” I examine two seemingly separate sites of inquiry, a politically contentious 
discussion among teachers in composition and rhetoric, and materials from a new 
teaching assistant practicum, that together help begin to illuminate the less than visible 
influences and importance of collective emotion in contentious political discourse in the 
writing classroom. In chapter one I establish the exigency for the project and provide an 
historical account of the divergent paths that have led to politically contentious 
discourse in writing classrooms. In chapter two, I develop a working definition for the 
 
 
concept of emotion and suggest particular theoretical frames from political sociology 
useful to the analysis of emotion. Chapter three provides an explanation and 
justification for the use of situational analysis as a methodological way forward in 
exploring relational factors involved in the situation of inquiry. Chapter four analyzes a 
politically contentious discussion among professionals in composition and rhetoric, 
which highlights the autonomous power of collective emotion to open and reinforce 
social division. In chapter five I examine steps that scholars in composition and rhetoric 
have taken toward understanding the implications of emotion in politically contentious 
classrooms, and argue that there are important gaps in this work, particularly with 
regard to the range of experience of the teachers taking on the challenge of critical 
pedagogy in first year composition. The final chapter examines a particular site of such 
teaching work, a new teaching assistant practicum, through materials collected 
retrospectively from teachers, students and mentors. In sum, this dissertation argues for 
first steps we might take to ensure a more productive way forward for teachers and 
students in classrooms where politically contentious work is part of the writing 
curriculum. 
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Introduction 
 
As a child I attended the “campus school” at the college where my father was an 
art teacher. The school emphasized student learning completely through curiosity—no 
grades, no set curriculum. I worked with a young graduate student named Noel, who 
taught me about the religion she practiced, which today would likely be called 
Neopaganism or Wicca. I bring up this experience not to highlight what might have 
been a bit out of control in the progressive elementary schools of the 1960’s, but to 
remember a lesson this woman taught me that has remained with me, especially in my 
teaching. Noel taught me about what she and others from this religion called the 
“Rede,” an agreement among those performing elements of her religion to always 
assume responsibility for effects their workings might have, intended or unintended.  
These women believed that their religious work was not so much grounded in the 
“supernatural” as in the natural--but natural channels that they simply had no full 
understanding of.   
It’s been decades since this experience, but some of these ideas resonate for me as 
I make teaching decisions that involve the use of channels of emotion that I have no full 
understanding of: invoking shame in my students for their prejudices, intentionally or 
unintentionally, for example; or encouraging a collective anger or resentment in my 
classroom for corporations that put profit before human welfare. As professionals, we 
have a responsibility to examine the ways that the seemingly “natural channel” of 
emotion, which we have no full understanding of, is at work, even when our intentions 
are positive.  
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Shifts in the teaching of writing over the past three decades have moved many of 
us toward a greater sense of responsibility for social justice in the world, both through 
our individual actions, and through our work with students. I am not interested in 
taking an argumentative stance regarding the shifts toward a focus on social justice and 
critical pedagogy in many writing classrooms, but I am interested in what it means for 
us as teachers and for our students. 
This question of how emotion is involved in our work is not new for educators, 
of course. When we teach, there is necessarily change involved; and change is 
sometimes painful, or joyful, or exciting. But invoking emotion in relation to the 
political has special implications—and, I would argue, special responsibilities. As 
writing teachers, we have always used emotion to make things happen in our 
classrooms, but as we learn more about it, as we get better at purposefully using it to 
build toward the goals of social justice, it becomes more and more our responsibility to 
recognize the consequences and impacts of our efforts. Is it possible, for example, that 
we might be opening new or larger rifts at the same time we are working to bring 
people to a greater awareness of social injustice? Emotion is not supernatural, but 
sometimes its forces remain outside our full range of understanding. We can see the 
effects, but it is very difficult to cipher how and why these effects occurred.  This 
dissertation is an attempt to find some preliminary ways of better understanding how 
emotion functions, so that we might more ethically and productively work with it, 
especially in our politically-oriented teaching work. 
This project grew out of my curiosity regarding the emotion work that appears 
increasingly integral to successful teaching of writing in classrooms where critical 
pedagogy is employed.   As a mentor for new teaching assistants in a college writing 
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department, I saw intersections, sometimes clashes, between the political questions 
given prominence in many of the shared course designs, and seemingly unrelated 
classroom matters such as teacher authority, grading, and classroom management.  
Yet the relationship between these practical, classroom-based concerns and the 
more theoretically based uses of political inquiry was not often observed or analyzed. 
Conversations about the intersection, when they happened, tended to circulate around 
terms such as the “resistance” of students, or “contrapower harassment” of teachers. 
While discussions of the problems in terms like resistance or contrapower harassment is 
certainly helpful, they tend to bracket the emotion involved, and come to stand in for 
larger, more complex processes of emotion at work with the political. Within a term like 
resistance, for example, is a built in notion of both instantiating a critical view of the 
world in students (as in resisting the neoliberal agenda) and the students’ reluctance to 
take up such a critical view, as well as collective feelings about the people who are 
“resisting” and what is being “resisted.” By looking more closely at the situation of 
critical pedagogy in the writing classroom, relationally and within a larger context, it 
may be possible to make some progress in understanding and addressing these types of 
recurring concerns. 
Though intersections between the politics involved in critical pedagogy and the 
writing classrooms of these new teachers initiated my interest, analysis of the teaching 
practicum itself does not come until the final chapter of this dissertation. In order to 
make sense of the moments recorded in the practicum materials, it is necessary to first 
establish new ways of seeing the connections between emotion and political contention 
in the writing classroom. As a way to help the reader better see the approach taken in 
this dissertation project, I offer a concrete example of such a political moment from the 
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new teaching assistants’ practicum, followed by an explanation of how each chapter of 
the dissertation is designed to make possible a more nuanced and productive 
understanding of the situation, and those like it. 
A new teaching assistant I was mentoring wrote to me asking for help with a 
situation from class.  She was using a shared inquiry for the class called “Contested 
Space.” This inquiry for the first year composition class was guided by questions from 
critical human geography about the inequitable power relations in the production and 
reproduction of the use of space.  After a shared reading from Don Mitchell’s “The End 
of Public Space? The People's Park, Definitions of the Public, and Democracy,” the 
teacher invited Matthew Works to speak to the class. Works is an artist and homeless 
advocate, who was homeless himself for sometime, but now takes up residency at 
colleges where he speaks to students about his work and activism. According to a news 
story from Street Spirit, a publication about homelessness produced in the Bay Area, 
Matthew Works “became homeless after he stood up for himself and others in a job in 
which his duties were doubled without extra pay or compensation” (Clair). A large part 
of Works’ activist message is that because urban areas have criminalized poverty, 
churches should offer sanctuary, more specifically, he argues that “Jesus was homeless 
and churches should give sanctuary to homeless people 24 hours a day” (Clair). 
The teacher was very upset about the way that her students reacted to Works. 
Her email to me, as well as the exchange between her and the student, is reprinted 
below:  
From: J 
Sent: Friday, October 1, 2010 4:10 PM 
To: Jonna Gilfus 
Subject: Help! 
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Hey, Jonna, 
 
I'm sure this is old hat for you, but as a new teacher, I'm really shocked by the 
students' responses to Matthew Works’ talk. 
 
It's as if they think homeless people are homeless for the explicit purpose of... 
upsetting their ideals! 
 
I'm forwarding this email, but man, you should see the Blackboard posts on this. 
I'm really going to have to take class time on Thursday to talk about the finer points. At 
the very least, I can use their responses as jumping-off points for making more 
sophisticated and nuanced claims about a subject. 
 
But, whew. It's going to take every ounce of restraint I have to appear calm, cool 
and collected. I knew bringing a homeless person into the classroom was slightly 
unorthodox, but I was completely unprepared for the students to react by victim-blaming, 
which most of them are doing. Anyway, here's one...(below) 
 
Any suggestions? 
J. 
 
From: J 
Sent: Thursday, September 30, 2010 6:39 PM 
To: A 
Subject: Texting in class 
 
Hi A, 
 
I saw that you were texting and drawing all during class today. 
 
As you know, I tried to get your attention by sort of waving my foot in your line 
of sight. You stopped for a moment, and then resumed texting. I found the click of the 
texting --- and the very act of texting -- to be disruptive, not to mention disrespectful to 
our guest. As you know, it's not tolerated in my class. 
 
Let me know if you need further clarification on this. 
 
Best, J 
 
Hey J, 
 
I thought that the speaker was terrible...he was saying some things that really 
disturbed what I stand for and how I was raised.  I wrote about that in my notes that I 
took during the presentation.  I was tempted to up and leave but I thought that would be 
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taking it a little too far and I didn't want to make a scene or make anything awkward for 
next class.   
 
I do respect your no texting rules and I never text in your class besides that one.  
It was not anything against you or your class I just found that what this guy was 
portraying to the class or myself specifically was not something that I believe in and or 
will listen to so I needed something to take it off my mind.  My apologies and it won't 
happen again. 
 
--A 
 
In the opening chapter of the dissertation, the first task I undertake is to try to 
better understand how and why as professionals, we came to design a classroom space 
and course inquiries which take up questions of social justice, such as this teacher has 
chosen regarding the right to public space. A more thorough look at the history and 
development of the practices we have come to regard as critical pedagogy allow us to 
see, first, that practices labeled as critical pedagogy actually vary quite broadly, and that 
this variation is not without controversy in the field. Secondly, this historical view 
provides a sense of where and how writing teachers identify collectively. Our 
professional identity matters, in terms of both the larger university structure and the 
larger world; it makes a difference in how we understand and experience emotions in a 
setting like the one above. Who does it appear this teacher sees herself aligned with, for 
example, Matthew Works, or the students whom she perceives as part of the upper-
middle class?  
In chapter two, I look for how we might define this ubiquitous and abstract 
concept, “emotion,” in order to better understand how it actually might be working. In 
the email reprinted above, we see references to emotion—the student’s note about 
feeling disturbed, the teacher’s comment that it will take every ounce of restraint she 
has to work with the students. We can point to emotion in the text, but it is necessary to 
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decide, at least tentatively, how to define what exactly it is referring to. Thinking of 
emotion as a bodily experience, or as located in the unconscious, or as located within 
the soul, is very different from imagining emotion as part of a larger system that is 
integrated with rationality, beliefs and values. Before we can take on the analysis of “the 
emotion” at work in this episode, or any other, we must find a way to at least 
tentatively agree on what emotion is, and how it functions, especially with regard to 
groups. This “macro” level functioning of emotion is one part of the scholarly interest in 
the topic where some progress has been made that may be useful to our work. 
Chapter three introduces a methodological approach called “situational analysis” 
that can be used to examine these concerns regarding emotion, writing teachers and 
critical pedagogy. In many cases, teachers and students using critical pedagogy are not 
connecting the possibility of political contention to other teaching issues, such as the 
concern about texting in the example above. The exchange above between the teacher 
and student is rather an anomaly in that there is an honest and straightforward 
connection between a classroom issue (texting) and of the underlying problem related 
to political values or beliefs. The fact that the student feels free to indicate the 
underlying political issue may speak to the teacher’s ability to form a relationship with 
the student that makes this communication possible. Situational analysis suggests that 
researchers should examine the data more relationally and contextually. Through these 
methods, we are able to examine intersecting relational elements, in order to better 
illuminate “sites of silence” in the data, such as the curious lack of willingness to 
connect classroom issues with the political emotions that may actually be at work in the 
situation.  
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In order to look more closely at the way emotion functions in political contention 
within the “social world” of writing teachers, chapter four next takes a closer look at a 
listserv thread where professionals interact in a contentious political moment. Close 
analysis of the discourse presented reveals that even among colleagues with similar 
goals and interests in the world, collective emotion functions as an autonomous force in 
matters of political contention, shaping social relations and shifting power, sometimes 
in surprising ways. 
Chapter five reviews the approaches writing teachers have taken up in the 
project of critical pedagogy as it relates to emotion, and I argue that, given what we 
have seen at work in the listserv discussion, there are problematic gaps. For example, 
many scholars operate on the premise of a more uniform, informed version of the 
individual writing teacher undertaking these practices. In reality the “social world” 
labeled as writing teacher is incredibly diverse, and includes teachers like the one 
above, who have never taught, never studied composition, and whose graduate training 
has provided them with strong, preceptive views regarding social justice. 
With an eye for what it means for teachers with little or no training to be working 
with complex collective emotions related to political values and beliefs, chapter six 
finally returns to data gathered from the new teaching assistants’ practicum. The 
analysis in chapter six highlights more obvious examples of the politics of what Arlie 
Hochschild has identified as “emotional labor” involved in this work, but it also seeks 
to make visible the connections that are missing between the political work of the 
critical pedagogy classroom and what appeared at first to be practical classroom 
management issues, and uses theory developed and uncovered in earlier chapters 
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regarding emotion to show how collective emotion may be at work as an autonomous 
collective force. 
Returning then to the emails and request from the teacher for help, we might be 
able to ask some new questions about the way emotion is functioning within the 
situation. We can’t know exactly what Matthew Works might have said that brought 
the student to explain that his words “really disturbed what I stand for and how I was 
raised.” But we might ask what collective sense of emotion is at work in such a 
statement. Who might also ask ourselves who this student sees himself aligned with, or 
aligned against, and why? His apology to the teacher, and declaration of respect for her 
and for the class appear sincere. At the very least, with a generous read, we can identify 
a kind of emotion work on the part of the student, as he strains to keep himself aligned 
with her. Like the teacher, he showed restraint. What worked against his impulse to 
leave the room? 
How might the teacher also be subject to collective emotion, as she sees the class 
as a whole as simply stubbornly resistant: “It’s as if they think homeless people are 
homeless for the explicit purpose of... upsetting their ideals!”   
Obviously the teacher is simply expressing her frustration and dismay over the 
situation; she does not believe that her students actually feel people are homeless to 
upset their ideals. But I would argue that the decision to invite Works to visit that 
classroom was made with at least some sense that his presence and words would 
potentially upset students’ ideals. Probyn argues that “ideas and theories, especially 
about embodiment, cannot be divorced from their affective connections” (33), and that 
it gives life to learning when we invoke emotion, which she and many other 
recommend. 
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In this classroom, this is exactly the formula put in play by this new teacher 
when she took this “slightly unorthodox” risk toward more emotionally centered 
learning. It’s one thing to read Mitchell’s theory of the urban environment in the 
assigned text, where he explains: "It is not so much a site of participation as one of 
expropriation by a dominant class (and a set of economic interests) that is not really 
interested in making the city a site for the cohabitation of differences" (Mitchell 18), and 
quite another to have Matthew Works, homeless, sitting in front of you (a student at a 
private university which costs more than fifty thousand dollars a year to attend), telling 
you his story, his version of the world. In the latter scenario, you potentially have what 
Probyn refers to as the “goose bump” moment, the emotion/feeling/affect response 
that calls the person to action. Probyn’s assertion is that it is this introduction to caring 
at an emotional level that makes it possible to do the work intended in critical 
pedagogy. I agree, but how do we know exactly what we have unleashed in that 
moment? 
Probyn also warns that this needs to be done safely. “Careful consideration 
needs to be paid to providing safety structures for students for whom a triggered 
affective response may be deeply disturbing. In elaborated terms, these questions 
gesture to what might be called an ethics of the affective in the classroom. This in turn 
entails consideration of the structure of the space in which affect is generated and 
experienced”(30).  I agree with Probyn, an “ethics of the affective” is exactly what is 
required. But what might this look like, especially in a space where so many positions 
are held with regard to political and social identity, by teachers and by students? And 
where the world outside the classroom walls seems to tend more and more toward a 
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polarized version of political stances possible in the world (left/right, 
liberal/conservative).  
I argue that the complexities of “using” emotion as a force in the classroom have 
not been fully examined, so even if we are using them toward a perceived common 
good, such as social justice, and even if they are not purposefully invoked, as teachers, 
we are still responsible for their effects. In this dissertation I attempt to provide a view 
into of the complexities involved in the emotion work in critical pedagogy, and to 
suggest a few small steps we should consider in order to move forward more 
productively. 
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Chapter 1   Arguing about what Matters: Politics and Emotion 
 
A glimpse inside 
In “Argument as Emergence, Rhetoric as Love” Jim Corder asks his readers to 
consider the idea that “each of us is an argument, evidenced by our narrative” (18), and 
asks a series of questions as he explores what happens in those moments when our own 
beliefs and truths, the story we have built about who we are, is brought into question in 
an encounter with another. He asks:   
What happens, then, if the narrative of another crushes up against our own—
disruptive, shocking, incomprehensible, threatening, suddenly showing us a 
narrative not our own? What happens if a narrative not our own reveals to us 
that our narrative was wanting all along, though it is the only evidence of our 
identity? What happens if the merest glimpse into another narrative sends us 
lurching, stunned by its differentness, either alarmed that such differentness 
could exist or astonished to see that our own narrative might have been or might 
yet be radically otherwise than it is? (18) 
Corder’s depiction of encountering a new and radically different perspective 
allows his reader a glimpse inside some of the intense emotional work involved in a 
moment where we understand, in a personal way, the implications of seeing our views 
of the world, even our very identity, brought into question. Corder’s project is 
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addressing questions of the way rhetoric functions in argument, but the passage is one I 
return to as I encounter examples of students and teachers grappling with the renewed 
emphasis on what has often been labeled “critical” approaches to writing instruction.  
Practices often short-handed as critical approaches, or critical pedagogy have 
been growing in the field of composition for at least the past two decades. As Olson 
commented, “Many of the notions of such theorists as Freire, Ohmann, and Sledd that 
seemed so shockingly revolutionary in the 1970s now regularly inform composition 
scholarship, and even official NCTE and CCCC resolutions” (297). I have seen many 
examples of moments like the one Corder describes in my own composition classes, as 
well as the classrooms of new teaching assistants I mentor. The intense emotion work 
involved is not relegated to students alone; it circulates through everyone involved in 
classrooms where attention has been turned toward topics that invoke political 
contention. And there are significant ways that teachers and students may be affected. 
By “political,” I mean here inquiry that is explicitly directed toward power and 
difference as it relates to particular groups or institutions; often examined in terms of 
categories such as race, class, gender, sexual orientation or disability.  There are 
complicated reasons for the shift toward political topics in composition classrooms, 
which will be examined later in this chapter, but I would like to begin with a concrete 
example of such a moment, which may help illustrate the complexity of emotion work 
required of those involved. 
Emotion (at) work in the classroom 
This is a story that may feel familiar to many composition teachers. It comes from 
a national listserv, a virtual community where professionals who work in composition 
and rhetoric come together, asking questions and posting ideas, arguing about theory 
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and practice, and seeking advice. In 2005, a teacher wrote the list asking for help with a 
class that left her quite distraught.  Her post is reprinted below: 
Hi everyone.  I just finished teaching one of the most disastrous classes of my 
career, and I could use some advice. 
I have two overtly racist students in one comp class, and I've spoken with both of 
them privately about it.  One of them has said such disturbing things about African-
Americans in essays that I've spoken to a counselor and the assistant dean about him, but 
neither of them has offered substantive help. 
 So today in class we were workshopping as a group on their upcoming paper 
topics, and this guy suggested that he would write his next essay on the fact that "blacks 
are not as intelligent as whites."  His classmates were obviously shocked, and one blurted 
out, "That's terrible!"  But this student persisted and said that anyone who wouldn't 
consider his thesis was actually closed minded and just interested in "political 
correctness." 
The other students in the class seemed too surprised to respond (except for one 
other guy who pronounced the whole thing "disgusting") so I was trying to salvage the 
"teaching moment" on my own and, I fear, failed utterly.  I suggested to him that one of 
the reasons people respond so badly to his thesis is that it has been used in the past to 
perpetrate great crimes on a group of innocent people, and I talked about the problems 
with the so-called studies he cited to support his point, saying that they were biased and 
didn't take into account all sorts of important factors. 
Unfortunately, he only became more dogmatic and defensive, and he was egged on 
the entire time by Racist #2.  Then class ended and everyone just left.  I should have 
probably stopped the conversation much earlier, but I really felt as though I should try to 
make it into a productive educational moment.  Instead, it was a total nightmare, 
compounded by the fact that today is the last day of class before spring break. 
So...  Should I send the class an email tonight or tomorrow following up on WHY 
they should not be racist?  Should I plan a lesson for our first day back from break 
following up on today's conversation?  Should I just forget the whole thing and let these 
two jerks lead their miserable lives? The last option would obviously be the easiest but 
would leave me feeling the worst, I think, for giving up so easily.  But if I choose one of 
the first two, I don't really know what to say in the email or on our first day back from 
break. 
Sorry for such a long email, but has anyone dealt with anything like this before?  
What did you do?  What would you do in this situation? 
Thanks so much. 
G. 
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Members of the list wrote back with many kind words and suggestions, ranging 
from asking the racists to leave the class to developing pedagogy around the incident.  I 
offer this post not to argue that politics could or should somehow be excluded from the 
work of composition teaching, but rather to illuminate what seems often ignored in 
much of the work where people are arguing in classrooms about politics—the questions 
about how emotion is functioning in these writing classrooms using critical pedagogy. 
In this dissertation, I argue that emotion merits much more careful consideration in the 
critical pedagogy classroom featuring contentious political situations; not because it 
may somehow get in the way of reason, or because it may evoke ethical questions in 
terms of pathetic appeal in argumentation, or even because it is attached to labor that 
often goes unrecognized; but because collective emotions have an analytic autonomy 
that we have not taken into full consideration, and may be shifting actions in ways we 
cannot fully anticipate. 
A closer examination of this post yields a sense of the complexity of the emotion 
work the teacher and her class are performing, as well as the forces of emotion as it 
gathers people together and divides them, and as it reformulates or reinforces identities, 
beliefs, values and ideological views. As the teacher struggles to use the tools of 
persuasion she has available to help promote understanding, to fight racial oppression 
and to change minds, what other forces are at work that may be less visible? 
We can’t know exactly what motivated the behavior of her racist students, or 
what resulted, but even with a partial glimpse through the teacher’s perspective, it may 
be possible to see a great deal of the emotional work that both students and teacher are 
doing at the moment of this incident.  Through Corder’s framing of the situation, for 
example, we might imagine the racist student being in the midst of a violent internal, 
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emotional clash, finding himself at the kind of crossroads where the self, the “narrative 
and the argument,” in Corder’s words, that he has constructed of self, his identity, are 
in deep trouble. What is driving the “dogmatic and defensive” behavior the teacher 
describes?  As we shall see in subsequent analysis and attention to theories of political 
emotion, this part of the reaction is actually quite predictable, perhaps even to be 
expected in such a moment, because factual corrections often do little to change views 
or values, as Nyhan and Reifler explain in “When Corrections Fail: The Persistence of 
Political Misperceptions.” Correcting an inaccurate fact often leads, ironically, to 
reinforcing original beliefs. So the young man goes charging ahead with the “story” he 
has created for himself—where race is not a construction, but a fact; where there is a 
way of imagining his privilege as naturalized, or worse, even biologically based. Again, 
it is not that we would like to see these ideas maintained. But in a situation like this, 
where the teacher feels the responsibility to make this young man see something he has 
not seen before, something that potentially changes much of his worldview, it is curious 
how little attention or focus there is on any of the emotion work of the participants, let 
alone the force that emotion may have on shaping the very beliefs and values the 
teacher has set out to change.   
Consider, for example, that theorists of political emotion such as Berezin have 
noted that kinship bonds are the most influential of all collective emotional forces in 
terms of political identity. Perhaps “Racist #1” is making choices about maintaining his 
faith and respect for other family members in his life who may have taught him this 
version of the story that no longer seems to make sense.  “Racist #1” is joined by a 
student whom the teacher has called “Racist #2;” becomes an ally in maintaining this 
story.  Corder might say that what is being challenged at this moment is more than logic 
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or a single belief; what is being challenged is the identities, the stories of who we are.  
Berezin’s work, and other similar theories regarding political emotion help reinforce 
Corder’s version of the upheaval required for change. Our emotions are linked to our 
identities in profound ways, and it takes more than what one might expect to shift 
values, especially regarding political belief.  
“Racist #2” feels compelled to provide “Racist #1” with a sense that he is at least 
not alone in his story, that they have some shared, collective feeling that informs ethical 
and moral views of the world.  And the collective force of emotion is something that 
deserves very careful consideration.  Emirbayer and Goldberg, argue, for example that 
the role of collective emotion in situations of political contention have been hugely 
misunderstood and underestimated, that collective emotion has a kind of autonomous 
force that often goes unrecognized. This emotional turmoil does not, of course, excuse 
racist behavior, and I am in no way implying that the young men are somehow victims.  
Corder himself argues that we need to teach those who are learning to argue some 
foundational understanding regarding the risks and mindsets that make a shift in view 
possible. But I am arguing that the forces of emotion, especially as they relate to the 
political, are something that needs much more attention. Most people tend to think of 
emotion as something that “belongs” to a particular individual. After all, our language 
about emotion operates to reinforce this; we speak about someone “being angry,” for 
example. It appears to be an internal and private state. But newer understanding of 
emotion conceive of it more as an “economy,” one in which emotion may coalesce 
around groups, and in which emotion itself has force to shape and influence collective 
identity. 
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Inquiries into the way such moments play out are often centered on those 
targeted to have their minds changed, but it is not only the “racists” who are being 
asked to rethink deeply held, albeit “disgusting” (as one student in the class put it) 
views of the world. Aside from the rather obvious emotion work required of the 
students directly involved, we might also consider the emotion work required of the 
other students in the class.  Surely even as first year students they have heard or 
experienced versions of racist rhetoric, but the placement of this racist talk, from a peer, 
and in the presence of the authority of the teacher, has new significance in terms of 
collective emotion.   How are emotions functioning at this moment to gather, but also 
potentially to fragment group identities? How is emotion circulating? These questions 
become even more complex when we try to more fully account for the embodied nature 
of the situation—how do participant’s gender, or race, or other factors complicate the 
emotional work? Where and how does one align oneself? How is silence, or the decision 
to speak up, read?   
The teacher feels she “failed utterly,” implying that she has a direct and 
unquestioned responsibility for changing the racist views of students in her writing 
class. She says she has received no help from the counselor or the assistant dean at her 
school.  In this moment, whom does she feel aligned with, aside from the listserv 
community to whom she has written? Her first idea is to respond to the students’ racist 
comments with reason, providing examples as evidence. She tells her student about  
“the problems with the so-called studies he cited to support his point,” which, she 
explains to him, “were biased and didn't take into account all sorts of important 
factors.” She is surprised that none of this has any impact on the students’ views and 
response, at least outwardly. But she perhaps should not have been surprised at all, 
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given findings like those of Nyhan and Reifler, which indicate that correction of facts 
may actually increase misperceptions and reinforce worldviews. Rationality is certainly 
important to learning and to argument, but what Emirbayer and Goldberg refer to as 
the  “persistent postulate” that rationality and emotion are somehow separate, and that 
rationality is the cure for emotion, is highly problematic, especially for teachers so often 
asking students to engage in contentious political questions that are often deeply linked 
to various identities.  
The scene in this writing classroom is not rare, and, in fact is not restricted to 
writing classrooms at all.  The focus on social justice and critical pedagogy is not 
confined to composition and rhetoric; it is a longstanding interest in formal education 
more generally, and growing within many disciplines. But the fact remains that teachers 
who believe in and employ critical pedagogy, or who teach in departments where the 
curricular goals make the study of power and difference a central focus, are frequently 
confronted with such complicated questions about emotions, often without even 
recognizing that this is an integral part of their work.   In order to understand the ways 
in which many writing classes have come to require this level of skill in working with 
emotion, it’s useful to think through the trend toward a focus on what is often labeled 
by the broad term critical pedagogy, both within composition and in the larger 
academy. I’ll begin at a more global level, examining this shift through trends in higher 
education more generally, and then focus on trends within composition and rhetoric. I 
do not intend to enter into the discussion of whether social justice or critical pedagogy 
is or should be the focus of the composition classroom, (see Phelps’ “A Constrained 
Vision of the Writing Classroom” for a thoughtful and interesting approach to this 
question). My interest and approach are pragmatic, beginning instead with what the 
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path we have taken, and how best to navigate it. The more that can be understood 
about the sources of the emotion work performed, as well as the forces of emotion being 
invoked and employed, the better chance there is for making good productive decisions 
about what is best for our students and our classrooms when politics come to the 
forefront.  
Social justice on the agenda of higher education 
  Just over a decade ago, the World Conference on Higher Education called for a 
renewed commitment for higher education to promote social justice. At the conference, 
Vice-Chancellor of the University of Natal, South Africa, noted:  
It seems to me that universities have done their least impressive work on the 
very subjects where society’s needs for greater knowledge and better education 
are most acute - poverty, violence, war, unemployment etc. And if universities, 
wherever they may be, with whatever their resources (human and physical) do 
not seek solutions to the pressing human conditions of the society in which we 
are embedded then this could only be regarded as an ethical failure or an 
intellectual failure, or both. (Gourley 20)    
This call for a more intense and directed effort in solving global problems is not 
only a call to action, but also a recrimination for the lack of effort up to this point.  And 
this call can be read, in part, as a demand that more scholarly work of the professoriate 
be directed toward solutions to crises in the world.  There is a simultaneous 
commitment in many universities to teaching the undergraduate population in a way 
that ensures they will develop a sense of the urgency regarding a response to 
oppression and global injustices. In 2008, the American Association of Colleges and 
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Universities “Core Commitments” Initiative surveyed students and teachers across a 
wide variety of colleges and universities to learn whether they felt the development of 
“personal and social responsibility” should be better emphasized and taught to 
undergraduates on campuses.  There are certainly many members of the university 
community who feel the broad ideas of “social justice,” or of “personal and social 
responsibility,” are, at the very least, in need of further definition, and that the move to 
take on the task of solving global crises should be made cautiously. Still, according to 
AACU findings, more than 50% of students and faculty agreed that there should be an 
increase in such teaching.  Of the five “core commitments” named, three stand out as 
especially important to the questions surrounding social justice: “contributing to a 
larger community; taking seriously the perspectives of others; and developing 
competence in ethical and moral reasoning” (Dey and Assoc. 2).    
But the call for emphasis on social justice is often more than a requirement for 
renewed attention to ethical and moral reasoning, or acceptance of the perspectives of 
others.  Ron Barnett of the University of London has called for not just critical thinking 
as a major goal for higher education, but critical being -- taking an active role in the 
world and influencing change. Though not every institution makes these goals explicit, 
it appears that in many cases higher education is being called upon to produce students 
who become involved not just in their studies independent from the world, but with 
and through the world. This call is for students to recognize their own role in the 
circulation of power, and personal responsibility and implication in the types of issues 
that Professor Gourley spoke of more than a decade ago.  
The plans for implementing this kind of work often span the entire university, 
including programs for community building and equal access for diverse populations 
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to the college or university, the development of relationships with the towns and cities 
where these institutions are situated through service learning, scholarly projects and 
research toward solutions to social inequities, and undergraduate curricula designed to 
foster critical thinking about political issues that might lead to a sense of responsibility 
for “social justice.”   
Consider, for example, “Educating for Social Justice,” the Massachusetts Campus 
Compact’s Resource Guide produced at Tufts University. The guide is designed to help 
teachers, students and staff in the affiliated institutions of higher education to fight 
oppression and social injustice through classroom work.  In the opening explanation of 
purpose, they write: “In order to further the role of civic engagement in higher 
education, it is imperative that we honestly consider the ways in which our society 
discriminates against different kinds of people: racism, sexism, classism, ageism, and 
homophobia” (Cooper). 
Students are required to grapple with these issues, as well as related crises that 
are occurring globally, and they are asked to see these issues not just as a concern, but 
also in relation to their own place in the world.  It is not difficult to imagine how this 
type of critical examination of one’s beliefs and morals might lead a student to the kind 
of moment that Corder describes, a violent and painful realization that one’s 
“narrative” has been lacking all along, even that one’s identity is in flux.   This 
conception of social justice teaching or critical pedagogy is presented not just “about” 
the struggle of some distant other(s), but also as a call to political action.  
These types of curricula are designed to promote changes in the structures of 
power in the world, especially in relation to social class. The project of critical pedagogy 
has great breadth and variation, but nearly all those interested in it agree that Paolo 
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Freire is central to the movement.  In “Critical Pedagogy and Class Struggle in the Age 
of Neoliberal Globalization,” McLaren, who might be thought of as representing one 
end of the spectrum, laments the practices he thinks of as missing the point of critical 
pedagogy: “The conceptual net known as critical pedagogy has been cast so wide and at 
times so cavalierly that it has come to be associated with anything dragged up out of 
the troubled and infested swampland of educational practice, from, for 
instance, classroom furniture organized in a "dialogue friendly" circle to "feel-good" 
curricula designed to increase students' self-image.”  
McLaren argues that Marxist philosophy must be at the heart of any true critical 
pedagogy, and that cross-fertilized versions of the pedagogy that emphasize “a 
performance of ethics, or as a post-truth pragmatics, or as an open-ended, non-
determinate process that resists totalizing tropological systems” are problematic, 
because they ignore the central problem, in his view, which is the influence of 
capitalism, and they forego what he sees as the essential philosophical center, Marxism. 
In McLaren’s conception, “It is an encounter with the process of knowledge production 
from within the dynamics of a concrete historical movement that transcends 
individuality, dogmatism, and certainty. Only within the framework of a challenge to 
the prevailing social order en toto is it possible to transform the conditions that make 
and remake human history,” McLaren claims. For him and other self-proclaimed radical 
teachers of critical pedagogy, the underlying premise is that the work of critical 
pedagogy is a project that transforms the prevailing social order, and more specifically, 
capitalism, using education.  
This is an important point to take into consideration, because McLaren’s sense of 
what “counts” as critical pedagogy dismisses many other practices, practices that may 
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also have interesting possibilities for furthering social justice and democratic principles, 
even if they are not defined as McLaren has defined them. It is also important because 
often those who take issue with these practices (students and the public alike) view this 
“radical” Marxist version of critical pedagogy as representative to all critical 
pedagogical practices focusing on power and difference.  
Yet the term critical pedagogy in composition can also be linked to the same 
basic political project outlined as “social justice” in some of the earlier descriptions in 
higher education. In some composition classrooms, a shift toward critical pedagogical 
practices might be much more subtle. For example, teachers might encourage students 
to recognize the larger discursive and social understandings essential to persuasion, or 
open up questions about the ethics and consequences of the writing produced, and to 
whom. But often it is the more radicalized version of the project that receives press 
coverage. Students entering these classrooms may have strong objections to this critical 
pedagogy based on what they have already heard and seen about such work, especially 
if it is laced with the overtones of blame, a predetermined ideological approach and 
responsibility. Consider, for example, Giroux’s recent statement regarding the 
responsibilities of students in North America for our democratic society’s future:  
Thus, the most important question to be raised about American and Canadian 
students is not why they do not engage in massive protests, but when will they 
begin to look beyond the norms, vocabularies, and rewards of a market-driven 
society they have inherited? When will they begin to learn from their youthful 
counterparts protesting all over the globe that the first step in building a 
democratic society is to imagine a future different than the one that now stunts 
their dreams as much as their social reality? Only then can they be successful in 
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furthering the hard and crucial task of struggling collectively to make a future 
based on the promise of democratic freedom happen. 
Giroux’s message concerning the effects of late stage capitalism has an element of 
hopefulness, in that he invokes a future of “democratic freedom,” but it is also an 
indictment of current behaviors and attitudes, implying a carelessness and blindness on 
the part of these young people in to the harmful “norms” they live by, and the need for 
“hard and crucial” task of change. It is expressed as an imperative, and necessarily 
involves political clash and activism. Giroux invokes a version of “democratic freedom” 
as a binary with the way that young people are now living; and implies that this battle 
is the responsibility of the youth of North America.   
Most would agree that the basic concept of social justice is a positive goal (how 
could it not be? after all, who is in favor of social injustice?), and that critical approaches 
to reading, thinking and writing are important to developing writers. But the version of 
the project offered through scholars such as Giroux has hardly been agreed upon. Some 
welcomed the more ideological approach to writing instruction, while others saw it as a 
serious concern. Consider Maxine Hairston’s response to the impression of a movement 
toward social reform as the centerpiece of first-year composition teaching from her 1992 
essay “Diversity, Ideology and Teaching Writing:”    
I see a new model emerging for freshman writing programs…It’s a model that 
puts dogma before diversity, politics before craft, ideology before critical 
thinking, and the social goals of the teacher before the educational goals of the 
student…. The new model envisions required writing courses as vehicles for 
social reform rather than student-centered workshops to build students’ 
confidence and competence as writers. (660)  
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Hairston’s complaint comes in the midst of significant influence from the 
growing field of cultural studies twenty years ago, and allows a view into the shifts that 
many departments were/are experiencing as the “turn toward the social” gains 
momentum.  It’s interesting that she includes “critical thinking” as an element pushed 
out by the “new model” of the “freshman” writing program. She differentiates the 
“critical” approach that Giroux and McLaren call for from another kind of “critical”—a 
student’s ability to make choices for her or himself. Hairston places the blame for much 
of this ideological focus on the influence of English departments, (with a nod toward 
the political and economic influences of the day). But one can just as easily point to 
examples of this approach attracting scholars to composition. 
In Changing the Subject in English Class, Alcorn offers an account of his interest in 
composition teaching as deriving from an adoption of a critical theory/cultural studies 
influenced approach to teaching: 
Berlin’s widely read theoretical essay ‘Contemporary Composition: The Major 
Pedagogical Theories’ pushed many of us to see writing from a broader and 
more responsible perspective than we had entertained earlier. I was just 
beginning my career at the time of its publication, and the essay was 
instrumental in persuading me to accept a position primarily in composition 
rather than in theory. Berlin’s later essay, “Rhetoric and Ideology in Writing 
Class,’ pushed many of us further to see writing as part of an ideological cultural 
practice. (3, emphasis added)   
 I am especially interested in the Alcorn’s use of the phrase “more responsible” 
here to describe the perspective that Berlin offered.  In many ways, Berlin, Giroux and 
others opened up not just possibilities for writing teachers to follow a path of inquiry 
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regarding theories of ideology and power, but a sense that this inquiry was an 
imperative, and maybe even the only ethical choice. Rather than a theory about the 
teaching of writing, the framing of the situation that Alcorn offers signals a shift in what 
many teachers and students ought be reading, thinking and talking about in the writing 
classroom. Teachers who do/did not move to a course design featuring questions 
regarding power and difference, social justice and the critical, would be, in effect, 
irresponsible, given this new paradigm. All of this has implications for emotion work, 
as well. 
But how did we get here? The answer to that question is not simple, but a few 
threads from the history and conception of composition may shed some light on this. 
Political questions in the writing classroom 
In “Rhetoric and Composition as a Coherent Discipline,” Jan Swearingen 
provides an analogy to illustrate one conception of the complexity of the “family” ties 
that bind us in the field of composition and rhetoric:  
Deconstructionist daddies and their feminist children were among the first to 
theorize and colonize rhetorical studies and graduate programs of the late 1970’s. 
Asserting equal footing, and some shared ancestry with literary scholars and 
their favorite theorists, rhetoric and composition scholars turned to several tasks. 
Invoking Derrida, Foucault, and deMan, rhetorical scholars observed linguistic 
and rhetorical elements in much critical theory, and they adapted critical theory 
to the study of linguistic and rhetorical legacies. Ancestry and self-definition 
were among the first projects. Deconstructing “straight” historical studies in 
rhetoric, and hierarchal models of writing pedagogy, postmodern theories were 
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adapted by rhetoric and composition scholars and graduate program designers 
to define several new sites for scholarship and pedagogy. (17) 
Swearingen argues that composition was (is) working out the challenges which 
postmodern rhetorical theory introduced. Her description and analogy help point out 
the complex intertwining of composition, rhetoric, critical theory and literature.   North, 
Phelps, Berlin, Bloom, Connors and other noted scholars have created maps and 
histories of the field, but in the end, no one history can ever really be complete. The 
history of composition is complicated and falls under no simple pattern, but for the sake 
of creating some order by which we might examine the development of what has come 
to be known as critical pedagogy in composition, I’ll begin with a sort of composite that 
has taken hold in the mind of many in the field.  
One version of the story begins with a group of practices, theories and materials 
swept together and short-handed “current-traditional rhetoric.”  In this historical 
framing, current-traditional “before” lays the groundwork for social-epistemic 
rhetoric’s “after,” because, in effect, it is seen as arriving at a deeper (more 
“responsible”) understanding of the construction of knowledge.   CTR, in this version of 
the story, is associated with formalism, with Hugh Blair’s influence in writing 
instruction, and with the notion that science had the path to Truth. In Berlin’s account of 
the history, which has wide traction for many in the field of composition, current-
traditional rhetoric is challenged by expressivism and social rhetoric, and leads finally 
toward the notion of rhetoric as epistemic, that knowledge as a human endeavor and is 
constructed within the exchange of language itself. Credit for this idea is often 
attributed to Scott for his 1967 essay on the concept, but Berlin and others forwarded 
the these theories and applied them to composition history more specifically. This 
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version of the story sets up composition and rhetoric in a progress narrative—one that 
allows those involved in the shift to see their work as having gained the strength of new 
understanding. It is related, I would argue, to Alcorn’s sense that he could now see 
writing “from a broader and more responsible perspective than [we had] entertained 
earlier…” and “in persuading [him] to accept a position primarily in composition rather 
than in theory” (3).  
But this progress narrative leaves out a great deal of the history. There are 
interesting parallels, for example, between the conception of rhetoric as epistemic and 
much, much older arguments about the relationship between language and the 
construction of reality—namely the Greek sophists and Plato. In the more recent past, 
the 18th century traditions of civic writing and moral philosophies that might be seen as 
deeply connected to social justice are made much less visible in this version of history, 
as well.  
 A revival of interest in the debates over the sophists from scholars such as Neel, 
Jarrat and Crowley explore the possibilities for what sophists of 5th century BCE might 
offer in the present world of rhetoric. These scholars did not set out to try to trace the 
full history of the Sophists. As Greenbaum and others have pointed out, this eclectic 
group of paid teachers and craftsman are actually not very easily traced or defined in 
historically. Neosophists draw mainly from their understanding of work of Gorgias and 
Protagoras, examining the way that relativism might be productively reincorporated 
into thinking about constructions of knowledge. For example, Crowley’s “A Plea for 
Sophistry” outlines a history of the place rhetoric held up until the 18th century, 
highlighting the importance of the work of rhetoric in “improving the life of man” and 
“providing guidance, especially in moral and ethical questions” (118). She goes on to 
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describe a search for wisdom as the proper approach for teachers of writing to take, 
rather than a search for (K)knowledge in our scientific and fragmented world.  
This theory, that rhetoric might provide the key to educating students in 
composition toward wisdom, and in particular a wisdom that could “improve the life of 
man” might also be understood as part of the project of critical pedagogy, albeit from a 
different vantage point than McLaren expresses. And it might be thought of as related 
to another strand that the progress narrative outlined above (from current-traditional to 
epistemic rhetoric) seems to gloss. Many rhetoricians of the 18th century offered ideas 
about how “perspective-taking” allows for a more pro-social, more civil interaction and 
treatment of one’s fellow man, and perhaps even, more social justice. These rhetoricians 
are often credited with paving the way toward the discipline of composition.  Hume’s 
work spoke to the way that imagining oneself in another’s place might evoke feeling, 
and Adam Smith’s thinking on this goes even further. “The concepts of sympathy and 
spectatorship, central to the doctrine of Theory of Moral Sentiments, had already been put 
to work by Hutcheson and Hume, but Smith's account is distinct. As spectator of an 
agent's suffering we form in our imagination a copy of such ‘impression of our own 
senses’ as we have experienced when we have been in a situation of the kind the agent 
is in” (Broadie).  We can imagine ways in which this ability to see from another’s point 
of view links to questions of power and difference in modern composition.  
Agnew offers a useful approach to the question, revisiting the eighteenth century 
doctrines of “taste” and “propriety” from a more dynamic vantage point than 
previously considered. She argues that in order to find ways to help “students develop 
more expansive notions of civic participation and responsibility” it might be possible 
for look again at Blair’s ideas about the important connections between language, 
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reason and a just society. Rather than imagining taste and propriety simply as terms 
that recollect the reproduction of social class, they might be considered the tools 
students in composition classrooms could learn to use with skill, in order to produce 
citizens prepared for the complex political questions and circumstances in the 
classroom and beyond.  
Greenbaum’s  “Dissoi Logoi: Neosophistic Rhetoric and the Possibility of Critical 
Pedagogy” in which she describes “social activism to remedy the ‘actual’ in the hopes of 
achieving the ‘possible’—a more equitable democracy” (14).  This too might be labeled a 
theory applicable to critical pedagogy, but Greenbaum links herself quite firmly with 
the Marxist imperative that Giroux and McLaren call for-- a challenge to the 
foundational capitalist structure as the centerpiece of “true” critical pedagogy. 
I would argue that this more radical version of critical pedagogy is not the only 
one that a practitioner interested in the work of critical pedagogy might choose from, 
yet parts of this have found there way into other kinds of critical pedagogy teaching, 
perhaps partly because their is the perception of a stigma attached to not taking a 
radical Marxist approach. In many ways, Giroux, McLaren and others are trying to 
make a case that other versions of the project are simply watered down or naïve, or 
examples of teachers’ deep misunderstanding of the history, culture and sociology. 
Many of these same self-proclaimed proponents of radical critical pedagogy name 
Dewey as foundational to their project. Though Dewey was a philosopher and educator 
deeply interested in social change, he was not a proponent of Marxist philosophy. In 
fact, much of his writing on progressive education echoes the practices more linked to 
the less “radical” practices of critical pedagogy described by Giroux McLaren and 
others—learner driven curricula, collaboration, and active learning, for example.  
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Returning to our story of composition, we might then make room for some other 
versions that allow further possibilities regarding what should count as critical 
pedagogy.  North sees “the birth of modern Composition, capital c” (15) traced to 1963, 
with Kitzhaber’s challenge to those already administering and overseeing first year 
writing to step up to a leadership role in the English reforms of the time. Or perhaps we 
can also trace composition (small c) back to important previous moments such as the 
Morill Act and subsequent need for workers with composing skills, as well as the 
written entrance exams at Harvard that led to the “English A” programs there.  
Expressivism, often associated with Peter Elbow and the “authentic voice,” does not 
need to be read as a period of naïveté regarding social aspects of writing, for example, 
but rather a moment where quite explicit attention was being paid to the developing 
writer.  A period overlapping with this one is sometimes labeled social constructivist. 
Teachers and theorists such as Bartholomae and Harris asked about how we compose in 
communities, and, some might argue, provide an opening for what has been labeled 
“the social turn” in composition. It is at this juncture that Delpit and others begin to ask 
questions about power dynamics in the classroom, and that many teachers in the field 
seem to “discover” Paolo Freire’s “The Banking Concept” and the possibilities for 
critical pedagogy in their own classrooms, where interest had grown in what it meant to 
be teaching in a community. Freire’s work was used in many different ways, but one of 
them is in helping students see more about how their education shaped their beliefs and 
views, as well as the possibilities for change that might exist. This version of critical 
pedagogy might be understood as an exploration of the politics of difference, and of the 
classroom as community, rather than a call to take up the challenge of defeating 
neoliberalist agendas.  
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None of these threads of history are complete, (or completely fair) to those who 
have worked on them. They are highlighted not as a way to understand composition in 
some stable or coherent way, but rather to demonstrate a few of the tendrils that have 
informed the project of “critical pedagogy” and perhaps illustrate, at least in some small 
way, why these practices might be so diverse, and why we should allow for this 
diversity. But before turning to theories that might help us better understand more 
about emotion work and the forces of collective emotion, I need to point to a few more 
places in composition that require attention in terms of the questions that will be 
explored later regarding how emotion operates in critical pedagogy. As we shall see, 
emotion is deeply linked with identity, so it is worth looking, at least briefly, at the 
ways that composition as a field sees itself. As I implied in the opening of this section, 
composition is certainly not a field with one unified identity, but there are particular 
elements and concerns that recur. The importance of naming some of these recurring 
collective notions about what it means to be part of composition becomes especially 
important as we begin to examine the teacher of writing in a politically contentious 
classroom.  
Working‐class academics, gatekeepers and sad women in the basement 
As we have seen, there is a broad spectrum of practices and inquiries that fall 
under the heading of critical pedagogy, but in many of these classrooms, teachers and 
students need special skill at emotion work, and can benefit from a more nuanced 
understanding of the forces behind collective emotion as they interrogate issues of 
political contention.  But there is another important element to consider in the study of 
emotion and political contention in writing classrooms—the collective identity of 
practitioners and scholars in the field of composition.  
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The first is the perception of composition teachers as having the conflicting 
functions as both gatekeeper and advocate to those not initially invited into the 
academy. This becomes important as questions of social justice are explored and made 
more explicit in classrooms, because part of the historical identity for many 
practitioners in composition arises out of this conflict of both wanting to empower 
writers (especially those who are not given access to academic literacy) and also being 
implicated in maintaining what came to be seen as an unjust system. The second strand 
of collective emotion comes out of a version of the history of composition that identifies 
its roots as working class and the work itself as feminized and undervalued. These 
strands become important when one examines collective emotion, because shared and 
conflicted identities are at the center of the power of collective emotion.  
Mina Shaughnessy’s landmark book of the late 70’s, Errors and Expectations, made 
the “basic writer” suddenly more visible. Changes in admissions policies in that time 
period required the immediate attention of writing teachers, and Shaughnessy helped 
teachers recognize the “logic” in patterns in student writing once labeled simply as 
“error.” And in so doing, she also unlocked some of the sense of their academic 
potential.  Shaughnessy’s work is well-known, but in terms of better understanding 
how composition teachers begin to take on social injustice and critical stances in their 
pedagogy, one might think about her book as constructing an insider’s view of “the 
basic writer,” a view that many writing teachers who work(ed) with “underprepared 
students” at the time shared.  
Shaughnessy’s book made visible not only what patterns could be understood in 
the writing produced by this population, but also what was happening to these 
students as they were trying to compose.  For many, myself included, her words created 
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a sense that I was not alone in sensing a great injustice and frustration in what was 
happening to these young people as they worked to gain a foothold in the educational 
system.  “For the BW student, academic writing is a trap, not a way of saying something 
to someone…. writing is but a line that moves haltingly across the page, exposing as it 
goes all that the writer doesn’t know, then passing into the hands of a stranger who 
reads it with lawyer’s eyes, searching for flaws…. Some writers, inhibited by their fear 
of error, produce but a few lines an hour or keep trying to begin, crossing out one try 
after another until the sentence is hopelessly tangled” (7).  For anyone who has ever 
worked closely with writers who are bright, interesting and perfectly fluent in the 
version of communication that has mattered up to this point, but are unprepared to 
tackle the version of literacy prescribed by the outside forces that get to decide what 
counts as literate, this is a familiar description.  The metaphoric “lawyer’s eyes” belong 
to standardized versions of literacy, but also to you, as the teacher, because as teacher 
you have taken on a particular role in the reproduction of power and authority through 
teaching standardized language of the academy.   
Shaughnessy’s groundbreaking book helped teachers begin to identify patterns 
of “error” and to suggest what might be done to help.  But Shaughnessy did more than 
suggest a way of looking more closely at these patterns. In her assessment of the basic 
writer’s situation, she launched, along with many of her colleagues at the time, a study 
of ourselves and our role in this process. We hear directly from the writers she is 
studying, and in the end, can’t help but agree with Shaughnessy that when it comes to 
basic writers, that “colleges must be prepared to make more than a graceless and 
begrudging accommodation to this unpreparedness, opening their doors with one hand 
and leading students into an endless corridor of remedial anterooms with the other” 
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(293).  There is a way in which she has represented two simultaneous and linked 
interests for the writing teacher, and for composition as a field—looking inside the 
student and empathizing, and looking outward at the structures that have created the 
barriers for the student. Later, we see some further signs that we might be imagining 
the teaching of writing as a kind of protector and nurturer of writers.  
Putz utilized a version of Berne’s psychological theory of transactional analysis 
to help “free” students’ from the many rules she claimed stopped their ability to 
produce text.  Putz reasoned that just as children must have space to practice new skills 
like walking or talking in a playful positive environment, so too must a student learning 
to write be allowed the freedom to experiment without criticism. “So in writing, if a 
student is protected from his own and other’s criticism for a while in a climate of 
acceptance I believe he will claim his writing potency” (572). This idea, that there was 
an authentic writer waiting to be brought out given the right circumstances, is echoed in 
other composition research and theory of the time--Peter Elbow, Don Murray, Ken 
Macrorie.   Critical observations about this early work have since developed, of course, 
but it marks a time in the development of writing instruction practices that focused on 
the development of writer, and on the teacher’s relationship to that writer. If we 
imagine this conflicted positioning, of wanting to nurture and protect developing 
writers from the criticism that they are not producing standardized academic literacy, 
while also feeling complicit maintaining these standards, it may begin to identify the 
collective emotion of the practitioners in the field. 
 In Irving Peckham’s “Complicity in Class Codes: The Exclusionary function of 
Education” he explains “In writing classes, we are particularly implicated in this class-
based screening agenda for we are experts at evaluating students via their texts.  We 
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have been trained to valorize texts flashing with class codes of the professional 
managerial classes and to marginalize the texts betraying our students’ working class 
origins” (273).   
But there is another layer here, and it has to do with how these practitioners 
identify themselves in terms of social class. In the his essay from collection in This Fine 
Place so Far from Home, Peckham names himself as “a working-class academic” and 
expresses his belief that “although the educational institution claims to be promoting 
universal literacy and egalitarianism, it has embraced a system that institutionalizes 
difference, and through difference, failure, with the failed ones coming primarily from 
the working class (the ones who have different habits of language and cognition)” (275). 
It also helps one see where there may be some clash in terms of one’s sense of identity.  
Coming to Class, another anthology of essays by composition scholars who see 
themselves as outside the academic world in terms of social class, speaks quite directly 
to both “working class roots” of many academics and also to the desire to become an 
ally of one’s working class students (MacKenzie). Mike Rose’s Lives on the Boundary, so 
often anthologized in composition readers, is another example of the concerns over 
class division, one’s socio-economic roots, and teaching composition made visible.  
Rose’s auto-ethnographic analysis inspires critical examination of the politics of 
language, class and race; and situates these questions in the writing classroom. In so 
many of these publications, we can see a story that invites collective anger and 
indignation about injustices done to our students and ourselves, but also inspires 
conflicting collective guilt in our implication in this division.   Faigley goes as far as to 
note, “If we look at the history of writing instruction in America, we find that writing 
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teachers have been as much or more interested in who they want their students to be as 
in what they want their students to write” (396).  
And, perhaps we might add another concern that some have argued has 
trumped questions about writing itself--the concern about “who” composition studies 
wants to be?  In Rhodes’ description of the “drive to legitimize ourselves in the 
academe” we can see how composition has struggled to find an identity, and that while 
part of this struggle for legitimacy is related to social class, there is also a way in which 
composition’s association with the feminine has been at issue in this struggle. In Susan 
Miller’s chapter “The Sad Women in the Basement,” from Textual Carnivals, she argues 
that the feminized nature of composition has been partially responsible for the slow 
move toward being taken seriously in the academe. Schell has noted that the kind of 
nurturing approach to writing instruction in some models of classroom practice could 
be problematic in terms of reinforcing a structure already in place that denigrates the 
work of composition as female/nurturing work. The relationship between the feminine 
and composition studies becomes especially important as we contemplate the 
importance of emotion work to classrooms where contentious political arguments 
occur. Emotion has long been negatively associated with women, and the move to 
explicitly address its intersection in composition studies is potentially problematic for a 
field that has just come to enjoy some respect as a discipline. 
Yet without this exploration, emotion work and its cost continue to go 
uncounted. And perhaps more importantly, the powerful forces of collective emotion 
stirred and circulated in the political composition class remain largely undertheorized. 
It is important to take account of some of the foundational understandings of shared 
identity in the field in order to recognize how these collective emotions of guilt, of 
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righteousness, or of shame, might relate to what happens in the often politically 
contentious atmosphere of the classroom. These emotions, collectively, have a force, 
and it is not always the kind of force we hope for or imagine. 
Calls like the one Giroux makes for students to “engage in massive protests” or 
the MCCRG Program at Tufts are evidence that in many cases, it is activism that is 
sought from these students, and education necessarily means political education. Why 
then, with so many smart, dedicated composition teachers working on the project of 
critical pedagogy in such diverse ways, are there are a growing number of groups that 
collectively identify themselves as counter to this philosophy?  Across the country, 
student groups such as Students for Academic Freedom, founded and supported by 
controversial writer David Horowitz, promote the idea that the social justice agenda at 
the university does not allow room for other views.  They cite the AAUP’s “Declaration 
of Principles” as a doctrine entitling not just professors’ freedoms as educators, but 
students’ freedom from what they view as indoctrination.  Horowitz’ views may be less 
than reputable among many scholars, but recent cases such as the one at the University 
of North Carolina are proof that at east some of the views of these groups are taken 
quite seriously.  In this case, a student made comments regarding his “disgust” for 
homosexuality in class. The teacher called his student’s comments  “hate speech” in a 
later email to entire the class about the incident.  The U.S. Education Department's 
Office of Civil Rights ruled that the professor had violated the student’s civil rights.  
The appearance of groups that announce strong opposition to call for activist support of 
a particular view of the world should not be a surprise, according to much of the 
research done on political emotion study, and this is much of the reason it becomes 
particularly important at this moment to look more carefully at both the emotion work 
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being performed by those involved, and also the forces of collective emotion in the 
political situations being investigated and entered into. 
In chapter two I use a historical context to workably define the concept of 
emotion, and also examine more recent research on emotion at the macro level that 
might lead toward a productive examination of the forces of emotion in politically 
contentious discourse. 
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Chapter 2  Defining Political Emotion 
 
 
This chapter briefly traces some of the philosophical history of the study of 
emotion, especially as it relates to reason, ethics and morality, in order to provide some 
insight into how emotion might best be defined and located in the work of critical 
pedagogy.  Research in intergroup emotion theory and macro-structural emotion theory 
are then examined in an effort to define emotion in relation to collective identity.  
(Re)conceptualizing emotion 
Robert Solomon’s “Philosophy of Emotions” opens by making note of a basic 
problem nearly all scholars interested in the study of emotion face: defining the term.  
Although Solomon agrees that it would be best to define one’s terms before study 
commences, he argues that because emotion has grown out of a tradition in which it is 
“slave” to the “master” reason, in philosophy, and because it has been approached from 
so many differing disciplinary angles through history, “the truth is that a definition 
emerges only at the end of a long discussion, and even then it is always tentative and 
appropriate only within a limited context and certain models of culture …” (4). Rather 
than attempting to offer an abstract definition of emotion at the outset, I hope to 
develop a definition (even if, as Solomon suggests, it will be necessarily tentative and 
limited), through examination of emotion in several different contexts. I begin by 
examining the persistence of the conception many theorists share, that emotion has 
been historically placed in a binary position with reason, or as something that impedes 
clear reason. Next, I examine Dixon’s suggestion, that this persistent historical account 
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is flawed, creating the category “emotion” as an over-inclusive term for a more complex 
relationship among the various aspects of human will and affection. In addition, I offer 
further implications regarding the nature of emotion explored through Raymond 
Williams’ thinking about “structures of feeling.”   
According to Solomon, many scholars persist, consciously or unconsciously, in 
privileging reason, thereby positioning emotion as something that impedes reason. 
Solomon argues emotion back into the mix with his analysis of the shift in thinking 
about emotion from Plato to Aristotle. “The emotions, as such, accordingly, do not form 
one of the three aspects of Plato’s tripartite soul as defined in The Republic. There are 
reason, spirit and appetite; not only does what we call emotion seem divided between 
spirit and appetite, but considering Plato’s discussion of eros as the love of Good… 
there are emotions involved in reason as well”(4). Solomon is making note of the 
confusing way that emotion is referenced for those trying to make sense out of it in 
Plato’s work.  While reason is the most important element for Plato, emotion is perhaps 
implied in the aspects of spirit and appetite, and also in the use of “eros.” As scholars 
from anthropology, sociology and psychology reassess former treatments of emotion 
from philosophical traditions, many identify a recurrent misconception of emotion as 
static and categorically different from reason.  
The consideration of a (dis)connect between emotion and reason is mapped in 
Fortenbaugh’s Aristotle and Emotion. He analyzes the ways that reconsideration of 
Aristotle’s definition of emotion might help shift previously held conceptions of 
emotion.  As long as emotion remained locked in the soul, without any embodiment, 
Fortenbaugh argues, it was nearly impossible to study.  In his discussion of the complex 
definition that Aristotle took up with regard to particular emotions, such as anger, and 
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their causal contexts, Fortenbaugh argues that Aristotle cleared the way for perhaps the 
most interesting contribution to thinking about emotion in relation to reason:  “By 
construing thought or belief as the efficient cause of emotion, Aristotle showed that 
emotional response is intelligent behaviour open to reasoned persuasion” (17); this a 
very different formulation from earlier Platonic views of emotion.  Fortenbaugh argues 
that Aristotle’s thinking shifted the original conception of the tripartite to a bipartite, (a 
dual systems of logic and illogic); yet the reasoning, logical side of man was not closed 
to emotion.   Ellen Quandel makes similar claims regarding this way of understanding 
Aristotle as “an indispensable predecessor for acknowledging and working with, rather 
than against emotion in rhetorical education” (111).  As Quandel points out, many 
contemporary thinkers such as Walker, Nussbaum and Cooper, agree that Aristotle’s 
work exemplified the understanding of emotion as not separate from rationality and 
reason, but rather important to it. Thus when arguments are made, perhaps especially 
political arguments, it is not simply a matter of finding the logical answer without 
context or emotion. Emotions, conceived of in this way, are integral to the ways we 
make decisions, are persuaded, and persuade others.   
Thomas Dixon approaches the concept of emotion from a different angle, in part 
to show the importance of the shift from religious conceptions of emotion to moral 
sentiments. He argues that the persistent myth many of his colleagues (including 
Solomon) speak of is not in the disconnection between reason and emotion, but rather 
in the tendency to see emotion as a “coherent category” (29). Dixon argues that it would 
be more useful to look back at the moment when passions, affection and sentiments 
were swept together into the single category, “emotion,” as psychology became more 
secular:  
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It is particularly important, then, to realise that—contrary to popular opinion—
classical Christian views about reason and the passions were equivalent neither 
to the view that reason and ‘the emotions’ are inevitably at war, nor the idea that 
‘emotions overpower us against our will.  Appetites, passions and affections, on 
the classical Christian view, were all movements of different parts of the will, 
and the affections, at least, were potentially informed by reason. (31) 
Dixon’s historical account posits that classical Christian principles shifted to 
become moral principles in the Victorian period (see Dixon’s “The Invention of Altruism” 
for a more thorough treatment).  Dixon explains that earlier Christian conceptions were 
of the lower animal soul “passions and appetites” (the appetites here referring to such 
things as hunger, thirst, and sexual appetite) and the higher order “affections” (love, 
sympathy, joy); but all were operating under the will of man. Dixon contends that there 
is a need for a much more complex understanding of what we mean when we say 
“emotion,” and the way that this concept has been the historically conceived. It isn’t as 
simple as reviving the concept in contrast to reason. 
Dixon’s argument, that the category of emotion is “over-inclusive,” is important 
to recognize, because it allows for a more complex look at the forces at work, especially 
in matters of morality, ethics and beliefs, which I would argue are closely linked to the 
project of critical pedagogy, where a student is likely to be asked to form a moral or 
political position. Emotion, as I am here defining it, is socially constructed, but this does 
not preclude bodily experiences such as the heat of shame, or a raised heart rate in 
anger or fear.  A critical-pedagogical experience like service learning, for example, may 
involve very direct, “present-tense” or lower-order response like, hunger, thirst, or fear-
-but still also involve the will; and, as we saw in the discussion in chapter one regarding 
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Hume, sympathy and empathy can move someone toward similar responses to first-
hand experiences. Dixon moves us closer to seeing that it is problematic to collapse all 
of this under the umbrella term emotion, which then is investigated through cognitive 
science as a coherent category “inside” the body and outside of human will. He also 
helps us see the subtle shift from religious conceptions of “affections” as being closer to 
God, to secular conceptions, of being pro-social.  
Some researchers have chosen to name the interaction between bodily responses 
and the will “affect,” instead of emotion. Lawrence Grossberg, for example, described 
emotion as “ideological attempt to make sense out of some affective productions” (316). 
But I would argue that choosing the competing category “affect” is potentially just as 
misleading, because neuroscience uses affect to describe physical changes (heat, heart 
rate) arises from particular situations.  
Ray Williams’ perspective on this system of processes helps collapse some of the 
inside/outside binary concept of emotion by noting that it is that it is always in a 
formative phase. He unravels an idea he refers to as “structures of feeling” (128) that 
speaks to the intersections Dixon has touched upon.  Williams argues that the social and 
cultural tend to be understood only in formed, fixed categorized states, rather than 
taking into account the way feeling, always in present tense, moves one toward 
“practical consciousness” in our social system: 
We are talking about characteristic elements of impulse, restraint, and tone; 
specifically affective elements of consciousness and relationships: not feeling 
against thought, but thought as felt and feeling as thought: practical 
consciousness of a present kind, in a living and interrelating continuity. (132)    
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The elements of lived reaction are not in contrast to rationality; instead, thought 
and feeling combine, though perhaps recognized only in a pre-thought/pre-language 
moment. In this way the idea of the unconscious is less a silent and fixed thing, as many 
early descriptors would have it, rather it is feeling and thinking “in an embryonic phase 
before it can become fully articulate and defined exchange” (131).  This is an important 
difference, for it helps us to understand how what appears to be organic and physical is 
part of a larger process, a process that is “alive, active, subjective”(128). Emotion is 
located in the present, in relationships, sometimes barely available to semantic 
formation, but still part of and in relation to our larger social and physical world.   Like 
Corder’s description of that moment when our narrative comes bumping up violently 
against someone else’s, Williams helps explain the elements of lived reaction as not in 
contrast to rationality, but within and through it. I suppose I could have named the 
object of study here “structures of feeling” or “practical consciousness” in order to be 
more precise regarding the object of study I have in mind, but I leave it at “emotion,” 
hoping it can still provide a sense of the complex grappling of will and feeling and 
rationality and relationship to others that are sometimes left out.  
Fortenbaugh’s argument, that once emotion was “unlocked” from the soul it was 
possible to better examine and assess it, has value, because there must be a starting 
point for examining the phenomenon, but it also runs the risk of simplifying emotion 
into an objectified and unitary thing which belongs to/within a body; a stationary and 
fixed entity. Once it is conceived of as categorically different from rationality, we ask 
what I would argue are the wrong questions about the process.   Dixon and Williams 
provide a way to imagine how emotions are perhaps better conceived as an ongoing 
exchange between our senses and larger questions about our place in the social and 
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physical world. Emotion is always about our values, beliefs and ethics; a process always 
under new construction as we take account of both our perceived physical and 
psychological needs and the larger social rules we sense around us.  
Emotion through a macro‐Lens:  intergroup emotion the “affective economy” 
Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta argue that until the 1960s, emotion was central to 
the interest in political action, but only through a “pathologizing” perspective (66).  The 
dominant notions before 1960 were that people involved in large-scale actions were 
unwittingly caught up in emotion that was dangerous and contagious (LeBon, Blumer), 
and that those prone to this type of activity were typically seen as irrational, empty, and 
anxious to lose themselves in a larger identity. For example, Goodwin, Jasper and 
Polletta explain that Hoffer offered a “list of ‘undesirables’” likely to engage in political 
action. His list described them as “’the poor, misfits, outcasts, minorities, adolescent 
youth, the ambitious, those in the grip of some vice or obsession, the impotent (in body 
or mind), the inordinately selfish, the bored, the sinners” (qtd. in Goodwin, Jasper and 
Polletta).   This is quite a collection to place together, but aside from this, and more 
worth note, is Hoffer’s reference to them as “in the grip of some vice or obsession,” 
because it resonates in interesting ways with the questions just examined in the history 
of emotion. Dixon’s more careful look at the history of emotion allows us to see that 
even in this much later work, there are the echoes of the slippage between religious and 
moral philosophy, as well as a simplistic flattening of “emotion” as a term, and the use 
of scientific methodology to study it. The results are claims such as this one, in which 
various weak-minded sinners and outliers are whisked away by emotion toward 
political movements outside of their own will.  Hoffer invokes the old reference to the 
lower order appetites, neglecting any parlance with reason or will in the process. Dixon 
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explains that as thinking moved away from classical Christian psychology and toward a 
more mechanistic view in the 18th century, “Passions and affections were conceived 
increasingly as mini-agents in their own right, or as a faculty of their own, rather than 
as acts or movements of the individual will” (31), which seems to be the case in Hoffer’s 
work. Hoffer has essentially removed the idea that the will is involved in the choices of 
those involved in social movements of the time, and then gestured back vaguely to the 
notion of this as a lack of godliness. 
More recent theories of inter-group emotions, however, offer instead the idea 
that “important group memberships become a person’s identity…along with the 
person’s individuating attributes” (Smith and Mackie 428). The “group” can be 
relatively small, such as people who interact on a regular basis, or a larger social 
category (race, religion, gender, nationality). These theories are not based on the idea 
that people have a “group think” mentality, in the way Hoffer portrayed his subjects, 
but rather as a more fluid part of identity that becomes more important given certain 
conditions: 
Under circumstances that make a particular group membership or social 
category salient, people do not think of themselves as unique individuals but 
rather as relatively interchangeable members of a group…This occurs primarily 
when an ‘intergroup situation,’ one in which social comparisons, competition, or 
conflict between groups are salient. (429) 
This model, known as Intergroup Relations Theory (IET), was developed in an 
effort to better understand how intergroup conflict might trigger emotional responses.  
According to Smith and Mackie, emotions toward outgroups can be negative (disgust, 
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anger, outrage), but may also include more positive collective emotional response 
(empathy, desire to offer help). 
“Macrostructural” analysis of emotion is an area of emotion studies dedicated to 
examining the relationship between emotions and larger social structures. One theorist 
who has taken on this project is Jack Barbalet, who explores relationships among 
“certain aspects of social culture—especially those having to do with inequality, power 
and specific emotions, namely resentment, fear, confidence, vengefulness and shame—
from a more macro-level” (37). Barbalet contends that emotions are distributed in 
different ways across various groups in culture, most typically relating to a person’s 
socioeconomic status. For example, confidence, according to Barbalet, arises out of 
circumstances where a sector of society “perceive(s) their future is under their control 
and predictable” (37), while vengefulness may occur among groups that perceive 
themselves as less powerful and denied access to high-status positions. Barbalet’s 
speculations point to the idea that emotions are, as most resources, distributed 
unequally. 
In “Affective Economies” Sara Ahmed offers a correlative argument, beginning 
with the premise that emotions are not ever really “contained” or “belonging” to 
persons or objects, though this is often the way that emotions are framed through 
discourse (i.e. I am sad). Ahmed says that emotions may be better understood as 
circulating in a way that might be thought of as analogous to the Marxian theory of 
surplus value (money to commodity to money).  
Ahmed opens her essay by analyzing the example of a posting on an Aryan 
Nation website, which suggests, among other things, that “It is not hate that makes the 
white workingman curse about the latest boatload of aliens dumped on our shores to be 
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given job preference over the white citizen who built this land,” but rather “love.” 
Ahmed borrows from psychoanalysis to explain where a kind of repressed transference 
that allows a statement like this to have emotional currency is derived: 
What is repressed from consciousness is not the feeling as such, but the idea to 
which the feeling may have been first (but provisionally) connected. 
Psychoanalysis allows us to see that emotionality involves movements or 
associations whereby “feelings” take us across different levels of signification, 
not all of which can be admitted in the present. This is what I would call the 
rippling effect of emotions; they move sideways (through “sticky” associations 
between signs, figures, and objects) as well as backward (repression always 
leaves its trace in the present—hence “what sticks” is also bound up with the 
“absent presence of historicity. (120) 
In her analysis of the Aryan message, she points to the feeling invoked by a 
threat of “aliens” taking away security, and the way that the Aryan group channels this 
collective desire to protect.  She also provides the example of how historical myth about 
who built the country might shape collective pride in the targeted group. Together, 
according to Ahmed, they allow transference of hate toward the figure of “the alien” 
who is poised to take it all away (118).   
Like Barbalet, Ahmed argues that emotions are part of an economy; they are the 
“binding force” (119) that creates the sense of collective—and also determines 
displacement.  Her theorization of the economy of emotion helps one see how emotions 
could inhere in a group, yet not be contained in any person or object. Ahmed’s argument 
focuses on the idea of how hate circulates toward a group, for example: “The 
impossibility of reducing hate to a particular body allows hate to circulate in an 
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economic sense, working to differentiate some others from other others” (119). As in her 
work on “recognizing” a stranger, Ahmed has theorized a way to understand collective 
emotion as a kind of precognizant differentiation. In the example from the Aryan 
website described above, the sense of fear, or aggression or love is not attached to a 
particular body, but instead aligns itself toward a group or categories.   
In such affective economies, emotions do things, and they align individuals with 
communities—or bodily space with social space—through the very intensity of their 
attachments. Rather than seeing emotions as psychological dispositions, argues Ahmed, 
we need to consider how they work, in concrete and particular ways, to mediate the 
relationship between the psychic and the social, and between the individual and the 
collective (117). 
 Sara Ahmed uses her theory of affective economies to analyze the less than 
visible work emotion is doing in situations such as the mobilization of anger and fear 
toward immigrants or members of the Islamic faith, but it also provides a potential way 
to theorize emotions in circulation in other contexts.  
If we return to Giroux’s call for North American youth to stand up against 
neoliberalism, for example, what might Ahmed’s analysis help us see? 
Thus, the most important question to be raised about American and Canadian 
students is not why they do not engage in massive protests, but when will they 
begin to look beyond the norms, vocabularies, and rewards of a market-driven 
society they have inherited? When will they begin to learn from their youthful 
counterparts protesting all over the globe that the first step in building a 
democratic society is to imagine a future different than the one that now stunts 
their dreams as much as their social reality? Only then can they be successful in 
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furthering the hard and crucial task of struggling collectively to make a future 
based on the promise of democratic freedom happen. (Giroux) 
I recognize the irony of using a Marxist cultural studies theorist (Ahmed) to 
analyze the collective emotion invoked in a call for Marxist actions, yet this is exactly 
what I am arguing we need to do. Not in order to critique the use of critical pedagogy, a 
project embedded in much of the composition work currently underway, but to better 
understand the circulation and force of emotion in all requests for collective action.  In 
the above call to student action, for example, the “future that stunts their dreams” is 
caused by a “a market driven society” that they did not ask for, nor help build, but 
“inherited.” Their dreams have been taken away, according to Giroux, and democratic 
freedom is in danger of being lost. Further, “they,” (American youth), are the only ones 
who might find the strength to accomplish this “hard and crucial task.” Students are, in 
this case, “aligned with other communities” or “social space,” as Ahmed has 
suggested—namely with the coming loss of freedom, the destruction of dreams, actions 
attached, in his view, to the market-driven society.    
Perhaps, as Ahmed has argued, because of the affective economy, hate or fear is 
aligned with “the liberal” or “the conservative” rather than with particular bodies. And 
perhaps, as Barbalet has suggested, this economy is distributed differently along 
segments of the society, might we inadvertently be causing further divisions through 
collective shame, resentment, fear or anger?  
For example, consider this Google groups post entitled “Fighting the Liberal 
Faculty Thought police,” in which an anonymous poster offers advice for a new place to 
write about experiences in the university where students feel they have been “abused”: 
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Everyone knows that America's universities have become centers of political 
indoctrination, whose faculties regularly stomp on the academic freedom of their 
students. But few have bothered to do anything about it. Until now. 
Noindoctrination.org is a new website that gives students who ’have experienced 
sociopolitical bias’ in a college course a forum where they can comment on the 
professors who abuse them. (Google groups: nyc.general) 
This invitation to participate in Noindoctrination.org is ripe with the kinds of 
emotion work Ahmed is interested in—collective bodies, the circulation of fear, the 
movement from the non-contained to the larger, yet unknown other. This use of 
emotion to make the moves Ahmed traces is not the province of the frustrated 
‘conservative’ alone, however. In a recent article from The Dartmouth College 
newspaper, announcing a new “People’s coalition to unite progressive orgs” professor 
Russell Rickford writes: “We’re in a profoundly dangerous moment politically…. I see 
the country in a sort of pre-fascist state. College students are the most vulnerable to 
conservative ideas, but they also have the most potential for challenging the moral 
bankruptcy of a narrow individualism and amoral careerism” (People’s coalition). 
In both cases, Ahmed’s theory of the economy of emotion is a useful way to 
begin to analyze the work emotion is doing, especially in terms of a circulation of fear 
and anger, as well as a desire to somehow “protect” those imagined as threatened.  
There is no denying that each of us, as individuals, experiences emotion. But examined 
through the lens Ahmed provides, we also see the tremendous power emotion has as a 
kind of currency that allows for collective experiences and attitudes toward individuals 
and groups. 
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Now that we have established some of the terms of this inquiry, it is necessary to 
make the path the inquiry takes more explicit. In chapter three, I provide the 
methodological framework used to approach the questions about critical pedagogy and 
emotion in the writing classroom.
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Chapter 3 Finding the Way In: Methodological Approach to Emotion 
 
This chapter is an explanation and overview of the methodology and methods 
used in this dissertation project to examine the situation of emotion in classrooms 
where critical pedagogy is employed. Drawing from a new strand of grounded theory 
called situational analysis, the data is examined within a larger context in relation to 
other factors that might otherwise be ignored. 
Framing the question 
In Composing Research, Johanek encourages researchers in composition and 
rhetoric to “explore a question in the context of the researcher’s curiosity, experience 
and available resources”(186), and to let this be the determining factor in choosing 
methodology, rather than an allegiance to one methodological approach or another. She 
argues that researchers in rhetoric and composition must respect the diversity of 
methodological choices available.   Johanek offers a pragmatic approach to 
methodology, guided by such straightforward questions as: “…What do I want to 
know? Why do I need to know it? How can I frame my question in such a way it can be 
answered?”(104.) 
This dissertation project grew primarily out of my interest regarding emotion 
and emotion work in composition teaching and learning. While emotion work has 
always been required in teaching, the shift sometimes noted as “the social turn” in 
composition appears to have brought new types of emotion work for students and for 
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teachers. In my work as part of a team responsible for mentoring and training new 
teaching assistants at a large private research university, for example, I began to hear 
more stories about contentious political moments in the classroom and about the 
“resistance” of students.  Teaching assistants told stories about episodes in which they 
felt tensions in the classroom during discussions, about their authority being questioned 
in new ways, about grading and evaluating political arguments, and about the 
difficulties they sometimes felt when talking with students about race, gender, social 
class, disability or sexuality. Sometimes these tensions brought excitement and a sense 
of fulfillment, other times they were the source of anxieties and resentments. From my 
standpoint as a mentor, the classroom concerns regarding issues such as authority and 
evaluation appeared often to be related to collisions occurring as a result of the more 
politicized content of the course, as the curriculum shifted to focus quite explicitly on 
issues of power and difference. But, as I will explain, this connection was not visible in 
my first attempt to analyze the materials gathered from their teaching work. I needed a 
larger context and more relational view in order to see the connection, which I found in 
Adele Clarke’s “situational analysis” methodology.  
As we have seen in chapter one there have been general trends in the field of 
composition toward critical pedagogy. These shifts in the curriculum were particularly 
visible at the site where I teach, because a generous grant through the university’s 
diversity initiative launched a large project in the writing department directed toward 
developing a more purposeful engagement with diversity. In an effort to avoid some of 
the worn out and counter-productive ways “diversity” is sometimes addressed, the task 
of addressing “diversity issues” was re-conceptualized in the writing department as 
engaging with critical issues of power and difference.  Especially in the two required 
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lower level writing courses, where new teaching assistants were working, students and 
teachers were asked to address the political in a more direct way. 
The shift was not abrupt or wholesale; no one announced that we would 
suddenly be working on a critical pedagogy. In fact, many members of the department, 
including myself, were already interested and highly invested in work such as service 
learning and community literacy, and students were already often asked to read texts 
that would bring issues of race, class, gender or sexuality in relation to power to the 
forefront.  But the work one might put under the heading of critical pedagogy became 
more uniformly an expectation, as, for example, the term “critical” was carefully woven 
into revised course goals, course titles, readings and assignments, including the 
materials that new teaching assistants were required to use.  
“Critical,” in this context, was broadly conceptualized as the deliberate 
questioning of what was once imagined as normal or obvious. Inherent in this 
questioning, in theoretic terms, is a critique of the social and ideological structures 
informing the writer’s worldviews.  Though the phrase critical pedagogy was not 
employed in this work, the move to highlight “the critical,” “power,” and “difference,” 
closely mirrors the kind of questioning common to the goals of what I have earlier 
identified as along the spectrum of practices of critical pedagogy.  All teachers in the 
department, including full-time faculty, part-time faculty, and teaching assistants were 
asked specifically to address issues of power and difference in their course designs, 
course inquiries, readings, assignments and activities. Most of the materials developed 
were directed toward an examination of ideological structures that produce and 
reproduce cultural power and normalization. 
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Because of my mentoring work, I was especially interested in the reactions that 
new teaching assistants to the department might experience in relation to the new more 
political focus for the inquiries of the course.  These graduate students come from a 
variety of areas of study; some are poets, novelists and short story writers from fine 
arts, others are pursuing degrees in English textual studies, still others are part of the 
graduate program in composition and rhetoric. They represent diverse approaches to, 
and philosophies about, writing and writing instruction. Most of the new TAs arrive 
with little or no teaching experience, some having just finished their undergraduate 
work themselves. New teaching assistants, required to choose from materials developed 
by the department in their first year, were provided with a menu of course inquiry 
choices such as  “Reimagining the Normal;” “Cinematic Depictions of Global Poverty” 
and “Contested Space.”  After participating in a brief one-week introduction to teaching 
the required writing courses, typical responsibilities for new TAs include teaching two 
20-seat sections of first-year academic writing each fall, and one sophomore level class 
in the spring. They attend a weekly two-hour practicum throughout the academic year.  
Learning to teach is no small task for anyone, of course, and I have witnessed 
many instances of emotional response from TAs during my ten years as a member of 
the teacher training team.  But instances of what I later identified as “emotion work” 
shifted notably with the new emphasis on critical, and sometimes contentious, political 
analysis and argument, and the complex and sometimes contradictory elements of this 
visible emotion work invited my curiosity and further inquiry: How might the “critical” 
and more overtly political approach to writing instruction be influencing emotion in 
students and teachers? In what ways might emotion, in turn, be influencing the work of 
the classroom?   
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Returning to Johanek’s basic questions, this was, crudely carved out, the “…what 
do I want to know?” of the project.  The exigency for the project (in response to 
Johanek’s “why do I need to know it?”) is the concern that not all teachers or students 
were fully prepared for, nor did they fully understand the emotion work required while 
using political inquiries such as those we were focusing on. I wondered about how 
students--both the graduate students whom I mentored, and the undergraduate 
students they were responsible for in their own classrooms--were being affected.  
Johanek’s final simple question: “how can I frame my question in such a way it 
can be answered?”(104), however, was more difficult. As we have seen, the concept of 
emotion itself is not easily defined—and even the history of defining the concept has 
been contested. Added to this problem is the positioning of emotion in relation to 
politics. Berezin writes: 
The study of emotion and politics is the study of the non-cognitive core of 
politics. Emotion and politics presents its own special set of difficulties…. [First,] 
the social analyst has to attempt to understand how an individual micro-level 
instinct, an emotion, contributes to the collective macro-level processes and 
outcomes... Second, emotions are ontological and in the moment... a robust 
analysis of emotion demands a multi-disciplinary approach. (35) 
Though Berezin’s description of emotion as individual and instinctive may not 
completely take into account the complexity of the concept, I believe she is correct about 
the seemingly inverse relationship at the micro and macro level between emotion and 
politics, and also about the ontological and present-tense nature of emotion, all of which 
present quite particular problems for a researcher interested in pursuing questions 
regarding these phenomena.  In the next section, I explain the roots of my 
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methodological choices for the project in grounded theory, and how this approach 
helped address these concerns. 
 
Grounded theory as a starting point   
Grounded theory was developed as a way to build original theory through close 
reading of data. It is sometimes presented as if it is a cohesive methodological approach, 
but in actuality involves quite a number of differing perspectives and methods. This is 
in part due to the historical development of the methodology, as it was positioned as 
one side of a binary-- a “qualitative” approach that needed to be justified in relation to 
more accepted “quantitative” methodologies. Especially in fields where qualitative 
approaches have been regarded as suspect, some of the early development of grounded 
theory appears to be working hard at answering the potential questions about the 
objectivity or reliability of findings. Glaser and Strauss are often named as the “fathers” 
of grounded theory. Their work was in the pursuit of knowledge in social-scientific 
work, in this case a study of terminally ill patients (Bryant and Charmaz 33). They 
developed a system built around multiple readings of data (usually collected through 
ethnographic or interview methods), coding and categorizing, and construction of 
careful theories based on the findings. But as views of the social sciences shifted in the 
1970’s (with challenges to conventional science such as Kuhn’s critique of “normal 
science” and notion of importance of “the paradigm”) new questions and visions for the 
method and philosophy of grounded theory emerged. In fact, Glaser and Strauss went 
on to differentiate their approaches to grounded theory from one another quite 
significantly in later work. Accounts of the differences that developed often highlight 
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Strauss’ direction toward the “symbolic interactionist” and Glaser’s as a more empirical 
approach.  
Charmaz’ Constructing Grounded Theory represents a next generation in grounded 
theory methodology (GTM). She illuminates what she refers to as a constructivist 
approach, which emphasizes the subjective interrelationship between the researcher 
and participant, and the co-construction of meaning. She objected to the idea that this 
methodology was being approached as if objectivity were possible, and felt that the 
researcher should take into more careful consideration the interrelations and previous 
knowledge in the research site. In his 2002 article, “Constructivist Grounded Theory?” 
Glaser wrote that he felt Charmaz’ “constructivist” take on grounded theory illustrated 
a significant misunderstanding on her part of the intent and philosophy of grounded 
theory itself. But Charmaz’ methodology and constructivist approach continue to be 
taught and used fairly often in anthropological and sociological research. No matter 
which scholar of GTM one is drawn to, some basic parts of the methodology are shared. 
Grounded theory methodology takes as its central premise the idea that it is possible to 
construct theory by looking closely and inductively at data in context.  And though 
method for GT is not as straightforwardly provided for the researcher as one might 
hope, in nearly all cases, the researcher is expected to select or collect materials for 
analysis, read and reread this material in order to begin to create emerging categories 
(open coding), keep careful notes about emerging categories and look for their 
relational perspectives (axial coding) and focus the ideas by determining what might be 
most important in the patterns (selective coding). In some versions of method, the 
researcher is expected to try to begin with a kind of blank slate about the data, and 
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allow categories to emerge naturally. Others, myself included, see this as less than 
possible, taking as a starting point the subjective, interested nature of all inquiry. 
Although there has been quite a lot of disagreement about GT as methodology, it 
remains potentially useful to many researchers in composition. Two decades ago in his 
contribution to Kirsch and Sullivan’s 1992 Methods and Methodologies, Huckin called for 
“a broader conception of text analysis that includes not only the cognitive and 
expressive aspects so closely associated with the process movement, but sociological 
and cultural dimensions, as well” (85). His epistemological assumptions bring him to a 
position matching many of the principles of Grounded Theory, and help illustrate many 
of the connections that researchers in composition have found useful in grounded 
theory as a methodological approach. 
For example, Huckin notes that meaning includes not just “propositional” 
content but also “meta-linguistic and interpersonal content,” and that “writers belong to 
multiple discourse communities, and the texts they write reflect their divided 
loyalties”(85).  Likewise, Grounded Theory takes into consideration the larger 
contextual possibilities in data, by allowing the researcher to see patterns of all kinds 
through coding, which involves combing data carefully to find possible categories as 
they emerge in the reading and rereading of the material.   
Huckin also asserts that “text-sensitive analysis is problem-driven, not theory 
driven,” and this is also in line with the basic notion in GTM that it is the material one is 
examining that helps the researcher develop a theory, rather than a selected theory 
applied to the data. Huckin notes that we must account for “as much of the context as 
possible” and rely on “plausible interpretation” rather than proof, assumptions also 
important in Grounded Theory. After initial coding of data in GT, the researcher is 
 
 63 
encouraged to look for relationships, and put ideas into conversation with one another 
in a step often referred to as axial coding, and then create “memos” that are developed 
toward a theory. This process is very much in line with Huckin’s methodological 
recommendations. Finally, Huckin observes that researchers in composition need to be 
open to “multiple forms” of analysis. Many versions of GTM recommend the 
triangulation of data and multiple forms of analysis.  Huckin recommends that the 
researcher begin by looking for “salient patterns” and determine what he refers to as 
“interestingness,” which he finds useful to composition in terms of building theory.  
Huckin’s discussion of the methodological requirements of textual analysis for 
composition research foregrounds the usefulness of grounded theory methodology for 
many researchers in composition.  
The inquiry for this dissertation began with rather broad questions about how to 
identify and conceptualize the emotion responses I was noticing; what one might learn 
by looking closely at these instances of emotion; and what might be important about the 
instances I had observed. These questions demand a great deal of attention to context, 
and also do not immediately suggest a theoretical frame for the research, making 
Grounded Theory a reasonable choice.  I did not begin the examination of the data with 
the “blank slate” approach the Glaser might advise, however. I acknowledged the fact 
that given my own experiences in the field it was not possible, nor was it particularly 
desirable to erase the potential connection between the social turn and new emotion 
work I thought I could identify going on in classrooms. But I also wanted to be careful 
to make this an element of the inquiry still under investigation, rather than a foregone 
conclusion. I also wanted to be sure that I learned more about other framing for 
emotion than those I was most familiar with from psychology, instead of beginning 
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with the premise that I had already found the most useful ways to conceptualize 
emotion—or critical pedagogy for that matter. Chapter two, then, is partly an inquiry 
that helps shape the definitions for emotion in order to avoid missing important ideas 
by flattening the concept. Having worked with grounded theory for analyzing data in 
the past (in an ethnographic study of rural language patterns and in a project analyzing 
student journals),  I was drawn to the methodology for this dissertation project, given 
the nature of the inquiry and the materials available.  
A large collection of retrospective material that referenced all kinds of emotional 
reactions linked to teaching experiences was available to me through my teacher 
mentoring work—notes from classroom visits, notes from interactions during the two-
hour a week TA practicum, notes from individual meetings and the bi-weekly meetings 
with the rest of the teacher training team, and reflections and email exchanges between 
myself and teaching assistants. In addition, student evaluations for each TA, along with 
monthly reports of their work and progress provided more formal documents available 
for collection and analysis.   
These materials are diverse in terms of their intended audiences and purposes, 
making coding a very useful way forward in terms of identifying patterns and moving 
toward a theory that helped tentatively explain the data. Susan Star has noted that 
“Grounded theory is an excellent tool for finding invisible things” (79). This may sound, 
in the fragmented version I present her comment here, as if GTM is magical or 
alchemical, but in actuality she is simply asserting the possibility inherent in the 
approach to finding phenomenon not otherwise easily identified or overlooked. And I 
would assert that emotion, so far as we have worked to define it, is such a phenomenon. 
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As Berezin notes, emotions are “ontological and in the moment” (35), making them less 
easily identifiable through some traditional methods of analysis.  
 
 
Applying the inductive methods of grounded theory in a first round of open 
coding revealed data categories of concerns shared by teaching assistants circulating 
around authority, grading and classroom relationships. And while  
there was talk about emotions (fear, 
anger, frustration, joy), there was little reference to 
how those emotions might potentially be 
connected to the political topics used in class. My 
first (open) coding of the data revealed the 
categories illustrated in figure 2. 
The connections between emotion and 
critical pedagogy were present, but lurking in the 
context. For example, one teacher reflecting on his 
frustration with a student’s reactions to grading 
referenced the student’s “dismissal” of the core text 
for the unit  (Manning Marable’s “What we Talk 
about When we Talk about Race”) as 
particularly problematic to the argument the student finally made in the essay (about 
representations of race), yet located the problem as essentially an issue the student had 
with his authority as a teacher, rather than considering it as potentially in relation to the 
AUTHORITY/POWER/IDENTITY 
(teacher, gender, 
ethnicity, class) 
 
RELATIONSHIP (building, 
destroying, trust, 
community, respect, 
openness to other views) 
 
DIRECT EMOTION (“I feel 
statements” anxiety, fear, 
anger, resentment) 
 
WP CURRICULUM (negotiating, 
understanding, note of 
“critical”)  
 
BELIEFS/OPINIONS 
(Respecting students, 
questioning where derived) 
 
QUIET STUDENTS/VOCAL STUDENTS 
(questions and concerns about why 
students are not talking, who is doing 
the talking) 
 
GRADING (anxieties, student anger, 
worry) 
 
Figure 2: Open coding for 
Practicum materials 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politics of the inquiry. There were surprisingly few direct references to the political 
questions being examined in class, though in many cases it was clear that they were 
likely at work in situations like these. References I categorized as “curriculum” related, 
were often couched as learning to think about writing from a “composition 
perspective,” though the term “critical” was sometimes referenced.   
I needed a way forward that allowed me to think through the situation in its 
larger context, to move outside of the initial data set in a way that allowed me to see the 
TAs and students’ talk in relation to other factors. 
Situational analysis and mapping techniques 
Adele Clarke, a student of Strauss, developed a version of grounded theory 
which she calls situational analysis. In Clarke’s view, Glaser and Strauss did not take 
into full consideration the larger “context/situatedness” of some research questions, 
though she feels that Strauss made this an emphasis in later work. Clarke notes that the 
emphasis in early works on grounded theory “were on taking a naturalistic approach to 
research, having modest (read substantively focused) theoretical goals, and being 
systematic …to work against what they and others saw as the “distorting subjectivities 
of the researcher” (3).  
Clarke notes several problematic “recalcitrancies” of traditional grounded theory 
that may be lingering because of the promises of a more positivist empirical version of 
the methodologies. These include a lack of reflexivity about research processes and 
products; an oversimplification in research reports that sometimes “strains toward 
coherence;” and oversimplifications that make it appear there are singular rather than 
multiple social processes characteristic of a particular phenomenon or situation” (12). 
Clarke sees much of the early work of grounded theory as taking an action-centered 
 
 67 
approach, by which she means using ethnography and interviews as the standard 
method for collection of materials to be analyzed without consideration of other 
historical or discursive sources. Clarke advocates instead for a situation-centered 
approach that takes ethnography or interviewing into consideration in determining 
sources for material to analyze, but also takes into consideration such elements as 
narrative, discursive and historical complexities of the situation. Among other goals, 
Clarke suggests that situational analysis may help the researcher see how multiple sites 
may be important to grounded theory research projects. For Clarke, “the situation of 
inquiry itself broadly conceived is the key unit of analysis” (314).  Clarke’s notion of 
“the situation” is based broadly on four scholarly contributions to the concept: 
• Thomas and Thomas’ assertion that “situations defined as real are real in 
their consequences… perspective dominates the interpretation on which 
action is based” (Clarke 21).  
• C Wright Mills’ argument that “we must approach linguistic behavior, not be 
referring to the private states in individuals, but by observing its social 
function of coordinating diverse action” (qtd. in Clarke 22). 
• Donna Haraway’s concept of “situated knowledges,” which emphasizes that 
“knowers are embodied and knowledges are situated”(22). 
• Blumer’s notion of the “gestalt”—that a situation is always greater than the 
sum of its parts because it includes their relationality in a particular temporal 
and spatial moment. “Frequently power relationship [of various actors is] the 
result of the situation rather than the situation being the result of their 
respective power positions as they entered it” (Blumer qtd. in Clarke 23, 
emphasis added). 
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In the next chapter, I develop in more detail the “situation” as I framed it for this 
project, but this brief overview of the principles guiding Clarke’s sense of situation 
serve as a foundation for the way she is presenting the concept, and for her suggestion 
that the site of research move out to a more open range of materials and texts, if 
necessary. 
In my research, for example, it is useful to look beyond the materials developed 
in the practicum, toward larger discourses and histories that might be important to the 
inquiry of the “situation.” This thinking takes me beyond the confines of the practicum 
materials as a flat data set. By examining the situation relationally, I would need to look 
beyond the immediate context of the production of emotion in critical pedagogy (the 
classroom, the practicum), at other relational forces at in work in the larger situation. 
One central premise of this methodological approach is that paying attention to 
the work of discourse itself, rather than concentrating on individual actors or actions, 
allows the researcher to consider data that might otherwise not be recognized as salient 
to the inquiry (see reference in #2 of Clarke’s concept of situation). Situational analysis, 
as outlined by Clarke, uses a series of mapping exercises at various stages of a research 
project, each of which is prepared in order to illuminate relational factors involved in a 
situation of inquiry, even those that might start out as less than visible. In some ways 
the steps parallel the original conceptions of method in grounded theory (open coding, 
axial coding, selective coding, memo writing), but Clarke felt it was necessary to create 
space for other relational elements, including the researcher’s prior knowledge. Echoing 
Star’s assertion, Clarke notes that:  
As trained scholars in our varied fields, usually with some theoretical 
background, we may also suspect that certain things are going on that have not 
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yet explicitly appeared in our data. In seeking to be ethically accountable 
researchers, I believe we need to articulate what we see as sites of silence in our 
data. What seems present but unarticulated? (85)  
The possibility that there were indeed “sites of silence” was precisely my concern 
in developing a responsible methodology toward the inquiry regarding emotion and 
critical pedagogy.  While it would be possible to examine only the materials collected 
from the teacher training practicum, it appeared that there were other relational factors 
at work. 
Clarke’s mapping exercises 
(which are explained next) are not used 
in place of the traditional coding and 
categorizing of data in grounded 
theory. They correspond to the stages of 
coding, and the researcher should be 
reading all materials carefully looking for 
emerging patterns, just as one does with 
other grounded theory method. Like much 
of the other literature on grounded 
theory, there are few “how to” step-wise instructions for method in situational analysis, 
but Clarke provides examples of some of her own work that are helpful to designing a 
method for one’s own project. Clarke encourages researchers who see the methodology 
as useful to choose which parts of her mapping exercises best help “open up” data. 
 
Figure 3: Situational Map Example 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 I created maps at each stage of the research, and simultaneously read histories 
and conceptual analyses that seemed to be pertinent to the categories I was uncovering.  
In the next section, I briefly sketch the mapping techniques Clarke proposes and the 
method she has used in her own research in medical sociology, so that some 
possibilities for method may be made a bit more concrete. Clarke proposes three kinds 
of situational analysis mapping exercises:  
• Situational maps  
• Social Worlds/Arenas Maps 
• Positional maps 
Situational Maps. The first of these mapping exercises, situational mapping, is 
used to articulate all the elements in a situation of interest. At this stage a researcher 
may or may not have compiled and begun to code data, and Clarke suggests that these 
maps may be especially “messy.”  An important element of this part of the mapping 
procedure is that the researcher is urged to locate not just the people in the situation, 
but all elements that may be of influence or agency in the situation. She calls these 
elements “actors.” They may include concepts, technologies and other possible 
relational influences (see Figure 2).  Once all actors in a situation have been identified to 
the best of a researcher’s ability, the next step is to systematically examine relationships 
between each actor and all others. This heuristic leads to the identification of some of 
the key relations within the situation of inquiry.  
In Clarke’s work, this mapping exercise has helped to illuminate less visible 
actors in the situation. In her student’s research on nurses’ work under managed care, 
for example, in addition to the actors one would expect, such as patients and physicians 
and nurses, “pharmaceutical companies” were included as actors in her mapping, as 
were “old, current and new medical equipment and technologies” (95).  Beyond the 
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initial site of data collection (as in my collection of materials from the TA practicum), 
Clarke stresses that “we also need to ask what ideas, concepts, discourses, symbols, 
sites of debate… may matter in this situation” (88).  In the case of my own work, this 
included a wide array of “actors” in the situation including physical elements such as 
curriculum materials; concepts such as justice; peripheral actors such as the parents of 
students, as well as students, teachers and teaching mentors. 
Social Worlds/Arenas Maps. Once the researcher has interrogated the relational 
factors between all actors in a situation, the next stage of mapping Clarke recommends 
is the creation of social worlds/arenas maps. 
In order to make this map, the researcher 
enters the situation of interest and “tries to 
make collective sociological sense out of it, 
starting with the questions: What are the 
patterns of collective commitment and what are 
the salient social worlds here? What are their 
perspectives and what do they hope to 
achieve through their collective action?” 
(110).  At this stage the researcher is working 
to identify the various patterns of boundaries 
and collective actions and how they may be 
situated within a particular network, taking into account the porous and fluid nature of 
such activity.  Clarke notes that some actors (individuals, collectivities…) might prefer 
not to participate in a particular arena, yet their dependencies (usually but not always 
for resources) often coerce their participation” (110). Yet these are still important 
 
Figure 4: Social Worlds/Arena Map Example 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“worlds” of collectivity to take into consideration. Clarke outlines her student’s  (Bones) 
project on nurses’ work under managed care, for example, for which she selected the 
US Healthcare domain as the largest plane of her situation map, and the Hospital as the 
“arena.” She explains the various ways that collective (social) worlds such as “big 
pharmaceutical world,”  “the hospital management world” and the “hospital nursing 
world” might intersect relationally with the hospital arena. She has placed patients at 
the center.  
Clarke uses the broad concept of discourse to describe the ways various 
discourses “write in” and “rewrite” what she has identified as social worlds—in other 
words, worlds are both creating and being constituted by various discourses. Clarke 
suggests the researcher can learn a great deal from examining collective action through 
examining discourses constructed by and constituted by these social worlds. This stage 
of her mapping techniques was especially interesting as a way forward in my own 
project. Clarke’s notion of the of the power of discourse to create and constitute various 
social worlds is strongly correlates to the power and function of collective emotion 
theorized in political and emotional psychology, which will be explained in more detail 
in the section of this chapter where I outline my own approach further. 
Positional Maps. The final mapping strategy proposed by Clarke is positional 
mapping. This mapping exercise is a way of thinking through “positionality;” not of 
individuals or groups, but rather “…positions constituted in discourses. Individuals 
and groups of all sorts may and commonly do hold multiple and contradictory 
positions on the same issue. Positional maps represent the heterogeneity of positions” 
(126).  This is perhaps the most important mapping exercise Clarke offers this 
dissertation project. This is because, as I noted in the section on social worlds/arenas 
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maps, emotion itself functions on a collective level (as we have seen in the analyses in 
the previous chapter), so the fluid and contradictory “positionalities” inside particular 
“social worlds” (in Clarke’s schema) are likely the places where emotion is collecting, 
and where we can see it doing particular work, sometimes in unexpected ways. 
Emirbayer and Goldberg argue that studying the circulation of emotion in 
contentious politics requires an investigation of relational contexts and their 
complexities: 
As we have seen, in the simplest of cases (as discussed by Dewey), emotional 
transactions occur between a single subject and a single object. However, in more 
complicated cases, they involve a potentially far greater number of actors, tied to 
one another in sometimes intricate patterns of emotional investments. These 
configurations of passion can be systematically mapped and charted, as with 
social-structural or cultural structures. And the mappings that result can give us 
a fuller picture of the relational contexts within which action, including collective 
action, unfolds.  Episodes of political contention can thereby be seen as the 
complex emotional interactions that they are, without reducing that level of 
insight to a mere reflection of other sorts of patternings or dynamics. (104) 
Emirbayer and Goldberg’s analysis of approaches needed to understand 
collective emotion in contentious politics parallel Clarke’s assertions. In both cases, they 
see the need to examine the larger context, and to map the socio-cultural structures in 
order to examine the complexities of collective emotion. Emirbayer and Goldberg do 
not use situational analysis in their work, but their call for relational analysis and 
mapping echoes Clarke’s. Clarke urges researchers to examine the discourses that 
potentially inform and construct what she conceives of as “social worlds;” and I would 
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argue that collective emotion is the same kind of force requiring contextual attention. 
Recognition of the importance of collective emotion to the project came from two 
sources investigated along side one another: the important work of scholars such as 
Emirbayer and Goldberg’s work on tracing the complex forces of emotion, and 
performing the first stages of Clarke’s strategies. Working with Clarke’s concept of the 
discursive construction of  “social worlds” and “positionality” within these worlds it 
became clear that it was important not only to examine collective emotion as an actor in 
the situation, but as a force operating within the same plane that Clarke gives 
“discourse.”   The two forces are integrated, though “collective emotion” is not an 
element of discursive function which Clarke pays particular attention to in her 
methodology. 
Emirbayer and Goldberg argue that beliefs, values and attachments—ideological 
understandings--are shaped and developed through the movement of the emotion 
economy.  Abu-Lughod provides a link between these in her discussion of the 
relationship between discourse and emotion. She has pointed out that researchers 
should be examining “how emotion discourses are deployed in social contexts…This 
would shift the concern from what Foucault has argued is widespread in the modern 
West—a focus on what is said in discourse—to the more interesting and political 
questions of what discourse is, what it does, and what informs it” (28 emphasis added). I 
argue that Clarke’s notion of the discursive construction of social worlds can be 
enhanced by looking as carefully as possible at how emotion is functioning in these 
moments, as Abu-Lughod puts it “how emotion discourses are deployed in social 
contexts” (28). 
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My methodology takes into account the fuller ecology of the situation, and of 
emotion transaction—it is a “contextualist approach” in which, as Phelps has noted, “all 
parts are not only interdependent but mutually defining and transactive, so that 
through their shifting relationships they continually constitute new parts or elements as 
well as new structures” (33).  Clarke proposes that the mapping work in situational 
analysis can function as a tool to find “fresh paths into a full array of data sources that 
can lay out what you have to date…provoking the researcher to analyze more deeply” 
(83).  But what exactly does Clarke mean by “the situation?”  
The Situation. Anthropologist Tom Mathar finds Clarke’s work useful, 
particularly in terms of forwarding and expanding grounded theory, yet critiques 
Clarke regarding the soft definition she provides for “situation.”  Earlier in this chapter, 
I laid out the groundwork Clark offered for understanding the concept she names the 
“situation.” Clarke attaches her notion of “situation” to assertions from other scholars 
regarding this concept, specifically about the power of perspective to generate action, 
the social function of coordinated actions, the situatedness of all knowledges, and the 
potential of a situation itself to shift and arrange power relations. Like Mathar, I find 
Clarke’s definition of situation may require further refining, but I also agree that as a 
methodology, situational analysis allows the researcher to recognize new relational 
elements through a range of positions, as well as to capture what is not yet articulated. 
This may then provide a key to understanding the nature of the situation in a more 
relational way.  So what exactly is “the situation” or, the situated site of this research 
inquiry?  
In some articulations of grounded theory methodology, my site would be the 
data from the practicum alone, and my task would be to approach this data without any 
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previous frame of reference, looking for emergent patterns. Instead, I frame the problem 
using the wider notion of the “situation” as: undergraduate composition classrooms 
and critical pedagogy, making particular note of emotion in relation to this situation as 
a collective and constituting force.  
Collective Emotion. Collective emotion is a term used to describe the emotions 
of a group who possess some shared feature of identification, and for whom those who 
identify as a part of the group tend to “feel” alike, especially toward those outside the 
group. These groups may be large or small, and they may be built from direct contact, 
as in members of a department or a family, or through a cultural categorization, such as 
gender.  In cultural studies, investigation of this phenomenon is sometimes viewed as a 
way of understanding belonging and non-belonging, as in Seigworth and Gregg’s 
attempt to describe the “accumulation” of emotion in bodies and groups: “Affect marks 
a body’s belonging to a world of encounters; or a world belonging to a body of 
encounters; but also, in non-belonging” (2). While cultural studies offers useful ways to 
think through affect and identity, scholarship in the field tends to differentiate between 
affect and emotion in a very particular way. For most scholars in cultural studies, 
“affect” is linked to physicality, to the body. And it is affect, rather than the parallel 
construct “emotion,” which is the focusing term used in much of the work in cultural 
studies theorization. Cultural studies scholar Lawrence Grossberg, for example, sees 
emotion as produced through affect. “Emotion is an ideological attempt to make sense 
out of some affective productions” (Grossberg 316). In the cases examined in this 
dissertation project, it is precisely the “ideological attempt to make meaning out of 
affective production” that is of interest.  In order to better understand emotion, then, I 
turn to theorization of emotion drawn from social identity theory.  
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Social identity theory offers the basic premise that “when group identification 
turns a group into an important social identity for an individual, the group takes on 
emotional significance” (Smith & Mackie 429). Within this larger theory, Smith has 
further theorized the way that emotions may belong to groups, as well as the influence 
that belonging to a group may have on one’s emotions, or Intergroup Identity Theory. 
According to Intergroup Identity Theory, emotion can function in groups very much 
like it does in individuals, as a collective. This is not the same as “group think” theory 
developed in the past, where we imagine that people are not thinking for themselves, or 
become powerless as they succumb to the thinking of the group.  Group identities are 
recognized as porous and in constant motion; there are complex layers of belonging that 
may influence reactions.  
Building on Smith’s work, researchers have begun to examine the ways that a 
sense of belonging may activate larger structures of emotional reaction, based on that 
sense of identification with the group. This collective emotion may occur within a 
group, in feelings toward others that one identifies as part of “us,” but it may also be 
directed toward an “out-group,” whether hostile or sympathetic.  Smith and Mackie 
outline in-group emotion in this way: “The individual who identifies with the in-group 
may feel that they are threatening us; we feel angry at them; we support policies 
preventing them from interfering with our best interest” (430). Emotion then, is not just 
an individual matter; shame, outrage, guilt, joy, any emotion, can be experienced 
collectively.   In essence, our emotions are rooted in and schooled by our various group 
identities, and these groups may develop a sense of collective emotion impacting our 
relationship to those both inside and outside these belonging-groups. 
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The “situation” identified in this project--composition teachers engaged in 
teaching with critical pedagogy—often brings out questions that are linked to 
competing political identities, within individual people and within groups of people. 
Some of the most useful study of collective emotion comes from scholars interested in 
political emotions. Political contention has particular potential for evoking collective 
emotion, as it is always tangled with various categories that represent power struggles 
between groups. Goodwin, Jasper and Poletta, as well as other scholars of protest and 
social movements would agree with Grossberg’s assessment that emotion is the mixture 
of affect and ideology. In their explanation for the importance of emotion to politics, 
they note the intersection between what they label a more “constructed” level of 
emotion involved: 
The emotions most relevant to politics, we believe, fall toward the more 
constructed, cognitive end of the dimension.  Moral outrage over feared 
practices, the shame of spoiled collective identities, or the pride of refurbished 
ones, the indignation of perceived encroachment on traditional rights, the joy of 
imagining a new and better society and participating in a movement toward that 
end—none of these are automatic responses. They are related to moral intuitions, 
felt obligations and rights, and information about expected effects, all of which 
are culturally and historically variable. It is for this reason that our analysis of 
emotions of protest and politics departs from much of the work in the sociology 
of emotion. (13) 
The situational analysis, as I have conceived of it in this project takes emotion 
into account as an “actor,” (in Clarke’s terms), but it also examines emotion as an 
integral force in the work of discourse, especially when the discourse involves 
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contentious political situations. The situation is not the site of the practicum itself, but 
the larger contextual situation, that of critical pedagogy in the writing classroom and its 
intersection with emotion, especially collective emotion. In order to get a fuller sense of 
this larger situation, I identified a moment where one important “social world” within 
this situation, composition teachers, find themselves embroiled in a politically 
contentious discussion. Analysis of this site reveals not only the ways that collective 
emotion is operating within this group, but also the ways that it serves to align and 
divide various positions within the social world, and serves to confuse some of what 
might actually be central to the argument. 
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Chapter 4  Collective Collegial Emotion 
 
When studying episodes of political contention, look for the intentional structure in the various parties’ emotions, 
whether they are social movements, established institutions, or third parties, and evaluate their perceptions and 
judgments on the basis of the intelligence and emotional appropriateness that they manifest.  
~Emirbayer & Goldberg  “Pragmatism, Bourdieu and collective emotions in contentious politics”  
 
 
"Reason" is not an antecedent force which serves as a panacea. It is a laborious achievement of Habit needing to 
be continually worked over. A balanced arrangement of propulsive activities manifested in deliberation— 
namely, reason— depends upon…proportionate emotional sensitiveness.  
~John Dewey.  Human Nature and Conduct. 
 
Opening‐up the data 
Clarke’s situational analysis methodology, outlined in chapter three, uses a series 
of mapping exercises designed to help the researcher open-up data:  
• Situational Maps (brainstorming all possible actors in the situation and 
examining them each relationally to one another);  
• Social Worlds/Arenas Maps (outlining the collective discourses involved in 
relation to one another and the situation); and  
• Positional Maps (interrogating complexities and contradictory positions 
within social worlds toward the situation)  
Clarke notes that these exercises are heuristic in nature, and encourages 
researchers to work with them flexibly in relation to one’s research goals and particular 
project. After initial open coding of materials from the new teaching practicum, (notes 
from classroom visits, practicum, individual meetings and team meetings, reflections, 
email exchanges, monthly reports); I used situational mapping to examine the larger 
context and relationships. In order to  open-up the data (as Clarke suggested), I created 
a situation map of “actors” that might be important to consider in undergraduate 
composition classrooms and critical pedagogy.  The situation map included people and 
group actors one might expect (undergraduate students, teaching assistants, teaching 
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mentors, parents, program administrators), but it also included material actors, (the 
menu of shared inquiries and assignments, the course reader, new technologies such as 
wiki space and computer labs, documentary film, the grant). In addition, the situation 
map (which Clarke suggests purposely tries to make a “mess” of things) included 
concepts that might be considered actors (social justice, critical pedagogy, power and 
difference, emotion work, collective emotion, left/right and conservative/liberal binary 
definitions of political views), and also larger outside forces that may have been at work 
in the situation (the economic recession, the long-term war in the Middle East, the 
national education debate). I spent time examining each of these in relation to each of 
the other actors within the situation map, as Clarke suggests. Viewed relationally with 
other actors, this created several new pathways for analysis, including the ways that 
collective emotion might be examined in relation to writing teachers working on critical 
pedagogy, the influences of the national economy and current educational debates on 
students’ views of critical pedagogy, the influences of new technologies on collective 
emotions and identity.   
The next step was to look more closely in order to identify the salient social 
worlds/arenas involved in the situation. In Clarke’s conception of the term, social 
worlds generate shared perspectives that then form the basis for collective action. 
Clarke argues that “activities in all social worlds and arenas include establishing and 
maintaining boundaries between worlds and gaining legitimation for the world itself. 
These processes involve the social construction of the particular world and a variety of 
claims-making activities” (113). People typically participate in many such worlds 
simultaneously, and such participation remains “highly fluid” (46). Clarke also notes 
that “there can be implicated actors in a social world or arena, actors silenced or only 
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discursively present—constructed by others for their own purposes” (46). These social 
worlds are both constituted by and constructed through discourse.  
Composition teachers as a social world 
 One social world that emerged through this mapping as particularly salient to 
the analysis, and thus worth closer examination is the social world of the writing 
teacher. Though the social world of writing teachers can be imagined as singular, 
differences and complexities within the group are important to keep in mind. Full-time 
faculty (tenured and untenured), adjunct faculty, graduate assistants—each of these is 
part of the larger constructed social world of ‘writing teacher,’ but each is also positioned 
quite differently in terms of power and in their relationship to the project of critical 
pedagogy. Closer examination of discourses (and collective emotions) that construct the 
collective identity of composition teachers could help uncover how this discursive 
construction might matter in moments where the project of critical pedagogy, or social 
justice is operating. How are writing teachers imagining themselves, collectively, in 
relation to others who are fighting for social justice, or victims of oppression? How are 
boundaries drawn in this social world, and how might this matter in critical pedagogy? 
Returning to Clarke’s assertion that “activities in all social worlds…include 
establishing and maintaining boundaries between worlds… [and] gaining legitimation 
for the world itself,” and that these “processes involve the social construction of the 
particular world and a variety of claims-making activities” (113); one possible way to 
examine the social world of composition teachers/scholars is by looking for particular 
moments where this boundaries are actually being constructed or deconstructed. This 
can be difficult to locate, let alone capture for later analysis. We can see evidence, for 
example, of this type of construction of boundaries of the social world of writing 
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teachers through the brief historical review of the discipline offered in chapter one, but 
it is more difficult to find examples of this activity in-situ and in some “real time” view.  
New technologies, however, have provided some opportunities once 
unavailable. Public, fully transcribed “conversations” among colleagues are available 
through professional listservs. Listserv discussions have the added value of being both 
highly public and feeling highly private-- a contradiction noted by recent researchers in 
digital communication. Participants in listserv conversations or other social media often 
feel a sense of privacy writing ‘alone’ at a computer screen, yet this is ironically 
combined with a simultaneous lack of any of the physical privacy boundaries which 
might otherwise encapsulate such communications in face-to-face discussion.  The 
participants in digital discussions, therefore, sometimes express themselves more 
openly in digital forums.  
What follows is an analysis of a listserv thread from such a digital forum, 
examined for some of the complexities and positioning in social world of writing 
teachers/scholars that might prove especially important in relation to critical pedagogy. 
I am myself a member of this listserv, (a “lurker,” to put it in uncomplimentary terms), 
who read this thread with interest at the time it was produced. As this research project 
developed, this extensive, politically contentious thread appeared to have more and 
more potential as a way to understand how reason, emotion and collective emotion 
might be functioning within the category usually imagined cohesively as writing 
teachers.  
The posts are made available in a publically archived format, and provide an 
excellent place to examine not just the writing teachers as a social world, but also 
discourse within and about this social world in the midst of a contentious political 
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debate.  The listserv thread illuminates longstanding beliefs about reason and emotion 
not easily shaken by theory, the complexity and contradiction in identities built into this 
social world, and a glimpse into the forces of collective emotion at work in it.  When 
applied to the larger analytic situation, the undergraduate composition classrooms and 
critical pedagogy, each of these illuminations provides a way to better understand 
concerns regarding the forces of emotion that we should be taking into account in our 
work with critical pedagogy in composition.  
 
The Rachel Corrie thread 
The listserv thread examined here did not begin as an outward attempt at protest 
or even a politically contentious debate. It began several years ago with a call for 
nominations for the “Rachel Corrie Award for Courage in the Teaching of Writing,” on 
a listserv where administrators, teachers and others interested in writing and teaching 
actively and regularly participate in discussions about the field.  Browsing the publicly 
archived list of posts, one finds that members often begin with the greetings such as  
“Friends…” or “Colleagues…” and frequently includes the exchange of praise, thanks, 
shared sorrows and joys, assistance, and congratulatory sentiments. In short, the more 
than 3,000 members of this list tend to think of themselves as sharing similar interests 
and obstacles and actions as professionals and pre-professionals in the field of 
composition and rhetoric—a social world invested in teaching and learning about 
writing, especially at the postsecondary level. 
But the thread I analyze in this chapter, which began with a call for nominations 
for the Rachel Corrie award several years ago, quickly became a space for a contentious 
political debate, during which the complexities and contradictory positions and power 
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relations are made visible within this social world. The announcement posted to the 
listserv by a longtime member began with a description of the young woman for whom 
the award was named. I have included the open coding in this first announcement (see 
Figure 5) as a sample of the categorization work. 
Rachel Corrie was a 23-year-old peace activist and senior at The Evergreen State 
College in Olympia, Washington. She was killed on March 16, 2003 in Rafah in the Gaza 
Strip. She was on leave from school to work in Palestine with the International Solidarity 
Movement, a group using and promoting “nonviolent, direct-action methods of 
resistance to confront and challenge illegal Israeli occupation forces and policies.” Rachel 
was attempting to block an Israeli military bulldozer from demolishing the house of a 
pharmacist and his family when the driver of the bulldozer ran over her, then backed up 
and ran over her again. Wearing a bright orange jacket and using a bullhorn, Rachel was, 
by all eyewitness accounts and in horrifying photographs published on the Internet, 
exceptionally visible. Her parents, some members of Congress, and grassroots 
organizations including several Jewish peace groups have called for an independent U.S 
investigation into her death. Such an investigation has yet to happen, and the U.S. media 
virtually buried the story—though it was featured prominently in the U.K. and in many 
other countries. Corrie took courses like “Labor and the Environment” and “Public Art 
and the Middle East Conflict”; she also wrote detailed emails from Palestine. The late 
Edward Said, who met with her parents in May, 2003, wrote, “Her letters back to her 
family are truly remarkable documents of her ordinary humanity that made for very 
difficult and moving reading....” 
 
In addition to this description, the actual call for the award appeared on the list. 
Note that the memory of Corrie (as a student) is being honored through the recognition 
of a CCCC teacher willing to take risks for their commitments.  
The Progressive SIGs and Caucuses Coalition (PSCC) of the CCCC wishes to 
honor the memory of this extremely courageous student by recognizing a teacher in the 
CCCC who has taken professional risks in order to promote social justice through the 
teaching of writing. It is well known that the politics of hiring, tenure, and promotion 
often motivate graduate students and junior faculty to write, teach, and serve in “safe” 
subject and project areas; many are encouraged by mentors to shy away from genuinely 
“controversial” or “risky” subjects until they are tenured. In making this award, the 
PSCC hopes, conversely, to encourage writing teachers early in their careers to take on 
research, pedagogy, and service projects that promote commitment to peace, justice, and 
human dignity—even when hazarding the ire of deans, chairs, editors, and hiring and 
review committees (coding added). 
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Following the advice of Abu-Lughod, I chose an 
examination of this listserv thread not just for “what is said” 
but rather “what it does, and what informs it” (28) as the 
best path toward an analysis of the discussion, and of this 
social world. As a way into the analysis, I used open 
coding a strategy.  The categories emerging through this 
work are presented in Figure 5. These categories are not 
parallel to one another, and in subsequent reading (axial 
coding) of the material it became apparent that some were 
related to one another (direct naming of emotion and 
discussions of reason as opposed to emotion, for example), 
but the open coding provided a way to begin to make 
sense of the data. As I mentioned in chapter three, I did not 
begin with a “blank slate” approach to the materials; the theory on collective emotions, 
especially as related to contentious politics, informed my analysis and categorization, as 
did my preexisting understanding of some of the history behind the so-called 
reason/emotion split and the history of composition. So the categories reflect, in part, 
that interested approach to the analysis. In the announcement for the award, for 
example, note the frequent use of references in the second section to risk & justice 
(orange) and the calls for support and references to collective action (green). The review 
of the questions regarding reason and emotion are not set aside in my interest in how 
members of this social world are navigating and using their discourse with regard to 
reason and emotion, especially given the political nature of the discussion.  Likewise, 
noticing such terms as “justice” presented in relation to both discussions of Middle 
OPEN CODING 
CATEGORIES: 
Emotion named directly 
Name‐calling, sarcasm 
Binary 
introduced/referenced 
Direct references to 
(in)justice and risk, 
safety or peace, war 
Calling for/referencing 
collective support or 
action 
Rhetorical technique  
Reason (versus) 
emotion 
 
Figure 5: Open Coding 
Categories for listserv thread 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Eastern political turmoil and the work of composition is obviously based partly on my 
reading on historical constructions of composition teaching as a discipline. All readings 
are interested readings, as Harris has pointed out, but this is also a careful reading. 
Before further explanation of the coding and findings, however, I want to 
provide a better sense of the movement, tone and context of this thread, by offering in 
its entirety the opening move that “shook the tree:” 
Hi M. and Others, 
This is the first I've heard of the Rachel Corrie award, and I'm wondering if 
others on the list are as troubled by it as I am. 
Of course I know about Rachel Corrie and respect her commitment and dedication 
to serving a very troubled and often abused population.  At the same time, I would hope 
that as teachers of rhetoric we would be careful to avoid the very disturbing loaded 
language of this award announcement.  
The implication of the sentence about Rachel's "orange clothes" is essentially to 
confirm the charge of intentional murder against the Israeli driver of the bulldozer (an 
extremely contentious charge in the international community, to say the least).  The 
assertion that this award promotes peace and justice suggests that Rachel Corrie was 
working on the side of peace and justice (not just in her own mind, which of course she 
was, but also objectively, which is a much more controversial idea) or, more 
problematically for me, that there is a clear "justice" in this terribly fraught and nuanced 
situation in the Middle East.  The accusations against the US media smack of the long-
standing anti-Semitic charges of Jewish media control. 
I certainly support the cause that this award aims to promote, lauding 
pedagogical bravery and academic freedom among the non-tenured, but this seems to me 
a particularly problematic and polarizing, and, for me at least, offensive, way in which to 
do it. 
As an untenured faculty member myself, I hardly feel prepared to take on the 
CCCC, but I am very curious about what others of you think of this rhetoric and what it 
means for our organization to advertise itself and its politics in this way. 
G. 
In this opening reply post, we can observe that the writer wonders if “others are 
as troubled by the award description” as she. One way to read this is as a call for who 
would like to join her in being “troubled” by this—asking, in effect, for who else might 
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be part of this collective emotion. The use of the term “troubled” is also worth noting, 
because as we’ll see in later posts, direct references to emotion tend, in many cases, to 
be carefully tempered. Listserv thread writers are “troubled” and “concerned” while 
“deans, chairs, editors, and hiring and review committees” are libel to express “ire.” 
These are some of the first quiet hints at the attitudes regarding emotion and its 
relational value with reason within this social world. It is not directly stated, but rather 
performed through the discourse, reasserting emotion as problematic, and positing 
emotion on those who are  “unreasonable.” 
The writer implies that those who belong to this social world would “avoid 
disturbing loaded language.” The speaker is framing the decision to post the 
announcement and description for the Rachel Corrie Award as falling outside the 
general behaviors agreed upon in this social world, which, based on their experience 
and skills, would not take such actions. In addition, the reference is to “loaded 
language” which is also a hint at the emotion rules of the social world. The speaker 
makes reference to the expertise of the group as trained rhetors, but also helps begin to 
form a sense of collective emotion—a sense of pride regarding their fairness and a 
generosity of spirit for other views, and a disdain for those who do not adhere to these 
principles. In her framing, this is part of what it means to belong to this social world, 
and what it means not to. 
As we can see in announcement of the award, it is linked to a political incident 
between Israeli and Palestinian forces, to peace activism/violence, to (in)justice, to the 
costs of risk taking--and to contingent labor in composition teaching.  But it is not until 
near the end of the post that the contributor directly references the section of the award 
she finds directly offensive in a political sense, when she points out “accusations against 
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the US media that smack of the long-standing anti-Semitic charges of Jewish media 
control.”  Here another circle is drawn, invoking collective emotion regarding the 
stereotypes that “they” (some others, outside of this social world) circulate about the 
media and Jewish control.  
In another move, the contributor invokes a larger collective emotion which all 
can ostensibly join; that of approval for the intent of the award itself, lauding 
“pedagogical bravery and academic freedom among the non-tenured” and adding that 
she is an untenured faculty member herself—aligning with those described as less 
powerful in the profession. It is interesting to note that this, in particular, is one 
principle on which all can agree; collective concern for contingent labor. After 
identifying as a member of the group that the award was ostensibly set up to honor, she 
adds that though she disagrees with this award, she feels “hardly prepared to take on 
CCCC,” (the Conference on College Composition and Communication) gesturing 
toward powerful sources that she is weak against, aligning herself not with the types of 
powerful forces gestured to in the award announcement (Deans, Chairs, Editors), but as 
someone who is ostensibly without power in her role in the social world. 
The next two contributors simply clarified that this was not an award sponsored 
by CCCC, but did not speak to any of the other questions or assertions in the post 
critiquing and questioning the award. After these two clarifications, a new contributor 
spoke up, partly to further clarify the sponsorship of the award, but partially in 
response to the critique: 
I should further clarify that Rhetoricians for Peace is NOT a 4C SIG and, thus, 
not part of the PSCC coalition.  RFP is an independent group.  While we do always 
participate at the C's in various way, we have never sought SIG status. 
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I'm a bit disturbed by G's words.  The description of Rachel Corrie's killing that 
G mentions is accurate.  I have not read any competing accounts, so I'm not sure how the 
language is loaded.  When human beings commit attrocities on each other, should we 
cover them up with euphemisms?    
Further, has there been some accusation that Rachel Corrie was not working for 
peace and justice?   I have read nothing to suggest that she was an agitator or that she 
took up arms against the Israelis.  Perhaps G. could explain more about what 
unpeaceful and inequitable actions Rachel Corrie took.  Being a Palestinian 
sympathizer hardly aligns a person with violence and injustice.  To say that there is 
no clear side of justice in the Middle East is to ignore a lot of history and to 
succumb to the propaganda campaign that has allowed so much unnecessary 
death to continue. 
Naming the PSCC award after Rachel Corrie is very appropriate.  She lived her 
convictions.  The parallel that the award tries to draw to adjunct teaching gives dignity 
to adjuncts who often take risks within exploitive working conditions. 
-D. (Listserv post) 
 
After these initial posts, over seventy posts followed in the thread, most 
occurring within a 24-hour period. Divisions were illuminated in this social world of 
teachers of writing that at other times are not very visible. The conversation became 
more and more heated as the arguments grew; arguments about Israel and Palestine, 
about charges that some members have insinuated that the U.S. media is “controlled” 
by Jewish interests, about using Rachel Corrie as a symbol in order to erase the context 
of the political situation, about why Rachel Corrie’s death was selected out of all the 
atrocities, about whether Corrie’s death can be “proven” to be murder using factual 
source materials, and about the question of whether adjunct faculty are actually “at 
risk” when they chose activist politics.  
I present analysis of particular listserv posts and responses next which illuminate 
particular understandings about this social world important to our larger situational 
analysis:  
• A collective sense that reason is separate from emotion, and has the true 
power to shift beliefs, values and ideologies in the heat of contentious debate. 
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• The fractures, complexities and contradictions within the larger social world 
described as writing teachers and in their collective relationship(s) to social 
justice and to critical pedagogy. 
• The autonomous force of collective emotion in a situation that involves 
contentious political debate and action. 
 
A “pernicious postulate” regarding reason and emotion 
Emirbayer and Goldberg outline three “pernicious postulates” regarding 
emotion in situations of contentious politics, one of which is the notion that emotion 
and reason are mutually exclusive. They argue that this postulate leads to problematic 
interpretations of various political situations, and blocks the way to broadened views 
regarding the specific decisions and actions of political leaders and followers. Many 
scholars in composition and rhetoric have also noted the problems with the 
longstanding notion that emotion and reason are mutually exclusive. In fact, particular 
attention is paid to the problem of holding to the sense that emotion “gets in the way” 
of rationality. Scholars and teachers participating on this very list have written about 
the problems with binary visions such as theoretical/practical; spiritual/natural; 
ordered/chaotic; certain/uncertain; intellectual/passional; mental/bodily and 
male/female.  
Yet this particular argument illuminates the point that theorizing and arguing 
this view in the abstract is not the same as enacting it. For example, as I indicated in the 
introduction to the conversation to my coding of direct emotion words, contributors 
carefully characterized their own emotions in cooler, more rational frames, while 
representing emotions of those they argued against as more inflamed. In the post 
responding to the person who first questioned the award recall, for example what B. 
writes: “I'm a bit disturbed by G's words.  Other examples from this coding include: 
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writers noting that they are “ uncomfortable with…”; calls for “reasonable discussion 
among concerned scholars;” and members who find what another post has said “a bit 
distressing.”  
 
When representing other views, however (those with whom they disagree), 
descriptions of their emotional states include “vehement,” “hypocritical,” “vitriolic” 
and “self-righteous.” Of particular note is a comment near the end of the thread in 
which J. says, “I guess I have to take the angry label. If it was any other 
ethnic/religious/racial group characterized as such, I'm sure others would feel the 
same. And I'm sure I would still be just as angry.” He recognizes the way that being 
outwardly angry positions him in the argument, because anger is seen as less than 
rational, and therefore problematic to clear thinking.  
We know that anger has a place in terms of building collective emotion and 
actions, yet those who admit to feeling it are likely to be dismissed. In their explanation 
of the framework passed down from ancient Greece, Emirbayer and Goldberg explain, 
“Emotions occupy a distinctly unenviable position…They are denigrated, seen as 
irrational, precisely because they accord too much importance to changing and 
uncertain things; persons in the grip of emotions are seen as every bit as unstable as the 
natural, material world itself” (473).  
Beyond the representation of others as less rational (and therefore, by 
implication, less likely to be thinking well), there is also another, related  “pernicious 
postulate” passed down, the impulse to imagine a singular, capital “T” Truth, unsullied 
by emotional impulse. This view is rarely represented as valued in the scholarship of 
the writing teaching community.  But the listserv thread contains many such references. 
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After some discussion regarding the representation of Corrie’s death, and whether there 
might be other interpretations possible, more than one contributor notes simply that 
“The description of Rachel Corrie's killing is accurate”(Rachel Corrie thread). I point 
this out not as an indictment of the response, but rather to help illustrate the ways that 
our commitments to various principles, beliefs and values (such as representation and 
the multiplicity of views possible) can fall away in contentious political situations. In 
fact, the next post makes note of this. Responding to the following quote,  
>To say that there is no clear side of justice in the Middle >East is to ignore a lot of 
history and to succumb to the >propaganda campaign that has allowed so much 
unnecessary death> 
J. makes note of the fact that this is being presented as Truth, arguing that this 
one-sided thinking: 
Oh come on. I'm not getting dragged into another one of these endless parades of "we 
believe in justice" when the rhetoric used is blatantly one-sided and hardly demonstrative 
of any justice. Don't act self-righteous.  One can easily go after the rhetorical stance 
taken up by this award and show how it IGNORES history and how this award is a very 
specific case of PROPAGANDA. 
Please. I've long had enough of this facade that somehow a side is immune from the very 
things it accuses another side of taking up. Rhetoricians for Peace hardly is an exception. 
You have a one-sided position. Fess up to it.  
…Simply put: I don't find the award appropriate and I don't find the propaganda move 
here appropriate. I especially don't find the pretending that it's not propaganda 
appropriate…. 
'Nuff said.  
J. 
This post makes the move away from the political situation itself, in order to 
argue that there is in fact a political agenda at work in the naming of the award.  
Another writer responded to this line of critique by saying that calling it 
propaganda closes off discussion, and offering the following:  
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…what I find problematic about this award is that it takes this tragic incident and holds 
it above the thousands of tragic incidents that have been going on in that region for 
decades now.  Where is the award named for the busload of Israeli school children which 
was stopped so that the children could be shot, execution style, at close range, for 
example?” 
This post introduces yet another element of emotion/reason problem often 
examined in this social world, the question of pathos in argument. The argument is 
presented in unemotional terms (this is the same post from which I made note of above, 
in which the person notes that he would like a “reasonable discussion among concerned 
scholars”), but at the same time it is obvious that the argument uses a high dose of 
pathos for its punch. Another example of this same sort of pathetic appeal occurs in a 
post by R. in which he defends G’s original post, and suggests that making the award 
aligned with Corrie’s death is “a bit disingenuous” and moves on from there to describe 
“members of Orthodox Burial Society's collecting scraps of flesh from the sidewalk in 
accordance with Jewish religious law.” 
In post that references source material and links that would show the “accuracy” 
of the description of Corrie’s death, the founder of the award responds directly to G. 
who first expressed being “troubled” by the award, even though there are, by this time, 
several other people who have expressed similar concerns. After a brief explanation and 
listing of links, she notes: “These are the facts. ”  
My point in recounting these moments from my analysis is to demonstrate that 
the scholarly will among writing teachers to be open to other views, to value the part 
emotion has in reason, and to respect a small t version of truth can quickly be upended 
in situations of political contention. This has significant implications for the classroom 
where political work is being done. In the classroom, in fact, there is an existing power 
structure that begins as openly unequal between teachers and students, and sometimes 
 
 95 
among students themselves, further complicating problem. If political questions such as 
these have the power to unmoor writing teachers from their convictions regarding 
fairness, or the importance of respecting emotion in belief systems, or the thoughtful 
and careful use of pathos in argumentation, why would this be different in our 
classrooms? 
 
Defining the work of  (courageous) composition teachers: rhetorics of justice 
In her analysis of the formation of political belonging and nationalism, Mabel 
Berezin has suggested that:  
Identity is both a noun and a verb; singular and plural. What is it; whom do I 
identify with? Who am I? Who are we? Personal identity and political identity 
differ. Who am I becomes who are we? In addition, Identity has an ontological 
and epistemological status. It describes a state of being as well as a category of 
social knowledge and classification. (85)  
Berezin suggests that identity is about both being and about categorization, 
about a sense of oneself as an individual and also as a part of a larger structure.   
In chapter one, I recounted some of the ways that composition teachers have 
imagined their history and their collective identity. This sense of collective identity 
matters a great deal in defining the work of composition teaching, particularly in 
relation to the project of critical pedagogy. My initial coding (Figure 5) included as 
categories “binaries referenced” as well as “calls for collective support or action.” Both 
of these categories fit together, and relate to the ways that individuals imagine they 
belong in relation to any group. When we draw the binary, we often ask for support, as 
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in the initial post by G., who wonders whether anyone else was “troubled” by this. 
Through the analysis of this listserv thread we can see how writing teachers, identified 
as an important “social world” in mapping the situation of interest, are not only 
stratified in the ways one might first imagine (tenured/untenured) but also in more 
subtle, yet important ways for our situation of interest.  
The initial request for award nominations itself points toward one binary/call for 
support. It references untenured, part-time or contingent faculty (as opposed to 
tenured, full-time faculty). The award frames this cross-section of the social worlds even 
more tightly, calling for support not for those graduate students and junior faculty to 
write, teach, and serve in ‘safe’ subject and project areas,” but rather for those who 
“take on research, pedagogy, and service projects that promote commitment to peace, 
justice, and human dignity—even when hazarding the ire of deans, chairs, editors, and 
hiring and review committees.” (Rachel Corrie thread). There is an implication here that 
safe projects are not in the interest of a commitment to peace, justice or human dignity.  
As we have observed in earlier parts of this analysis, part of the divisions that are 
made visible in subsequent posts is centered on the attachment of pedagogical bravery 
to an activist for the Palestinian cause. Some listserv contributors attempt to avoid the 
political binary of “Pro Israeli” or “Palestinian sympathizer” by pointing his comments 
at problem with using Corrie’s death as a symbol: “This award doesn't speak for me.  
And by saying that I'm not expressing my political views, solutions to a regional 
conflict, or any other binary division so often taken up here and elsewhere.”(Rachel 
Corrie Thread).   
In this post J. tries to steer away from the Israel/Palestine supporter binary, 
though this binary does divide the group during the argument at various times. 
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According to a recent (2011) Gallup Poll, 63% of the American public say that their 
sympathies lie more with Israelis, while 17% say their sympathies lie with Palestinians 
in this conflict. It is also interesting to note that support for one or the other is strongly 
arranged along political ideology, with 80% of Republicans supporting Israel, and 
liberals polled as the least supportive of Israel of any group Gallup measured” (Saad). 
This is important to our analysis, because examining the argument through this lens, we 
can see the way one group might be imagining itself pushing against the norms of 
American political thought, in the way that some critical pedagogy aims, while the 
other group may be concerned about being portrayed as naïve or uncritical. 
The binary drawn originally, regarding safe versus courageous teachers is of 
particular, parallel interest in this analysis, because it speaks to the question of how we 
define “courageous” teaching. Is courageous teaching, as it has been carved out here, 
only in service of the liberal point of view? In one particular post, the contributor makes 
an interesting observation about the differences between university politics and politics 
at large: 
…I would add this about the very premise of the award itself, quite apart from the 
connection to Palestinian/Israeli conflict and Rachel Corrie.  
To me, the very notion that, in the Academy, adjunct faculty are likely to be terminated 
or tenure-track faculty are likely to be denied tenure because of their /progressive/ politics 
or activism--the premise of this award--is as laughable to me as the Religious Right's 
assertion that mainstream American political culture is waging a war on Christianity 
and its values.  In both cases, those who are making the decisions--tenured faculty and 
elected officials--overwhelmingly share the values of those who are leveling the "critique."  
In each case, it seems to me, the tactic is to manufacture a crisis where none exists so as 
to further motivate (and polarize!) the group's base.  To be sure, the academy can be a 
conservative force: what counts as research, what counts as publication, what pedagogy is 
valid, what is the canon (of any discipline); but these conservative policies are not related 
to progressive or conservative politics as we generally define them.  Many politically 
progressive faculty members are arch-conservatives when it comes to pedagogies and 
canons.  Many politically more conservative faculty members can come under fire for 
their desire to innovate pedagogically and in their research.   
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The conservatism rampant in the academy is simply not the kind of conservatism that 
impels one to vote for George W. Bush; it is, instead, the sort of conservatism that 
squelches innovation, that discourages experimentation, and that dismisses what is new 
precisely because it is new--and the sort of academic conservatives who can make a 
professional life difficult for the adjunct and untenured in this way live on both sides of 
the political aisle.   
So, in my perfect world, an award for bravery among the adjunct and untenured (which 
this amounts to) would not award teaching from an extreme-Left political viewpoint, but 
in practicing sound, innovative, effective pedagogies and bold experiments in research 
and its reporting in the face of administrative conservatism--which, in my view, presents 
the much larger threat to the careers of new and emerging scholars in the academy today. 
This post in particular seems to me to call attention to a division within the social 
world of composition teaching and also to create a new layer of complexity to the 
binary created earlier (brave versus safe… courage versus cowardice). What does it 
mean to be courageous as a teacher of writing? As one subsequent contributor to the list 
put it: “After all, doesn't *all* teaching of writing--all teaching, even--require some 
courage? Why single anyone out as any more courageous than anyone else?  What 
about the quietly courageous who go unsung?” The teacher’s analogy quickly realigns 
her with the views of her group, as she notes the equally laughable premise in 
“Religious Right's assertion that mainstream American political culture is waging a war 
on Christianity and its values,” but she also wants to call attention to a wide range of 
practices that make a teacher brave, critical or effective. 
The questions posed here hearken back to the broad range of strategies and 
definitions for critical pedagogy explored in chapter two, and raises questions about 
where the space is located that allows one to ask such questions within the larger 
writing teacher social world we have identified. This contributor’s post/question 
received no response, and the conversation went on, as I will explain in the next section 
of the chapter, to return to the question of Israel, Palestine and representation, which, 
ironically may be the safer argument to engage in this social world. At issue for our 
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inquiry in particular here, are the less noticed divisions in the project of teaching 
writing.  Clarke argues, “Activities in all social worlds and arenas include establishing 
and maintaining boundaries between worlds and gaining legitimation for the world 
itself. These processes involve the social construction of the particular world and a 
variety of claims-making activities” (113). The boundaries being drawn here seem to be 
about Israel and Palestine, but examining this conversation in relation to critical 
pedagogy, one can begin to see that it also may be about what kind of teaching of 
writing counts as worthy, or brave, or courageous—and about who gets to decide this. 
In this situation analysis of the writing classroom and critical pedagogy, this is an 
important question.  
The (surprising) power of collective emotion 
In order to illustrate the power of collective emotion as an autonomous force, I 
take you to a section of the thread where a member of the listserv, L., decides to put in 
her two cents regarding the argument.  
The point of the Corrie award is to recognize teachers who in one way or another take 
chances while teaching activism. 
In the US we are most likely to be proIsrael because of the history between the US and the 
state of Israel. Period. And do not fool yourselves we are all under the influence of a 
group that can readily draw sympathies from the horrible crimes against them during 
WWII. 
To quote the Fox theme, there is nothing fair and balanced in our mainstream media 
sources and those of us who have been working with PSCCj and RFP for a long time have 
discussed this often. We have also advocated the award because of our sense that what we 
hear from the post, the nyt, or other papers must be taken with a huge grain of salt. 
L. 
 
Note that L. aligns herself with a particular collective in the conversation (those of 
us who have been working with PSCCj and RFP) and that she feels part of the group that 
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advocates the award. Up to this point, there has been plenty of discussion about the 
policies in the Middle East regarding Israel, the meaning and definition of Corrie’s 
death, and the appropriateness of naming the award in memory of Corrie—the second 
paragraph of this post, however, becomes almost immediately the central focus of the 
discussion. In fact, the listserv thread is renamed “And do not fool yourselves we are all 
under the influence” after this. E. is the first to respond, renaming the thread: 
I don't want to extend this no-winner thread, but this comment is finally WAY over the 
line. "We are all under the influence" of Jews because they can “readily draw 
sympathies"? This is classic anti-Semitism. Not cool. Not cool at all.  
I cannot believe I just read this comment in my email this morning.  
 
This is followed minutes later by: 
Good grief.  
Are you not a teacher who works with ideas, language, tropes, etc. Do you not ask the 
students in your courses to pay attention to the words they choose, to read texts in 
specific ways as to not fall back on cliches or basic assumptions or simplistic reasoning, or 
even racist conclusions? 
I don't know what's worse here sometimes. Composition teachers who repeat - without 
any sense of awareness - classic racist statements and then claim innocence or "how dare 
you accuse me of that" when called out; or the rest of us who let it pass. 
"We are all under the influence of a group..." Classic. What other tropes are you willing 
to bring out too? 
And this: 
I don't mean to pile on, but I agree with J. that no one should be left with the task of 
calling this out and thus getting the reputation for being angry.  (Though anger is the 
right response.)  This is pure "Jewish conspiracy" bullshit; I presume that L. belongs to 
"Rhetoricians for Peace," but this certainly doesn't strike me as  "rhetoric for peace." 
After a good number of other postings referring to L.’s being a “shocking” and 
“offensive” and a “racist,” one contributor spoken up for L., not to exactly defend her, 
 
 101 
but to allow that she might have been “referring to Zionism and Zionists, many of 
whom are clearly not Jews, in her reference.”   
After a barrage of references to L.’s racism, simplistic reasoning and unfit 
qualities for teaching, L. writes:  “Since you clearly feel it is important to react and 
inflame this conversation, I will cease from participating in it,” at which point she 
leaves the list, though this was perhaps not necessary as the moderator notes afterward 
that “though he is not shocked by anti-Semitism,” he “filtered the poster after that 
remark.”   
I am not representing this moment in the conversation in order to defend the 
remarks L. makes. I represent it in order to illustrate a powerful autonomous force that 
we often don’t recognize—collective emotion. In the end, whether it seems like a choice 
or not, L. is silenced. Her comments, by most measures, would be considered offensive, 
even racist, but particularly so in the social world of teachers of writing, where the rules 
are clear about such things. Yet it is also interesting to note that a thread that began with 
a call for nominations for contingent faculty willing to take risks, L., a female Latino 
adjunct instructor, leaves the list after public shaming for her views.  
In chapter three, I noted that I approached the methods I used in situational 
analysis with some theoretical perspective already in mind, namely, I planned to 
theorize the actors and “social worlds” through the concept of collective emotion as a 
part of discourse. Collective emotion is a term associated with a macro-level analysis of 
the functioning of emotion.  For many of us, emotion is habitually imagined as an 
internal and individual response. Certainly there are physical and personal ways that 
emotion is experienced. But for the purposes of understanding emotion in a 
conversation like the one we are presently analyzing, imagine instead emotion as 
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fundamental to the way we form social groups—to coalition and solidarity. Randall 
Collins’ explanation of this phenomenon in conversation is particularly helpful “…an 
appropriate image of the social world is a bundle of individual chains of interactional 
experience, criss-crossing each other in space as they flow along time. The dynamics of 
coalition membership are produced by the emotion sense individuals have at any one 
point in time, due to the tone of the situation they are currently in (or last remember, or 
shortly anticipate), which in turn is influenced by the previous chains of situations of all 
participants” (134). In his analysis of conversation as interactional ritual, Collins 
explains that what he labels as “successful” conversations bind the speakers and create 
a sense of membership. But more interesting perhaps for our purposes here are his 
assertions about what happens when conversations do not bind participants together 
fully. “Among those conversations that do succeed in evoking a common reality, some 
of these produce a feeling of rank differences, including feelings of authority and 
subordination. These types of variability, in fact, are essential for producing and 
reproducing stratified social order” (134). Collective emotion is a way of understanding 
the waves of unified feeling that move through conversation, gathering up power, and 
subordinating others.  
Emirbayer and Goldberg note that as long as emotion is imagined as individual 
states of mind, “Transpersonal phenomena that figure importantly in their accounts – 
solidarity, trust, hope, loyalty, identification, enmity, and so forth – all of which clearly 
entail collective emotional processes… cannot be theorized” (488). They also warn that 
theorizing emotion as an individual state distorts our ability to understand power, 
because it deters researchers from examining emotional situations for sources of power. 
Conceptualizing emotions as both collective and transitive allows for new insights 
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regarding the sources of power. In the example from the listserv, it might be possible to 
look more carefully at the moment as an example of the work of collective emotion.  
One of the ways that power has been examined is through Bourdieu’s 
explanation of symbolic violence. Emirbayer and Bayer assert that (in Bourdieu’s 
framing) “actors often enjoy a certain emotional power over others…Thus masculine 
domination, for example, perpetuates itself ‘invisibly and insidiously’ through feminine 
submissiveness, which often takes the form of –shame, humiliation, timidity, 
anxiety…or-sentiments-love and respect”(492).  Bourdieu’s conceptualization of 
symbolic violence does not create a sense that there is a clear “victim”—all players in 
the situations enact and propel the forces of emotion. Our listserv example is certainly 
too small and incomplete to draw any full conclusions about the source of power; this 
would potentially require an entirely new situation analysis. But it does hint at both 
Collins’ theory of the ways that collective emotion can serve to bind, and also to stratify 
and define power relations and Emirbayer and Goldberg’s assertions about symbolic 
violence.  
Rather than taking on a full accounting of the sources of power in circulation on 
this thread of the professional listserv, I want to examine the moment for what it can tell 
us about the situation of interest in this inquiry—critical pedagogy in the writing 
classroom. If collective emotion has the force it appears to have even in our small 
example, it is important that we study its power and influence very carefully before 
invoking forces such as shame in politically charged moments in our classrooms.  
In one of the final posts in the thread, M. remarks: 
I find the self-righteous pitch of this thread kinda fascinating. Not much interest in 
*inter*locution going down here among us-rhetoricians....but lots of interest in ranting 
in the name of justice against the other on the list who is classically and hopelessly stupid 
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or biased or prejudice or uninformed or insert-your-slam-here. In fact, it seems that the 
other is so morally or intellectually out of it that engaging with him or her in honest-to-
the-gods deliberation would be like shooting fish in a barrel. This thread--on a Writing 
Program Administrators list, no less--seems to operate as a microcosm of the broader 
realm of "civic discourse," which makes sense but which also sure does deflate any self-
important claims rhetoricians make about the need for the sorry-ass political body to 
study rhetoric.  
If a fairly cohesive group of people trained in thoughtful use of language and 
scholarly inquiry methods succumb to the forces of collective emotion in politically 
contentious discussion, as it seems evident happened in this admittedly isolated but 
interesting moment, perhaps we should be thinking more carefully about the forces of 
collective emotion in our writing classrooms, as well. The next chapter examines 
scholarly work regarding writing classrooms featuring critical pedagogy, in order to 
better assess how and where these concerns might be attended to and recognized.
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Chapter 5 Ubiquitous Emotion in Critical Pedagogy 
 
(Whose) freedom? (Whose) power?   
Much of the argument about critical pedagogy has centered on exigency and 
definitions of the practices. Why should critical pedagogy be done (now)? What are the 
true goals? The social efficacy of emotion is missing from many of these accounts, both 
at an individual and collective level.  
McLaren argues that true critical pedagogy begins with the goal of shifting a 
student’s ideological views regarding capitalism. Yet McLaren offers little in the way of 
theorization of the individual or collective effects and movement of emotion in such a 
project. His argument is situated around the exigency and definition of critical 
pedagogy. But once students are provided with such a challenge to their knowledge 
and understanding of the world, how can we know what (re)actions ensue, especially 
taking unacknowledged macro structures of collective emotion into account?  McLaren 
also appears to take little notice of the material circumstances for teachers in first year 
composition classrooms. Teaching assistants, who are employed in many first year 
writing classrooms using critical pedagogy, may have little experience or interest in the 
Marxist project. Or, alternatively, they may be quite steeped in it, but have little or no 
teaching experience that helps them navigate this challenge with their students. And 
even if we were to examine “composition teachers” from a more macro level in terms of 
emotion, there is some evidence of an inherence to seeing themselves, as a group, as 
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“working class” and this carries along with it emotional implications that require 
careful examination, as Barbalet’s work points out. What group resentments or fears 
might composition teachers carry, as a category or group, given the accounts reviewed 
in chapter one of their recurring identification as “working class” for example? 
Bruce Horner does examine the material circumstances surrounding critical 
pedagogy as he critiques Elizabeth Ellsworth’s account of the failure of her try at a 
critical pedagogy course. Horner argues that Ellsworth treated the course as a 
commodity “isolated from the material circumstances of its specific enactments” (82) 
and goes on to examine the importance of power as relational.  He examines the 
positioning of composition teachers within the academy and in the classroom in an 
effort to identify the material factors in the power dynamics of the classroom, but 
ignores the direct relationships between power, material social conditions and emotion, 
or how they might influence perceptions of students and teachers. How might an 
emotion such as resentment, which was examined in Barbalet’s work, for example, be 
functioning in the project of critical pedagogy? How might it shape reactions to what 
teachers often name as “resistance” to the project?   
Tompkins “Pedagogy of the Distressed” provides another inside view of an 
attempt to engage in a critical pedagogy where students are given the power and 
freedom to guide the class, as she enacts the Freirian philosophy of education as “a 
practice of freedom” (653).  Frustrated by a sense that her teaching had, by her own 
description, become a performance contrived to show how smart, prepared and 
knowledgeable she is, Tompkins designed a class that took her out of the expert’s role, 
allowing students to explore and move through the ideas they encounter, following the 
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advice of Freire. Tompkins speaks frankly about the emotions that motivate her as a 
teacher to stay with a classroom “performance” model: 
What is behind this model? How did it come to be that our main goal as 
academicians turned out to be performance? I think the answer to the question is 
fairly complicated, but here is one way to go. Each person comes into a 
professional situation dragging along behind her a long bag full of desires, fears, 
expectations, needs, resentments-the list goes on. But the main component is fear. 
Fear is the driving force behind the performance model. Fear of being shown up 
for what you are: a fraud, stupid, ignorant, a clod, a dolt, a sap, a weakling, 
someone who can't cut the mustard. (654) 
This is a startling description of the emotions associated with enacting a version 
of critical pedagogy based on what she calls “getting out of students’ way.” The course 
she taught used emotion as a topic, and Tompkins speaks here directly to the anxiety 
and fear in the situation. But emotion, in the end, is not truly a central focus of her 
questions or theorization. Instead, her focus moves back to the need to enact critical 
pedagogy as a way of attending to her own needs as a teacher, as well as those of the 
students. 
In her discussion of “The Politics of Politeness” Ryden seems to recognize the 
need for theorizing emotion with regard to critical pedagogy, as she recommends that 
“critical pedagogy may well pay more attention to the rhetorical and social functions of 
emotion, in particular, anger” (85), but in the end, her essay is a recommendation not to 
allow ourselves to quell emotion in the classroom where critical pedagogy is creating 
political contention, rather than a full exploration of what exactly happens when one 
“resists the urge to contain [a crisis] too handily through an evisceration of its emotional 
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component” (91). What is missing from this, as well as the other accounts and 
theorizations mentioned, is a sense of humility about how little we actually know about 
invoking emotional crisis—in ourselves, in our students, and in our colleagues.  
Emotion is discussed as something that exists, or something we might use, but where 
are the questions, for example, about how our approach as teachers might be oddly 
shaped by the collective emotion of resentment? Where are the questions about the 
implications for opening up to and inviting crisis, or in some cases, violence, in our 
classrooms? 
In the opening essay of Blundering for Change, a collection of essays that feature 
teaching narratives characterized as “blunders” in critical pedagogy classrooms, Powell 
tells about an incident which took place between a white male and a female student of 
color, in a critical pedagogy class he had set up to explore racial issues. During the 
exchange the male told the female student to “SHUT THE FUCK UP” (17, caps in 
original), and the female student slapped the male student across the face. I deeply 
admire Powell’s courage in telling the story to an audience of his colleagues, and for not 
turning the story into a teacher hero-narrative. But his stated hope for the narrative, and 
the collection as a whole as “putting something in circulation that people might turn to 
in similar situations” (20) leaves me with the same worries as the examples noted 
above. To be fair, he says that he admits that these examples require reflection and 
critical inquiry. But many other contributors to the volume follow up their “blunder for 
change” stories with quite specific suggestions for using emotion, for example, 
Micchiche suggests reasons why we should not avoid the provocation and development 
of anger in the classroom, based on its status as “an outlaw emotion” for the middle 
class, because, she argues, quelling anger potentially removes possibilities for change. 
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But I would ask whether a recognition that anger is not accepted within the social 
expectations and habitus of the middle class should translate automatically into a 
practice where we as teachers are now responsible for a deprogramming of this habitus 
by encouraging or evoking it in our classrooms. 
 Joe Harris comes a bit closer to looking directly at and theorizing the concerns of 
evoking emotion in A Teaching Subject, as he reexamines the now well-established ideas 
Pratt brought into play regarding the classroom as contact zone (or as Harris names it in 
Composition and Resistance a “zone of contact”).  Harris agrees with the basic premise of 
the idea of classroom as contact zone (as opposed to harmonious community), but he is 
concerned that this metaphor does not truly give the teacher or students in such a 
situation any real advice regarding the productive “wrangling” Pratt describes in her 
essay--what this might look like, or how it would actually be performed.  Harris asks 
composition teachers to think through ways that a sense of one’s “culture” might be 
fluid, rather than essentialized.  This is an important point as it relates to emotion 
theory, particularly with respect to collective emotion. Harris’ use of the term culture 
here implies cultural identities, which have various collective emotional attachments. 
Harris’ opens up these questions, not so much in terms of social class, but by 
examining the ways fluidity in identity.  Though he offers answers to these 
identity/conflict questions more in intellectual terms, Harris’ points speak implicitly to 
questions of emotion. His metaphor of the classroom as “city” where one is constantly 
asked to approach unfamiliar people and ideas, but still has the safety of some smaller 
enclave of understanding and acceptance, is parallel to the important question of 
belonging, and collective identity, emotional phenomena about which much has been 
examined recently in the political psychology of emotions.  For example, Berezin, who 
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studies the specific relationships between politics and emotions, has researched political 
movements and activities that allow her to theorize the ways that cultural identities are 
indeed “fluid,” just as Harris points out. Berezin lays out a theory of the “hierarchy of 
felt identity” (85) that helps explain the emotional categorizing we undertake when it 
comes to political beliefs, and lays the groundwork for useful ways to begin to think 
about the circulation of power in the collectives we feel we belong to. This concept of 
the collective is useful in reimagining the critical pedagogy composition classroom as a 
place where beliefs and politics often create lines of belonging; where values and ethics 
are purposefully brought into question; and where “power” within collective groups is 
shifted in sometimes unexpected ways. One area that has been examined within critical 
pedagogy a bit more carefully is gender, especially in relation to shame, which is 
examined next. 
Embodied emotion and critical pedagogy 
The question of how gender or other embodied differences operates within 
critical pedagogy has been of particular interest in composition, and has led many 
researchers toward emotion as one key to understanding the complexities of the 
intersection.  Worsham invites some of the most sophisticated rethinking of critical 
pedagogy with regard to emotion in her essay “Going Postal: Pedagogical Violence and 
the Schooling of Emotion.”  Though Worsham differentiates between “critical” 
pedagogy and “postmodern” pedagogy, she asserts “both arguably seek to change the 
emotional constitution of the postmodern subject so as to produce either a democratic 
citizen who participates fully in public life, or more radically, a revolutionary subject 
who is capable of the kind of political struggle that will transform the world” (251). The 
term pedagogy itself, in Worsham’s analysis, is meant in the broadest sense. Using 
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anthropologist Catherine Lutz as a guide, she examines what she refers to as the 
“dominant pedagogy of emotion” (my emphasis)—that is, the way that various subjects 
have been schooled through the family and the external world about the appropriate 
ways to feel and react. “This pedagogy mystifies emotion as a natural category and 
masks its role in a system of power relations that associates emotion with the irrational, 
the physical, the particular, the private, the feminine and nonwhite others” (241).    
This has particular implications with regard to the classrooms where critical (but 
also what she specifies as postmodern) pedagogy is employed.  Worsham urges us to 
re-imagine the project of critical (and postmodern) pedagogy as one that depends, in 
large measure, on emotion (and the pedagogy of emotion).   Worsham argues that 
although it should bear careful attention, “emotion appears as a phantom limb, so to 
speak, more nearly felt than precisely seen, thus it remains undertheorized and 
mystified in many important respects” (251).  The potential result of this oversight is 
sizeable. For example, Worsham examines the positioning of female professors, where 
dominant emotion pedagogy has them represented and understanding themselves as 
nurturers and caretakers, and looks carefully at the reactions of both male and female 
students toward them in their role as teachers for critical pedagogy.  In the end, 
Worsham urges those interested in the project of critical pedagogy to consider the 
importance of a more intersubjective model: “Without a fundamental revision in our 
concept of subjectivity and of our affective relationship to the world, the radical 
potential of recent pedagogy to reconstitute our emotional lives may be recontained, in 
spite of its best intentions and the euphoria of its claims, as a strategy of condescension” 
(260). 
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Worsham’s innovative work incorporating anthropology and psychoanalysis to 
examine the work of emotion in critical pedagogy invites further analysis of this type.  
For example, to what extent is it necessary to question the sense that there are 
universalized understandings and motives for such things as shame and anger, 
emotions that are both being used and examined more closely in critical pedagogy 
classrooms?  If there are ways that gender influences emotional exchange and the 
efficacy of critical pedagogy, what other factors should be taken into consideration?  
Arjun Appadurai, who has studied the culture-specific use of praise in Hindu 
India, provides an important example that may offer some perspective. She 
demonstrates through her analysis that praise is offered and understood quite 
differently in depending on the setting. “In the domestic situation of most Hindu 
households, parents do not praise their children directly, for this would be seen as 
inviting free-floating malevolence of the “evil eye” (99), but “flattery is a part of 
everyday public behavior in India,” she explains, especially in relation to political 
figures (97). Perhaps more important to our analysis, however, is the profoundly 
different conception of the act of praise itself between Hindu India and most Western 
ideas of it. The object of the more ritualized, sometimes hyperbolic display of praise is, 
according to Appadurai “to create a chain of communications of feeling, not by 
unmediated empathy between the emotional ‘interiors’ of specific individuals but by 
recourse to a shared, and relatively fixed set, of public gestures” (109).  Appadurai’s 
suggestion, that “emotional and aesthetic communion between audience, artifact and 
ultimate reality… differs from those assumed and created by most varieties of post-
Renaissance Western critical theory” (109) must also be taken into consideration our 
decision to use and invite emotion in critical pedagogy. Appadurai does not speak to 
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questions of critical pedagogy in her work, but it brings to the table some further 
concerns about utilizing emotion as a tool for this work by showing the fundamental 
cultural differences in conceptions about emotion that may be at work in the classroom. 
In what ways might the “hierarchy” of identity function in a classroom where 
contentious political issues are being discussed based on gender, culture or religious 
beliefs?  How might an emotion such as shame circulate differently on various bodies, 
and do quite different work, depending on the way social identity is constructed in an 
individual, aside from gender? 
Probyn’s project takes rather a different approach—acknowledging the fact that 
affect is at work in critical pedagogy, and examining ways it might be useful. Probyn’s 
work is of interest on two fronts: it provides a continuation of the conversation about 
the importance of our definition of emotion, and it also adds a very different theoretical 
perspective regarding the uses of emotion in critical pedagogy.  Like Worsham, Probyn 
sees emotion as important to the work of critical pedagogy, but instead of concentrating 
on issues such as intersubjectivity, she works from a view that emotion has the power to 
make social change possible.   Probyn differentiates between the terms emotion and 
affect—the divide, according the Probyn is this: while emotion is a cultural construct, 
affect is a more innate and bodily reaction. "In the face of an undifferentiated lumping 
together of emotion and affect, I want to try to clarify the difference between the two 
terms. A basic distinction is that emotion refers to cultural and social expression, 
whereas affects are of a biological and physiological nature" and further expresses that 
she is "taken with the argument that shame is biologically innate" (xiii).  
Though this divide between emotion and affect may be useful to Probyn’s 
particular theorization, as I have suggested earlier in the chapter, the division is not at 
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all obvious or accepted unanimously.  Probyn writes: “those interested in cognition, 
social expression and the interpretation of cultures tend to study emotions. Those 
interested in the workings of the brain and the body study affects or the affect system. 
Very few writers cross the divide between the social and the biological” (xv). Counter to 
this claim, Stets and Turner, though conscious of the divide, encourage sociologists to 
move past their suspicions of biological study of emotion and fears of reductionism, in 
order to incorporate the important new findings in neuroscience into social and cultural 
theories of emotion. And in “The psychophysiology of Emotion” Larsen et al. describe 
one of the goals of the field of psychophysiology of emotion as “to investigate the 
physiological processes by which emotion is embodied” (181).  Probyn’s neat separation 
of the two elements suggests that one could invert the will, to grab the learner using 
what she perceives as a place within him to which he has no real conscious access.  
Probyn wants to use shame “productively” in order to push the subject to see 
herself in relation to such things as colonial oppression. Probyn imagines shame as a 
tool for shifting habitus: "Through feeling shame, the body inaugurates an alternative 
way of being in the world. Shame, as the body's reflection on itself, may reorder the 
composition of the habitus, which in turn may allow for quite different choices" (56).   
Bartky problematizes Probyn’s argument that shame has a useful and productive 
place in critical pedagogy. She examines the ways that affect/emotion are situated 
differently on bodies—a position more in line with Harris and Worsham’s conceptions.  
Bartky does not make a distinction between emotion and affect specifically; however 
she does explain the importance of the historical understanding of shame through 
moral philosophy. In traditional moral philosophy, Bartky explains, shame is 
understood as a painful but necessary part of developing an ethical stance to the world. 
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In Probyn’s argument, this would be akin to affect functions, the nearly automatic sense 
in the body that recognizes error, doing its job to create more ethical and thoughtful 
relations between people.  
Bartky, arguing specifically about the way women are positioned in terms of 
shame, makes an important point of distinction, useful to our thinking through critical 
pedagogy in composition classrooms: “But for the shame-ridden and the shame-prone, 
there is no moral equilibrium to which to return: ’feeling inadequate’ may color a 
person’s entire emotional life.  Under conditions of oppression, the oppressed must 
struggle not only against more visible disadvantages, but against guilt and shame as 
well”(237). This is an important point to keep in mind in analyzing the emotion work in 
critical pedagogy.  Shame is one of the most discussed emotions in critical pedagogy, 
and Bartky’s argument regarding the habitually shamed points to the inadvertent ways 
the moves of critical pedagogy may work to disempower those it seeks to liberate. 
Critical pedagogy and first year comp: ideals & realities 
Micchiche borrows from Ahmed’s theories to re-examine composition studies in 
a wide reaching project, arguing that we must look beyond the simple conceptions of 
emotion, (for example in terms of the use of pathos in argumentation), for clues about 
the important work emotion is doing in the field.  Her analysis brings her to ideas such 
as the “persistent use of [degrading] metaphor” that creates a “feeling of disposition 
and hurt” for professionals and for the field more generally (45).  Borrowing from 
Ahmed, Micchiche provides ideas about utilizing the power of “wonder” in students 
(46).  Micchiche plays with concepts she describes as feminist wonder and critical 
wonder, and uses Ahmed’s description of these concepts as being “about recognizing 
that nothing in the world can be taken for granted, which includes the very political 
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movements to which we are now attached” (Ahmed qtd. in Micchiche 48). The ideas 
point toward a much more attentive and thoughtful approach to the critical pedagogy 
classroom. Citing Amy Winan’s work as an example, Micchiche describes a method of 
“starting from what students already know and feel about race” (107), for example, and 
taking students’ beliefs seriously.  
Yet Micchiche also describes the current work of critical pedagogy in a way that 
seems prematurely optimistic. Describing the “new“ version of critical pedagogy, which 
starts with respect for students’ experience she says: “…this is different from projecting 
certain emotions onto student bodies, as early version of critical pedagogy have been 
critiqued for doing, because more recent teaching methods are invested in what Ahmed 
calls wonder, which involves ‘learning to see the world as something that does not have 
to be’” (107).  While these utopian ideals have potential toward making the classroom 
space more emotionally inviting, I’m not sure that all those involved with critical 
pedagogy would agree that methods “projecting certain emotions” on students have 
been replaced with more informed teaching moves.   
This may be true in some classrooms—especially among those who are granted 
the time and space to think through these issues in depth.  But the economic and 
physical realities of first-year composition programs dictate that many if not most of 
these courses are staffed by part-time and graduate student labor.  Examination of a 
teacher training practicum in a large research-based university like the one where I 
teach allows a glimpse into the particularly complex nature of the faculty teaching these 
courses.  The writing curriculum features a version of the first year writing course that 
Worsham would likely describe as a “post-modern” critical pedagogy: issues of power 
and difference are emphasized as a required part of the inquiry for all classes, and listed 
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as the first goals for the course.  Some of these graduate teaching assistants who staff 
the courses come from the English department, and may be aspiring poets, novelists or 
short story writers.  They may also be working on doctoral studies in English, (a 
program with a strong influence from cultural studies), or they may be doctoral 
students in the composition and rhetoric program. Some new teachers have experience 
in the classroom, others have never taught.  For new graduate assistants, teaching 
writing as critical pedagogy requires complex handling of issues such as classroom 
authority, grading and evaluation and the goals of critical pedagogy  
In the next chapter, I examine materials drawn from this particular site of 
emotion work in the critical pedagogy classroom, drawing together the perspectives 
gleaned through analysis in the previous chapters.
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Chapter 6 Negotiating the work of the writing classroom: emotion and 
critical pedagogy 
 
Outwitted 
He drew a circle that shut me out-- 
Heretic, a rebel, a thing to flout. 
But Love and I had the wit to win: 
We drew a circle that took him in! 
~Edwin Markham 
 
 
First year composition: ideals and realities revisited 
Chapter five reviewed some of the material realities of the teaching of first year 
writing in contrast to the hopeful visions offered by Laura Micchiche. I noted that while 
her approach is certainly more informed and thoughtful than many others when it 
comes to the force of emotion in critical pedagogy, it largely ignores the reality that a 
great number of first year composition classes are taught by adjuncts and graduate 
students.  The graduate teaching assistants who often staff these sections are not 
“assistants” at all; they are expected to teach sections of the first-year composition 
course after very brief training. And while a university and/or a writing department 
may have made a commitment to teaching inquiries explicitly directed at issues of 
power and difference, those who are actually teaching the courses may have little 
experience in teaching, let alone in the project of critical pedagogy. Some new teaching 
assistants in the practicum where I mentor, for example, bring a strong background in 
areas such as Marxist, postcolonial, race or gender theory, while some come with what 
composition scholars might label “romantic” conceptions of the production of writing. 
 
 119 
They are a very diverse group in terms of their experience and attitudes regarding 
writing, but generally have a common lack of experience with teaching. 
Negotiating authority, allowing for experience to count in building knowledge, 
managing the circulation of emotion, respecting diverse (and sometimes offensive) 
opinions—in other words, teaching writing as critical pedagogy—is difficult for the 
most seasoned teacher. The social world I earlier identified as “teachers of writing” 
includes new teaching assistants, but they are often the least prepared in this social 
world to take on this complex work. As one of the three mentors leading a practicum 
for these teachers, I recognized that the artifacts that had been produced as a normal 
part of the work of this practicum might provide some insight into the negotiation of 
the work of critical pedagogy in the writing classroom for this group of teachers and 
students. 
What follows is a closer look inside the emotion work of new teaching assistants, 
students and mentors as they navigate and negotiate the first year composition classes. I 
examine the data (detailed in the next section) through the lens of emotion work 
(Hochschild, Bellas). But perhaps most significantly, my analysis of the data brings 
theoretical threads examined in previous chapters to bear on what Clarke and Star have 
referred to as a “site of silence.”  For all of the discussion of emotion involved in 
teaching in the notes, observations, emails and other materials from the practicum, 
there is very little talk about how this emotion might be connected to the political 
inquiries in the courses. In order to see this, it is necessary to look at the discussions 
beyond simple open coding, to see the data relationally and contextually. 
 
 120 
The new teaching assistant practicum 
As explained in chapter three, I explained the methods from situational mapping 
used to establish relational sites that might illuminate the larger situation of writing 
teachers and critical pedagogy. The first data site examined, the listserv thread (chapter 
four) featured a contentious conversation among professionals in the field of 
composition and rhetoric. Through this examination, we were able to see the persistent 
ways that reason is conceptualized as excluding emotion, how emotion discourse serves 
to shape collective identities, and the surprisingly autonomous power of collective 
emotion.  The data used for this part of the dissertation project comes from a teacher 
training practicum at a private research university. The practicum met once a week for 
two hours throughout the year, and was required for all of the new teaching assistants 
who join the department each year (typically 25-30). This site adds a new angle to our 
understanding of the situation, as it focuses directly on one segment of the larger social 
world of writing teachers who hold a particular positionality with regard to the larger 
situation.  
New teaching assistants begin with a one-week orientation before the teaching 
semester, and then continue to meet once each week for two hours in small groups.  The 
practicum is supervised by full-time faculty, but responsibility for the detailed planning 
and teaching of practicum sessions, curriculum development, classroom observations, 
vetting of calendars and other teaching materials is left to a group made up of staff and 
adjunct faculty members.  
In most cases, new teaching assistants are immediately responsible for two 
sections of first-year writing classes in the fall, and one section of second-year writing in 
the spring, though a few are asked to serve as consultants in the writing center. 
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Teaching assistants are generally required to use the shared syllabus, texts and 
assignments during their first semester with the department.  
Though required to use the shared syllabus, assignments and textbooks, 
teachings assistants choose from a menu of inquiries to be used to focus the class. The 
course catalogue description explains the first year writing course as: “Study and 
practice of writing processes, including critical reading, collaboration, revision, editing, 
and the use of technologies. Focuses on the aims, strategies, and conventions of 
academic prose, especially analysis and argumentation.” The term “critical” appears in 
this description applied to reading, but the first of the eleven goals for the course makes 
this focus much more explicit: 
1. By engaging with issues of diversity and community and considering issues of 
power and difference that shape every rhetorical act, students will compose 
texts that are ethically responsive to different perspectives. 
 
The crafting of course goals is a painstaking collaborative process, and the first 
goal of the course is an excellent example of careful rhetorical production. Built into this 
first goal is the explanation of why “engaging with issues of diversity and community” 
and “considering issues of power and difference” is imperative to producing “ethically 
responsive texts.” The inquiries which teaching assistants were asked to select from are 
designed to engage students in critical examination of issues of race, class, gender, 
sexuality, disability or other political topics. Inquiries for the first year course which 
teaching assistants could choose from included:  
• Cinematic Depictions of Global Poverty  
• Re-imagining the Normal 
• Visual Rhetorical Analysis (of race, class, (dis)ability or gender and sexuality)  
• Contested Space   
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The reader used for the course was a collection co-edited by a fulltime member of 
the faculty and a staff member, offering a variety of textual and visual genres designed 
to meet the requirements of these inquiries. Many of these readings offer perspectives 
which may be new to many students, such as Marable Mannings’ “What We Talk 
About When We Talk About Race,” or David Sibley’s “Introduction to Geographies of 
Exclusion,” and Susan Stryker’s  “A Hundred Years of Transgender History.”  The 
readings included diverse genres, including scholarly texts, images, graphic novel 
excerpts, poems and news articles. 
The materials from the TA practicum used for this analysis were collected 
retrospectively and with identification removed. Some of these materials were written 
by TA mentors, including notes from the two-hour practicum sessions; observations of 
classrooms where teaching assistants instructed undergraduate students; notes 
recorded during team planning meetings; and monthly reports to the department. 
Other material was produced by the new teaching assistants themselves, including 
teaching reflections requested as part of practicum work and email requests for 
assistance and advice during the semester. Further data available from the student 
perspective included student evaluations of the courses, email correspondence with 
students forwarded to me from new teaching assistants, and comments recorded 
directly from the classroom visits and observations. As explained in chapter three, the 
data was first examined using open coding strategies, and then reexamined in light of 
subsequent situational, social world and positional mapping techniques. 
As noted earlier, the first work with open coding yielded categories built around 
concerns for the new teaching assistants, specifically,  
• AUTHORITY/POWER/IDENTITY  
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(teacher, gender, ethnicity, class) 
• RELATIONSHIP  
(building, destroying, trust, community, respect, openness to other views) 
• DIRECT EMOTION  
(“I feel statements” anxiety, fear, anger, resentment) 
• CURRICULUM  
(negotiating, understanding, note of “critical”)  
• BELIEFS/OPINIONS  
(Respecting students, questioning where derived) 
• QUIET STUDENTS/VOCAL STUDENTS  
(questions and concerns about why students are not talking, who is doing the 
talking) 
• GRADING  
(anxieties, student anger, worry) 
But what appeared to be missing from this data was the direct discussion of the 
work of “engaging with issues of diversity and community, and considering issues of 
power and difference” noted as the first goal of the course.  The category labeled 
“Curriculum” seems to imply references to political issues, but in most cases there were 
only vaguely glossed with comments about the teaching assistants needing “time to 
digest it” or “negotiating” the curriculum.  
Given the influences noted regarding politics, identity and collective emotion 
found in the analysis of the listserv, the fact that teaching assistants had plenty to say 
about their emotional turmoil, but remained silent regarding political dimensions of the 
curriculum was something to examine closely.  
When the discourse from these materials is placed in a larger context and 
examined relationally, is possible to see how political contention and collective emotion 
might be influencing any of these categories. As we shall see through the analysis, the 
concern and talk about “quiet students” and “vocal students” and “silenced students,” 
for example, actually appears to be potentially related to who felt authorized to speak in 
a class. Reflections regarding how to respect the “beliefs and opinions” of students may 
relate to the concern about how to negotiate differences in political identity. Likewise, 
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the many examples in the collected materials of teachers worrying about “authority,” 
could also potentially be about the critical angle of the curriculum. The following 
passage is taken from notes (internal to the teaching team) about a class observation of a 
new teaching assistant who was respected for her dedication and interest in teaching 
and in the practicum: 
A. has spoken on a number of occasions about her struggles with a small passel of 
resistant students (mostly business majors), so I made arrangements to observe her teach 
the section with those students. They are pretty jerky—uninterested, dismissive—but A’s 
instruction was impressive; those students who haven’t tuned out are getting a great 
studio experience. A. paces her classes beautifully: she provides clear instruction and 
context for an exercise; she allows just enough time for students to apply themselves to 
the exercise; and she brings the class back for important debrief. She also responds to 
students’ questions, concerns, and struggles with patient, generous, clear comments. 
What is at work here? The observations are not contextualized within the 
framework of the political nature of the inquiry, so we can’t know for sure. While it is 
certainly true that there are occasionally negative, disinterested or even disruptive 
students in undergraduate classrooms, one wonders how and why such thoughtful and 
well-planned instruction is being dismissed by a group of her students. The note made 
by her mentor regarding the fact that they are mostly “business majors” makes one 
wonder whether there are ways in which the expectations and worldviews of students 
who come to college to study business, in particular, might more likely be at odds with 
the critical examination of power and difference? If so, why and how? 
In this and other examples, there appears to be a link between the issue the 
students and teachers appeared to be struggling with (authority, for example) and the 
course goals that put political contention at the forefront, but the link is tenuous. 
Rather than analyzing the materials in a completely open-ended or uninterested 
way, I argue that by looking at this material from a situational viewpoint, and in light of 
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what we can see through the previous analysis of the listserv thread, we are able to 
observe some moments where the work of the writing classroom is being negotiated 
between three “actors”—the student(s), the teachers, and critical pedagogy. But perhaps 
more importantly, I argue that collective emotion may be an important element in the 
composition classroom, and in effect, on the negotiation of what the purposes and work 
of the space are or should be.  
But there is another important element to consider as we examine this material, 
the emotional work teachers such as the one above must skillfully navigate in order to 
be successful is labor that goes largely unnoticed; it’s the labor that is quietly referenced 
in the last lines regarding the teacher’s patience and generosity in the face of “jerky” 
and dismissive students. 
Emotion work: invisible labor of the writing teacher 
The concept of emotional labor is best known through the writing of Arlie 
Hochschild; introduced nearly 25 years ago in her book, The Managed Heart: 
Commercialization of Human Feeling.  Widely read and cited, Hochschild’s pioneering 
book examines the ways that workers, and especially female workers, are expected to 
regularly perform labor that requires a great deal of emotional skill and effort; work 
which goes largely unnoticed.  Hochschild's study of the work of flight attendants drew 
her to analyze the way emotion is trained and commodified.  Flight attendants, she 
explains, are trained to smile, and to smile genuinely, to feign excitement and joy in the 
work they are doing.  In the interviews Hochschild conducted, flight attendants 
explained that they were asked not just to be polite to difficult people, but also to 
actually try to devise a reasonable explanation for the unacceptable behaviors of 
customers through the use of imagination.  They were encouraged to try to see things 
 
 126 
from the passenger’s point of view, even if it meant making up a plausible story about 
passenger’s lives— and they were taught to create a metaphor for their relationship to 
customers, to think of the passengers as family members; the plane cabin as their living 
room. One attendant told Hochschild that if there was an especially difficult passenger, 
the attendant imagined that he had recently lost his spouse or job, and this was the 
cause for their irrational and rude behaviors (105). Some of these flight attendants 
found they could not stop behaving in this unnatural way even after the hours of work 
ended.  Hochschild names this type of work emotional labor.  
This labor requires one to induce or suppress feeling in order to sustain the 
outward countenance that produces the proper state of mind in others. This kind 
of labor calls for a coordination of mind and feeling, and it sometimes draws on a 
source of self that we honor as deep and integral to our individuality … (7)  
This idea, that one might be expected to suppress their own emotion in order to 
produce “the proper state of mind in others” is a task many teachers will recognize 
from their daily work.   In class discussions in the critical pedagogy classroom this can 
be a very tall order, as in the example from chapter one, in which a teacher was faced 
with racist talk from a student in her classroom.  How far does/should the sense that it 
is our job to submerge our own emotions for the good of students? And in what 
respects are students encouraged to follow the same practice?  How is this potentially 
productive, or oppressive? 
In “Emotional Work in Academia,” Bellas examines the way emotional labor is 
performed, particularly by women, as they undertake the teaching, service and research 
required as a professional in higher education.  Bellas’ findings indicate that: “Teaching 
and service clearly involve substantial amounts of emotional labor” (107). She finds this 
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work is particularly evident for females in the professoriate. “Not only must [female] 
professors display positive emotions, but they must also work to control negative 
emotions—both their own and their students” (100).  Professors are expected to 
maintain a degree of neutrality and to suppress negative feeling toward their students, 
and any display to the contrary is read on the female in particular ways.  Emotion work 
has always been built into teaching at all levels, and it has particularly implications for 
students and teachers in the writing classroom. 
English and writing departments who develop instruction that features critical 
pedagogy in their writing courses do not set out to specifically demand emotional labor 
of writing teachers and of their students.  Still, what does critical pedagogy, or perhaps 
more broadly, the cultural studies inspired curriculum of many composition 
classrooms, in its various forms, bring to the table that is new in terms of emotion 
work? In what ways might the kind of emotion work Hochschild describes above be 
played out, as teachers and students in these classrooms are asked to take on emotion 
invoking questions regarding contentious political issues such as construction of race, 
class, gender and sexuality. “The personal is political,” as the saying goes; but the 
political is also personal.  
Hochschild theorizes that there are two levels of involvement in emotional labor. 
In “surface acting” Hochschild explains, the subject displays an emotion that she may 
not actually experience, recognizing that this is the emotion that is required of her in a 
given work situation.  But “deep acting” goes further; deep acting is the step the subject 
takes away from the freedom to produce an authentic emotion, to an internalized 
version of the emotion required for the job. It is easy to see the parallel to situations 
teachers encounter in the classroom, when they hear or see things that are seem 
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problematic—even reprehensible. But perhaps we might also imagine this from the 
other side of the desk. Are we inadvertently asking for a kind of “surface acting”—or 
even “deep acting” from students who suppress emotional reactions to the political and 
ethical ideas we ask them to consider?  
Bartky’s analysis of women’s emotion work offers important ideas that 
complicate the matter further.  Bartky’s analysis draws from Hochschild, as she argues 
that women are the primary deliverers of what she describes as “the feeding of egos, the 
tending of wounds”(105).  Bartky makes an interesting note about the distinction (or 
lack thereof) between the kind of emotional work Hochschild describes—
commercialized—and the emotional work that is done for intimate others.  “Surely the 
opportunity to attend to the Other in these ways must be morally empowering, for it 
gives us the chance not merely to be good by doing good, but to become morally better 
through the cultivation and exercise of important moral qualities”(105). But, upon 
closer analysis, this is not so, Bartky argues. The emotional nurturance women give is 
not truly reciprocated in many of our intimate relationships (as mothers and wives, for 
example), and the disempowerment is still there, though more “subtle and oblique” 
(108) than in the kind of commercialized emotional labor Hochschild outlines.   
But perhaps the roles of teaching (and learning) lie somewhere in between 
commercialized emotional labor and intimate emotion work.  Students and teachers are 
not intimates, but neither are they strangers. Each of us could name at least one teacher 
that we can say we honestly loved--we develop relationships, especially in the classes 
with smaller numbers, as in many first year composition classes. And critical pedagogy, 
with stated goals for a better world and a more just democratic society, complicates this 
sense of emotion further. In one student’s evaluation of a teacher, for example, the 
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student wrote: “I can't answer these questions because literally M. is the best teacher I 
have ever had.  Her class completely transformed my way of thinking and observing 
the world. This is not b.s.; she has transformed me as a writer and a person.  She taught 
a course that has had more impact on me than the last 12 years of primary school 
combined.  I can't speak highly enough of her." 
It is non-commodified emotion work, born of free will, in that we are “doing 
good” --working to make the world a better more just place. And yet it is emotional 
labor as well, commodified emotion work which takes skill, is a required part of the job, 
financially compensated, but not likely to be reciprocated equally in terms of emotional 
care-taking. 
 This is not to suggest that there was not emotional work involved in 
composition teaching in the past. As a high school teacher in the early 1980’s, trained in 
process theory and equipped with suggested techniques such as student free-writing 
and journaling, I once received a 19-page journal entry. It was a confession from a male 
student, a senior in high school, who had been sexually abused as a child, and then 
gone on to sexually abuse other young men. I honestly don’t remember the prompt I 
used for the “free-write” that led to this heart-wrenching journal entry, and perhaps it 
doesn’t matter. What does matter about this incident is that this personal/narrative 
writing (though not at this level of disclosure) was a quite common response to the 
open-ended writing tasks many teachers used to help developing writers. Peter Elbow, 
Ken Macrorie, Don Graves and other scholar-teachers encouraged writing teachers to 
think through the best ways to get students to produce “authentic” prose, often starting 
with personal experience. The result was narrative—sometimes quite personal 
narrative.  Without training in psychology, many writing teachers who worked with 
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these methods, including myself, were placed in a precarious position in cases like 
these—navigating extreme emotion, doing grueling emotional work.  
Many of us in composition realized (sometimes in disturbing and painful ways, 
as in my example above), that we were wholly unqualified to navigate the emotional 
responses evoked, and turned our attention to ways that we might quell the impulse 
toward self-disclosures of this kind in our work. The emotional work in composition 
teaching is not peculiar to critical pedagogy or to the turn toward a more cultural 
studies’ influenced curriculum, but it does change the shape of the work in important 
ways, and the choice to use the inquiries and teaching methods of critical pedagogy 
require as much, if not more responsibility to understand the emotional work we asking 
for and performing as did teaching practices that invited disclosure through narrative.   
 
Emotional and political negotiations in the writing classroom: grades, authority and 
content 
Grading and Evaluation. In any educational setting there is an intersection 
between grades, and in composition grading can be especially fraught with emotion. 
Evaluating another person’s written work, means, at least in part, evaluating their 
ideas. Writing teachers do not have the comfort of “objectivity” that comes from 
evaluation methods such as multiple-choice exams. This apparent “subjectivity” helps 
make grading and evaluation one of the most emotion-laden issues for teachers and for 
students. 
Sometimes these moments seem to have little to do with questions of politics or 
other elements of critical pedagogy. For example, consider the following email from a 
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student regarding a grading issue, forwarded to me by a new teaching assistant seeking 
advice: 
On Dec 22, 2008, at 11:28 PM, S wrote: 
Hey E, 
I see that my final grade for your class is a B-. I was wondering if there is anyway I could 
appeal my grade? I have spoken to you about my situation and how much it has affected 
me and I know you have been very sympathetic and understanding, and it is very 
much appreciated. But I will lose my scholarship now. I need to have a 2.75 GPA to 
maintain my scholarship. If you were to give me a B I would be able to keep my 
scholarship. And now I can't afford staying in Syracuse next semester. I know it is not 
fair to ask you to rethink my grade but I am in a very bad situation right now, and I need 
your help. I am hoping you understand and help me, please. I need a B in your class just 
to be able to stay in Syracuse next semester and I would so greatly appreciate it, you have 
no idea. My home life is not going to get in the way any more but I need a second chance, 
I don't want to have to leave Syracuse after a bad first semester due to things that 
weren't in my control. Thank you so much for your time and consideration and I hope 
you are well and the baby is well too. 
 
Sincerely, S. 
 
After much thought and deliberation, the teacher wrote a carefully worded email 
in response, explaining that grades were based on academic performance, not personal 
circumstances, and explaining the student’s alternatives: “You are welcome to write 
back to discuss this with me further; to explain the academic reasons you feel your 
grade should be changed; or to begin a formal appeal process,” she wrote to the 
student. The student accepted the response and did not appeal further.  
In her research regarding the feminized and “nurturing” role of teaching, and 
gendered emotional work, Bellas finds that male professors are less likely to relate 
personal experiences in the classroom, and that “female professors are more likely than 
males to exhibit warm, reinforcing behavior in the classroom”(99). We can see evidence 
of both of these in the above email, as the student mentions that the female teaching 
assistant has been “sympathetic and understanding” and also wishes she and her baby 
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well. These comments make clear that sympathy and understanding are important 
aspects of her work with the student. We might also glean from the email that the 
personal information about her being the mother of an infant was offered by the 
teacher.   
This email, and the many others like this one, do not reflect direct influences of 
political contention connected to an inquiry of power and difference, but there are forces 
of emotion at work with regard to gender. In chapter one, I explained the ways that 
teachers of writing are often placed in the strange divided position of gatekeeper, along 
with the role of nurturer of champion of the student fighting against a system that 
appears biased.  This teacher chose gender and sexuality as a topic of inquiry, but 
making this the focus of the inquiry for the class does not disrupt emotional forces that 
reproduce power related to gender. In other words, knowing/theorizing gender roles in 
the class does not necessarily influence on their reproduction through collective 
emotion.  
Here’s another, similar example, from a student to a female teacher who has 
advised the student to drop the course because his grades were near failing:  
…Yes you have been fairly understanding, but until you can step in my shoes, you'll 
never understand. I thank you for your willingness to work with me, but if you knew all I 
had to go through, you wouldnt quit on me, because even with all the things i've been 
through, I HAVENT QUIT ON ME...No one in that class is going through half of what 
I have to go through EVERYDAY....And I havent been doing bad considering what I 
could be doing...I couldve dropped out and quit but I DIDNT! 
So yes, i'd like to meet with you, just tell me a time and ill be there....Enjoy your the rest 
of your weekend...Because I wont. 
B. 
This email is indicative of the pattern regarding the expectations for female 
teacher’s emotion work noted by Bellas, Bartky and others. These teachers and students 
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may not recognize that they are being called into a particular position through collective 
emotion. The student in this email is using the emotional work role already in place, 
essentially arguing that by not supporting his decision to stay in class, the teacher is not 
fulfilling her role as a nurturer.  In this case, a few of the student evaluations of this 
teacher at the end of the semester made reference to her “lack of responsiveness to 
student needs and questions,” further evidence that there is a collective identity and 
emotion role in place, one that makes grading and evaluation potentially more full of 
anxieties, stress and guilt, especially for a teacher with no experience navigating such 
emotional work.   
In each of these cases, we can see collective emotion regarding gender roles in 
the power dynamics of the situation. But what about direct influences of a classroom 
where political topics themselves are influencing the grading process? As mentioned 
earlier, this is not as easily discernable, because in most cases, neither the students nor 
the teacher openly recognizes the role that political contention may play in the process. 
But there were places that this became a bit more visible.  
A male teaching assistant, B., wrote with a particular concern about an email 
from an “angry student” he had received. The students claimed that the teacher used 
“biased, inconsistent grading.” The teaching assistant’s explanation of the problem was 
that the student had made generalizations that were not supported. The grade dispute 
was about a paper that made an argument that the “baby-boomers” who were once 
central to anti-war activity are now steering the country’s liberal movement. In 
practicum, B. explained to me that the student supported the war in Iraq, and was 
trying to establish a connection with the anti-Vietnam movement and the current 
antiwar sentiment as coming from the same basic, but now better established, group, 
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the baby boomers. I did not read this paper, and from B’s account of the argument there 
were, in fact quite serious flaws in logic. Here’s a small part of the student’s response to 
this TAs critique and grade: 
Forgetting the pictures of boomers, draft ages and facts, or all of the other information I 
provided…as well as common historical knowledge…I guess i didn’t show any other link 
that boomers were anti-war?! 
Who is the department head?  I’d like to see what he/she thinks of my paper and your 
seemingly biased, inconsistent grading. 
J. 
 
The negotiation regarding “what counts” in the evaluation of student writing in 
this example is related to the others, in that emotion is playing an important role; but in 
this case there is the potential to see the political contention involved a bit more clearly. 
The teacher of the class had an anti-war sticker on his office door. The student was a 
first year recruit for the ROTC, according to the teaching assistant. Was the teacher 
correct in his assessment that the student had made hasty generalizations about the 
connections between large groups (the boomers) and their political affiliations (liberal) 
and later predilections (against the Iraq war)? Almost certainly. But the larger problem 
has to do with the forces of collective emotion at work in this moment as the two of 
them negotiate the evaluation of his writing. 
For example, one might look at the student’s “angry” reaction as potentially 
related to the collective emotions he has gathered in his affiliation and identity as a new 
member of the Reserve officer’s training Corp. One might also look through the lens of 
Ahmed, and her suggestion that collective emotion (in this case, anger) toward large 
groups, (in this case ‘the liberals’) is part of a larger economy of affect, one in which 
anger and hatred circulate based on previous experiences and the framing of ideas from 
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our past and expected futures. On the teacher’s side of the situation, even if he is able to 
see past his own feelings about the war, how does he reconcile this with the tangled 
question of what makes a convincing argument, and to whom, and his authority at that 
moment to evaluate this other person’s argument? 
Similar examples of collective emotion at work emerged in other grading 
situations, as well. In a formal monthly report, a member of the mentor team noted that 
a particular teaching assistant indicated he “struggled with the impulse to ‘make 
students see’ what he thinks they should see…. & this has led to some frustration and 
anger in students” And in the same report on this TA the mentor writes that “M. is 
willing to grade students rigorously. He’s currently experiencing push back from some 
disgruntled students over their analysis essay grades.”  But are the two things fully 
separate issues? How does a teacher navigate contentious political terrain in the 
classroom without making students “see what he want them to see?”  And in some 
variations of critical pedagogy, is this even the object? This TA, in particular, chose a 
difficult inquiry in terms of this problem. His class inquiry, “Re-imagining the Normal” 
takes as a central premise the idea that particular categories are developed and 
maintained (regarding race, sexuality, social class, gender and disability) in order to 
reproduce existing power structures. Core texts the TA chose to be included from the 
suggested menu in the reader included, Eli Clare’s “Freaks and Queers,” JoAnn 
Wypijewski’s “A Boy’s Life” and Jaspir Puar’s “In the Wake of It Gets Better.”  All three 
of these texts make arguments regarding the problems with normative categories of 
sexuality and also with the reproduction of masculinity more generally. The teaching 
assistant’s scholarly interests were in sexuality and gender studies. Even a seasoned 
teacher might have difficulty deciding where the edge of “seeing what you want them 
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to see” actually is in such a circumstance. For a teacher who has no classroom 
experience, this seems like a nearly impossible task. Notice also the phrasing of his 
circumstance from the mentor: “M. is willing to grade students rigorously.” As mentors, 
we encourage TAs to use a range of grades, and to think very carefully about grade 
inflation. What exactly is the push back from disgruntled students? We don’t ever get to 
hear about this. It appears to be about grades. Yet we know, from examining the 
contentious political argument among rhetorically skilled and thoughtful colleagues on 
the listserv thread, that political contention can open up waves of collective emotion. 
Perhaps the teaching assistant’s inability to hold back his views as if they were already 
decided arguments had nothing to do with the disgruntlement or “push-back” of his 
students. But it is well worth asking more questions about.  
Authority.  In many of the materials collected from the practicum work, there 
were references to what emerged as a category I labeled authority/power/identity. In 
many cases, the issues and talk in this category appeared mostly related to the fact that 
many of these teachers were so new to this work. For example, consider the following 
TA reflection produced at the end of the semester: 
I think one of the most important things I learned in teaching this semester was that, 
despite the fact that, on the first day, they all wondered who the teacher was, there is a 
bigger difference than I ever imagined between myself and the freshmen.   
The teaching assistant who composed this reflection had no teaching experience prior to 
this, and in her reflective analysis of the ways she found authority, at least in part, by 
differentiating herself from the students. She thought, for example, that they would 
have the same pop culture references, being close to the same age, but found this was 
not so. “At first I kind of resented it” she explains, discussing a lesson where she 
realized they had none of what she first assumed in common, “but then I realized it was 
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more important to learn about analysis, even if my examples weren’t working.” 
Learning to differentiate oneself as teacher is an important shift in identity, requiring a 
great deal of emotion work.  
As another TA put it, “I thought I'd be sort of a hardass. Instead, I've found that 
I'm really not a hardass at all. In some ways, this is good…” Other TA’s talked about 
this moment of finding oneself identified as the teacher in terms of fear: 
Never having taught before, I was worried about being in front of a college classroom. I 
worried about my brain freezing up, or them smelling fear. Over the course of the 
semester, I have gotten more and more comfortable in front of the room, and that has been 
a relief and has given me a sense of accomplishment. 
One is reminded in some ways of the description provide by Tompkins of the 
performance model of teaching, and her fears of giving up this sense of 
accomplishment, in order to use a version of critical pedagogy that puts students in 
charge of the class: “Each person comes into a professional situation dragging along 
behind her a long bag full of desires, fears, expectations, needs, resentments-the list 
goes on. But the main component is fear. Fear is the driving force behind the 
performance model. Fear of being shown up for what you are: a fraud, stupid, ignorant, 
a clod, a dolt, a sap, a weakling, someone who can't cut the mustard” (654). Setting 
aside the more “radical” model of critical pedagogy that takes the students to new 
political models, even a critical pedagogy like Tompkins’, which she describes as 
“getting out of students’ way,” may be outside of the reach of many new teaching 
assistants, emotionally speaking. How does one give back authority that she was never 
really granted?  
Some teaching assistants made direct note of the challenges of the curriculum, 
though without direct reference to the concerns of contentious politics. In this reflection, 
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in fact, the TA denies any relationship between the curriculum and questions about 
authority,  
This was a semester of anxiety for me, and I think a lot of that anxiety emerged from 
dealing with a new curriculum and a shared syllabus. The problem is not with the 
curriculum itself. Indeed, I think it’s a strong and appropriately challenging curriculum 
that really has helped my students improve their critical thinking and academic writing. 
The problem, for me, was in feeling like I couldn’t own the curriculum, that I hadn’t 
internalized it yet. 
The reflections are public documents posted to a wiki, and teaching assistants are 
aware of our particular interest in them as mentors. It’s not clear what part of the 
curriculum that this TA has not “internalized” yet, but like so many other examples 
from the data gathered here, the teacher subtly avoids any connection there might be 
between the issue being examined as producing emotion and the goal of engaging with 
issues of power and difference. Another TA described her challenge to “triangulate the 
program’s goals and expectations with my own teaching style and the particular needs 
of my students.” In each of these cases, we can see the hint of a connection between 
authority (“my own teaching style”) and critical pedagogy (“the program’s goals and 
expectations”), but it is not explicitly named.  
Not all TAs are equally successful with achieving authority through 
“triangulation” of these goals. In the notes from a class observation reprinted below, we 
see the kind of fear that Tompkins discusses brought to the light of day for one new TA: 
I arrived before S. did and several students were quick to say, “Are you the boss?? Help 
us!”  The class involved students’ questions not being answered, content that was 
unintelligible, and a classroom atmosphere that was uncomfortable.  The rudeness 
coming from students was difficult to watch; I saw virtually no ability to pull the 
troublesome students back into a productive mode.  The results of this observation turned 
into an intervention.  S. was/is really struggling with both classroom management and 
delivery of content.  
Like many of the other documents collected from this site, there is no overt indication 
that critical pedagogy or the study of power and difference is plays any part in the 
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authority questions evidenced in the above observation.  S., a smart and dedicated 
scholar in feminist postcolonial studies, chose a particularly politically angled inquiry in 
the first year composition class, Visual Rhetorical Analysis of Sexuality and Gender. The 
mentor names the problems she has observed as “classroom management” and 
“delivery of content,” but she also notes that the atmosphere was “uncomfortable” and 
that the “rudeness” of the students was “difficult to watch.”  
As in so many of the previous examples, questions about the relationship 
between the political nature of the course and other seemingly straightforward teaching 
matters as delivery, hover just far enough away from one another that it is impossible to 
derive any full conclusions. Bourdieu’s theories regarding symbolic violence and 
collective emotion might be at least a consideration in interpreting this particular 
classroom relationship, given a more thorough perspective. There is a kind of symbolic 
violence that appears to be swept onto this teacher by some members of her class. And 
though I do not wish to risk making her true identity visible for the reader of this 
dissertation by providing too many details, her cultural identity is embodied in the 
classroom through her speech and physical appearance, and it is possible that this 
impacted on the way she was bullied and harassed.  
Such moments are often identified as “contrapower harassment,” but this seems 
like a term that may stop analysis of the dynamics of emotion in the room nearly as 
quickly as naming it a problem with “delivery of instruction.” Creating a name for the 
behavior does nothing to create more nuanced understanding of the dynamics 
involved. Buchanan and Bruce, writing about their own experiences with contrapower 
harassment, describe those who impacted them as “ a small but significant group of 
students who found my presence offensive, my authority comical, and my capacity to 
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disperse knowledge non-existent. For this group of students, I will never be seen as 
knowledgeable or worthy of their respect because I do not embody the two factors they 
believe are key to being a professor: being white and being male” (AACU). My critique 
of this term is not to say that the phenomenon they describe does not happen, or that it 
does not matter. It happens and it matters. But I would argue that such as moment has 
more complexity than simply not believing anyone could be a professor except a white 
male. As Ahmed has theorized, the affective economy and the collective emotions in 
circulation within it are complex. A closer more analytic look at the circulation of 
emotion that results in these circumstances might yield more productive ways forward 
when encountering such behaviors and emotions. One can hear, in the description of 
the students imagining her authority as “comical” something of anger and resentment. 
Rightly so. But recall the power of collective emotion to create waves of power from the 
analysis of the listserv thread. In this case, Buchanan and Bruce suggest that this is the 
only reason for behaviors like those described, and also set the stage for collective 
aggression toward and student who seems to belong to the broad category of disruptive 
or disrespectful. 
 In my conversations with S. about her classroom, she reported how difficult it 
was some days to walk into the classroom. Her expectations regarding the behavior, 
interest and attitudes of her students were very different from what she actually 
encountered in this required class. She wanted to offer them freedom, but the students’ 
reaction to her made it necessary to reclaim this authority. She wanted to explore 
normative attitudes regarding gender, but the very thing she hoped to help students 
look more critically toward was being performed in the classroom, defying theorization 
and “rational” scholarly analysis. 
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There were many examples of the kind of “emotion work” that Bellas referenced 
in her study, as well—moments where the teachers are working hard to learn what 
Hochschild describes as the “feeling rules” of the profession—the appropriate public 
displays of emotion that represent the “moral stance” or script required of them (56). In 
some cases we also see individual moving from a “surface acting” to a “deep acting” of 
these rules. In surface acting, the teacher recognizes that there may be a gap between 
“what do I feel” and  “what should I feel.”  In deep acting, the distinction between these 
two things may blur, or may even be invisible to the person. Unlike the teacher in the 
opening example, who is learning to differentiate herself from students, the TA in the 
passage below is having a difficult time finding commonalities that allow for a 
sympathetic perspective: 
Education should not and cannot be viewed as merely an economic commodity. I should 
be teaching students because they want to learn, not simply because they’ve paid tuition. 
If a student refuses to participate or grow academically, this (to a certain degree) is not 
my responsibility. However, connecting with “below-average” students has been 
something I’ve worked on this semester. Not to sound egotistical, but I consider myself a 
relatively “good” student -- I always make an effort to participate, make thoughtful 
comments, and submit my work on time. So, at the risk of sounding naïve, being 
confronted with a student who never turns in homework, makes comments tangential to 
the topic at hand, or comes to class only to daydream is a whole new experience for me. 
I’ve had to place myself in the (relatively alien) position of a student who does not want 
to be an active part of the class and work to remedy that.  
In puzzling through his response to uninterested students, M. is looking for the 
appropriate reaction; searching for a way to come to terms with his own irritation and 
disappointment, and also to decide whether guilt is appropriate as a reaction. His 
description of the student who “never turns in homework, makes comments tangential 
to the topic at hand, or comes to class only to daydream” makes his irritation and 
disappointment clear, if only by noting the unqualified descriptors such as “never” 
turning in homework or coming to class “only” to daydream. But at some point the 
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teacher has come across evidence in his experiences that the emotion of anger or 
irritation will not suffice in his role as teacher, and thus has tried to imagine himself in 
the “alien” position of the student who is causing this reaction, and find ways to try to 
“remedy” their behavior. This is not yet what Hochschild would call “deep acting;” the 
teaching assistant is trying on a way to identify with and empathize with the student, 
but this is not (yet) a part of his own sense of identity and beliefs. Rather this is the kind 
of “what-if” imagining that Hochschild explains can potentially lead to deep acting. For 
the veteran teacher, encountering such behaviors, is deep-acting already in place? Or 
perhaps the sense of collective authority based on years of experience makes this level 
of emotion work no longer necessary, as authority can be situated in another way? 
The reflection can also be interpreted through the lens of collective emotion. The 
moral stance this teacher has taken on the issue of motivation still dominates, as the 
teacher struggles with whether it is part of her job to have “the burden of instruction” 
(motivation) on her shoulders alone, and the shadow of a collective sense of resentment 
toward the student, who the teacher reads as belonging to a group that sees education 
as purely an “economic commodity” becomes faintly visible.  This collective sense of 
resentment, then, belongs to those who feel education is and should be separate from 
the marketplace. The negotiation of purpose for the composition classroom is examined 
in the next section. 
 
Purposes.  While there were few materials collected from the practicum which 
spoke to direct clashes between teachers and students regarding the purpose of their 
education in classrooms that focused on political inquiry, Russell Durst’s account of 
first year writing classes at University of Cincinnati provides a perspective on the much 
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deeper complications of understanding “motivation” in a classroom that centers on 
questions of power and difference. As Director of the Composition Program, Durst 
wanted to learn more about what he described as a general “resistance to writing 
instruction” (27).  Durst was especially interested in the ways that the “cultural literacy” 
approach to the classroom (an approach with many of the same characteristics others 
would categorize as critical pedagogy) was negotiated between students and teachers.  
Through a two year analysis, he found that the goals students have in mind upon 
entering the writing classes at UC “differ substantially from those that will soon 
confront them” in the classes. “Students report little interest in engaging in critical 
analysis, in extending their writing processes, or in entering the sort of intellectual 
community the writing class entails” (60).  In the end, Durst’s claims are not that we 
should forsake the goals of creating more critical and questioning students through a 
curriculum, but that while we are putting these ideas into practice in the classroom, we 
should also be honoring “the fundamental reasonableness of students’ desire to gain 
practical expertise in their college coursework” (180).  The teacher’s goals are 
fundamentally different from the students, because the students, in this case, 
collectively saw their education as a means to other economic and employment goals. 
The democratic ideals built into the curriculum were viewed as an outsider group’s 
perspective on education. The lack of motivation was actually a mismatch in collective 
identity.   
This is exactly the type of pragmatic concern that Gwen Gorzelsky attempts to 
address in “Ghosts: Negotiated Authority and Liberal Education.”  Gorzelsky opens her 
essay with a “composite” incident set at her family Thanksgiving dinner table.  The 
question of why a nephew was required to take liberal arts courses for his degree 
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program is brought up, and she fumbles for a response that makes sense to this group 
from outside academia.  She uses this composite conversation to begin a theorization of 
the ways that she worked to negotiate authority with her own students, as well as to 
begin a critique of the current professionalization of composition studies. In fact, 
Gorzelsky sees a connection between the two, and is troubled by the disconnect 
between what she describes as “working class” attitudes, that is, utilitarian values 
regarding education, and democratic ideals fostered through liberal education.   
The problem is quite complex, and is one I have encountered in my own 
teaching. While understanding the larger institutionalized structures that are 
“managing” our beliefs, choices, attitudes, motives and language is perhaps essential to 
the project of opening larger understanding about potential factors at work in such 
things as the reproduction of poverty, how much does one take into consideration the 
agency of the student herself in her own goals for education.  Near the beginning of my 
work at the university, I was learning about theories of critical literacy in graduate 
classes, and I was still teaching at a rural high school during the day.  Encouraged by 
ideas about critical pedagogy from some of my fellow graduate students and my 
reading, I tried to integrate some of the ideas into my work at the high school. A high 
school junior whose family owned a local farm politely told me that while the stuff I 
was telling him about why his way of talking was not any worse than anyone else’s was 
interesting, it wouldn’t get him the good score on the SAT he needed to get into the Ag 
School at Cornell so that he could keep his parents’ farm going. “Can you just show me 
how to do it right?” he asked me. It’s not difficult to see the dilemma. 
Part of what Gorzelsky argues, (as Langstraat, Lindquist and Bean have), is that 
there has been too little examination of emotion in the matter of critical pedagogy, 
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especially with regard to class: “Addressing affect's role is crucial in any effort to foster 
democratic practices and, more specifically, in any effort to foster more democratic 
negotiations of professional authority” (309). Gorzelsky’s analysis suggests that 
collective emotion may play a large part in the struggle between teachers who offer 
critical pedagogical approaches in a liberal arts tradition and students who see this as a 
waste of their important time and money, which they understood as being spent to 
create better possibilities for them economically and socially. Gorzelsky’s analysis 
suggests that the project of critical pedagogy might be more generously and 
productively negotiated between composition teachers and the students in those 
classes, or perhaps even the lay-public outside the classroom, as represented by her 
“working class” family at the Thanksgiving table. While Gorzelsky says she cannot 
defend liberal arts practices as they exist now to this public, she is seeking some way to 
put the various collective emotions of the groups together in some harmonious relation. 
But in the day-to-day reality of classrooms set up to focus on power and 
difference, this is more easily said than done. And, as we have seen from the teaching 
assistant who remarked: “Education should not and cannot be viewed as merely an 
economic commodity,” many teachers have a deeply felt sense that education can and 
should be more than a system that provides training and credentials for various jobs. 
Simultaneously, we see teachers’ tendency to imagine their students as a “them” who 
needs to be converted to this other point of view about the uses of education, and as we 
have seen, this welcomes collective emotions toward large groups of students, blocking 
what might otherwise be a more respectful, harmonious negotiation regarding the 
purposes of education.  
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In all of these moments that appear at first glance to be about practical classroom 
practices, we can see hints that there are actually strong connections between teaching 
concerns like grading, authority, relationship and purpose, and the larger looming 
element of collective political identities and the emotions circulating around them. In 
the last section of this chapter, I’d like to offer a few ideas for the implications of 
collective emotion in circulation around issues of political contention, and to offer at 
least a few small steps in the direction that might be productive. 
Some implications… and a cautious way forward 
In the introduction to the dissertation, I offered a series of emails from a teaching 
assistant who seemed to be navigating a student’s disruptive texting in class, but was 
actually navigating his, and his fellow student’s collective emotions regarding homeless 
activist Matthew Works and the political views he offered. I noted that one of the things 
that this teacher has done that allowed for the student to tell her the truth about his 
reaction to the guest was to establish, somehow, a collective sense of belonging within 
the class itself, with her included, so that the student was trying to push back against 
the forces such as collective resentment for the ideological views represented in 
Matthew Works. His ability to come clean about his political feelings with the teacher, 
and to push against whatever shame felt in light of the embodied experience of being a 
privileged college student in the same room with someone who had no home, was 
overcome by his respect for the teacher and her class.  
Not every ending is a happy ending, but I’d like to leave the reader with one in 
this case. In my response to J.’s request, I sent a link to Corder’s essay, “Argument as 
Emergence, Rhetoric as Love” because I think that it opens up a new way for many 
teachers to see the complicated painful work in political contention. I told her to try to 
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learn a little more about who her students were as people, to think about where they 
come from, and what might be informing their world-views. Not from a dismissive 
point of view, with the collective resentment toward the “they” we see in Giroux’s 
indictment of American youth, not in a patronizing or an “okay I see why you are 
limited as a thinker” kind of approach, but to understand why her vantage points and 
his might be so radically different. Here’s her email to me about how things worked 
out: 
It's been a really interesting process, and you know... I THINK I KNOW 
EVERYTHING, in much the same way that kid thought he knew everything. And we 
were both completely wrong. ;)  So it was mutually humbling, I think, the whole 
experience.  
And... psychologically... it was really difficult for me to have this kid in class, thinking he 
hates me, etc. And then he comes and talks to me, and we don't address Matthew Work 
specifically, but we sort of address the notion of having one's ideas and ideologies 
confronted... and it was so great, just chatting with him and getting to know more about 
him and about his experience in his first month of college (college has, in his words, 
"really kicked [his] ass."). I really LIKE the kid. And some would say it's not important 
to like your students... but I actually think it is. In fact, I think it's essential. And I think 
a good teacher can find SOMETHING to like about every student. (I know it must be 
impossible in some situations... but still...) 
In the rush to make sure that the writing classrooms featuring critical pedagogy 
were not the “nurturing, nonconflictual” spaces Jarratt and others worried were 
overtaking the landscape of teaching, and the concerns that we were abiding by middle 
class values that eschew anger, perhaps we have skipped over some important elements 
of the puzzle.   
And while I am all for the propositions of less emotion work in the writing 
classroom, I don’t really see a way out of it. Teaching, and in particular politically based 
teaching, requires emotion work. The real question is which emotion work do we want 
to be doing? Which emotion work is most productive to the cause of social justice?  And 
that should be a question every teacher takes seriously. If we imagine ourselves as “sad 
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ladies in the basement,” how do we find the strength and authority to imagine that it is 
not a feminized version of the profession to imagine that thinking “a good teacher can 
find SOMETHING to like about every student,” as J. does. It’s not an argument if no 
one is listening, as the saying goes. In an age of cynicism, where, as anthropologist 
Michael Wesch has noted, many young people take the “world is on fire” metaphor into 
account as a given in their daily lives, are agonistic classroom practices really the 
answer? What we see happening, for example, between this new teaching assistant and 
her student is not a glossing over of the important arguments around questions of 
homelessness, it’s a way into them. 
My cautious way forward, then, is to begin by admitting to ourselves that there 
is no way to teach writing, and especially writing that involves political inquiry, 
without emotion labor, for both ourselves and our students. So we might as well begin 
with hopeful views, not just about the world, but about our students as people—
starting with the premise that there is something to like about each of them, and that 
they might have things to teach us, and shake off the worries that it somehow feminizes 
our work to “nurture.” There are lots of ways to build positive collective emotion in a 
classroom, but it usually starts with some respect for people as individuals. 
Second, I argue that we should be examining our own collective emotions toward 
others with the same verve we examine collective emotions of others. If we see 
ourselves as constantly the “working class academic,” how do we avoid the collective 
emotions attached to social class that foster resentments toward those we perceive as 
above our social standing, sometimes including our own students and colleagues? Our 
own social-political awareness must be more carefully interrogated.  
 
 149 
Third, (and specific to those who inhabit more liminal spaces of the “social 
world” of teachers of writing) we need to be explicit about why and how critical 
pedagogy has become important to writing instruction and what their expected part in 
it is. We need to help them see that there may be a connection between something that 
at first may seem unconnected—silence in a discussion of a particular text, authority 
questions in a class where collective emotions of fear or anger have gained momentum 
among students, and teach with this as a basic understanding about what it means to 
work with political topics.  
Fourth, and finally, we need to pay closer attention what might inform and 
expand the collective emotion in activists who see themselves as fighting against 
foundational elements of critical pedagogy, to assure that we aren’t helping to further 
feed this collective emotion so unproductive to the cause we have taken up.  
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